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In this dissertation I offer an explanation for why Indian states are undertaking 
economic liberalization at different rates, focusing on reforms to the electricity sector.  In 
the period between 1991 and 2003, India’s states restructured their electricity systems to 
vastly different degrees.  The dissertation evaluates three variables that feature 
prominently in the literature on economic policy change:  ideological predilections of 
governing elites, external pressures like those coming from international financial 
institutions, and state-society interactions.  I argue that it is the last explanation, focusing 
on the degree to which the potential “losers” from reform dominate state politics—that 
most compellingly accounts for the unevenness in state-level reforms.  In my work, I lay 
greater analytic weight on the role of rural actors than much of the existing literature on 
the political economy of market reforms. 
The primary independent variable that explains this variation in reform outcomes 
is the organization and political strength of societal actors in each state, particularly rural 
and industrial constituencies, and middle class interests.  In some parts of India, the 
advent of Green Revolution technologies in the late 1960s meant that farmers—chiefly 
larger landowners—became the primary beneficiaries of extensive development 
 vi
subsidies, including those for electricity.  During India’s period of economic 
liberalization in the 1990s, these beneficiaries constituted the main opponents of 
privatization, which today threatens to change the rules of the game by allocating 
resources according to market logics.  Given these dynamics, where farm sectors are 
large or well-organized, reform has not proceeded.  In the absence of rural political clout, 
state elites elected to privatize in order to satisfy industrial and urban constituents and 
signal the state’s openness to private capital inflows.  
By comparing outcomes across states within the single country of India, the 
research design can control for some variables that are proposed as determinative of 
government policy, like electoral institutions and macroeconomic shock.  I have selected 
cases to both capture variation of the dependent variable and control for other plausible 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
In India, demand for electricity habitually exceeds supply.  This scarcity forces 
the state as the largest owner of utilities to make allocative decisions that have profound 
implications for nearly everyone:  industrialists for whom energy is arguably the most 
critical input; farmers who rely on electric-powered tubewells to pump water from 
subterranean reservoirs; India’s famed high-tech ventures and call centers; and also 
ordinary citizens, many of whom now live an energy-dependent modern life replete with 
computers, televisions, washing machines, and air-conditioners.  The outcomes of these 
allocative decisions also have implications for the direction of economic development in 
India.  A recent example of how government decisions about energy allocation produce 
winners and losers, and shape economic outcomes, comes from the affluent northern state 
of Punjab, where in the summer of 2006 the state government declared an indefinite 
power cut on factories that run induction furnaces.1  These produce steel, a key ingredient 
for most light and heavy industrial production in the state, and thus industrialists were 
furious.  Yet the same government has been giving farmers free electricity for much of 
the last decade.   
If power is essential for new economy ventures, not to mention rural irrigation 
and industrial production, who decides which groups will get the benefit of this limited 
resource and which will be deprived, and who will pay the cost of expanding supply?  
                                                 
1 Shveta Pathak, “Power Crisis Hits Industry Hard,” The Tribune, Ludhiana edition, July 7, 2006; “Units 
flay PSEB move to shut down furnaces,” The Tribune, Ludhiana edition, September 5, 2006.  These and 
other articles report that at least 10,000 small, medium, and large manufacturers in Punjab that rely on steel 
produced by induction furnaces would be impaired, impacting over 25% of the industrial workforce in the 
state. 
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What are India’s development prospects without cheap and reliable power?  And what is 
the political economic milieu in which reform of the power sector is undertaken?  In this 
dissertation I look at how fundamental tensions between sectors and classes in the 
allocation of finite resources are being resolved in the Indian context, focusing on the 
period of economic liberalization and market reforms in India, and on the electricity 
sector specifically.2  In this project, the critical reform is utility privatization.  Because 
market reforms introduce new political and economic actors and change the rules of the 
game, they threaten to alter the logic that has guided allocative decisions in the past.  Not 
surprisingly, then, these policy choices have become politically contentious.  
Although this study focuses on India, questions about how distributive conflicts 
affect and are in turn affected by plans for neoliberal economic reforms are not particular 
to India.  After several decades of conforming to policies prescribed by the Washington 
consensus, countries around the world are now grappling with the political and economic 
consequences.  The rise of leftist governments in Latin America—many of which were 
brought to power by electorates dissatisfied with the outcomes of economic liberalization 
over the last few years—provides an example of this.  In Bolivia, for example, 
privatization of utilities was a lightening rod for public protest during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and was among the factors helping to propel the movement that brought Evo 
Morales to power in 2005.   
                                                 
2 Energy resources can effectively be called finite in the short-term for two reasons.  Current energy supply 
is restricted by the long gestation of new generating plants and the inefficiencies of importing energy over 
long distances. 
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In India’s federal structure, decisions about the electricity sector are made by state 
governments; this makes it an ideal comparative context in which to examine how and 
why the nature and policy outcomes of distributive battles differ from region to region.  
Why, as in the earlier example from Punjab, are some state governments guided by the 
political imperatives of keeping production costs low for farmers even at the risk of 
stalling or eliminating industrial production?  Why are other state elites guided by the 
desire to court private industrial capital, even at the cost of failing to meet basic welfare 
needs for the majority of the state’s population?  
Economic liberalization—understood here as the deregulation and opening up of 
markets to private capital—is a process unfolding in most sectors of the Indian economy, 
although it has been temporally and spatially uneven.  Of all the many varieties of 
liberalization, we can expect privatization of network utilities—electricity, water, 
telecommunications, railways, and gas—to have broad distributional implications 
because all sectors and classes avail of these goods.  We can therefore expect reforms to 
these sectors to be among the most politically difficult to implement in the context of 
democratic institutions, and especially so in the context of supply scarcity.3  In short, 
nearly everyone has a stake in the fight.  
The empirical question that lies at the heart of this dissertation, then, is:  what 
explains unevenness in utility privatization across states in India?  I examine the 
privatization of electric supply, or distribution, companies from the early 1990s up until 
                                                 
3 Again we can look to Latin America for a compelling illustration, where privatization has only become 
less popular over time, and public protests have hindered privatization in these sectors across the continent:  
Mary M. Shirley, “Why is Sector Reform so Unpopular in Latin America?” The Independent Review, Vol. 
10, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 195-207. 
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the passage of the Electricity Act 2003 (EA03) by the Indian parliament.  The 2003 
legislation mandated certain policies of restructuring, in essence restricting the 
discretionary powers of elected leaders at the state level.  During the decade between the 
start of reforms in 1991 and the passage of the EA03, some state governments moved 
fairly quickly to vertically separate publicly-owned electric utilities and privatize 
constituent units, including the distribution functions.  Other states retained the publicly-
owned model that had dominated the Indian sector—and indeed most electricity 
industries around the world—since the mid-twentieth century.  This thesis uncovers the 
conditions that compelled some states to privatize while binding others to the older, 
statist model.   
Through a comparative analysis of politics in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Orissa, and Delhi (see Map 1 on the following page), I show that where rural elites have 
been able to protect their rights to subsidized electricity, privatization has been stalled.  
Electricity subsidies have played a critical role in building and maintaining rural political 
coalitions in certain states.  In the absence of rural power, however, states pursued 
privatization as a means of satisfying industrial consumers and signaling an openness to 
private capital.  The individual case studies then go further to ask why rural elites have 
been much more powerful in some states than in others, and suggest that political 
geography and historical trajectories of development help to explain this variation.  
Specifically, rural elites have ascended to power in areas where caste institutions, historic 
land tenure relations, and modern rural cooperatives have enabled rural groups to 
organize politically.  
    5
 
Map 1:  Map of India showing in bold the locations of the four case studies:  Delhi, Maharashtra, 
Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh. 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, in the collection of the Perry-Castañeda Library at the University 
of Texas, Austin. 
Copyright: Public domain.  
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To substantiate my claims, I weave together information from public sector 
archives, especially utility reports, but also other government ministries and state-owned 
enterprises; data from interviews with relevant policy-makers, politicians, rural leaders, 
and union activists; media reports; legislative debates from the Indian Parliament and 
Constituent Assembly; and secondary scholarship.  I conducted this research over a 
thirteen month period, from September 2002 to October 2003, based primarily in Delhi, 
Mumbai, and Pune, but with field visits to other research sites around the country.  A 
three-month follow-up visit in the summer of 2005 in Mumbai and Pune allowed me to 
accumulate additional archival material.    
My work draws from and speaks to several of the literatures in comparative 
politics and political economy, most directly to the vast body of work examining the 
political economy of economic reform.  Research design and case selection allow me to 
test rival hypotheses in the literature, specifically, the role of economic crisis, ideology, 
and external pressures arising from either donor conditionality or policy diffusion.  My 
research extends our understanding of the politics of neoliberal reform by focusing on an 
understudied actor—rural elites.  With respect to a second literature—on urban bias in 
late developing countries—I argue that the rural-urban dyad underpinning most of this 
literature is underspecified.  Intra-rural inequalities, both within a single region and 
across the countryside, are equally significant in explaining development and policy 
outcomes, as analyses of the rural beneficiaries of electricity subsidies show.   
The cases were chosen to capture sufficient variation of the dependent variable—
privatization attempts and outcomes.  The institutional structures of the electricity sectors 
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across the states in India are similar enough that comparison is a sensible project.  
Furthermore, paired comparisons within the four cases also allows me to assess rival 
theories of economic reform empirically, which a subsequent section that situates my 
argument within the broader field of literature on the politics of economic reform will 
flesh out.  
For a number of reasons I employ a sub-national comparative design, and a 
sectoral focus on the electricity industry, rather than a single case study, a study of 
electricity reform at an all-India level, or a cross-national study of economic 
liberalization.  An authoritative body of research asks important questions about political 
economy, taking India as a case study.  Among the questions addressed by this literature 
are what explains dirigisme, what accounts for failures of development, and more 
recently, what explains India’s brand of neoliberalism.4  In much of this work the analysis 
takes place at a national register.  A few other studies compare state-level policy 
variation, but mainly these studies focus on the period prior to neoliberal reforms.5  This 
latter body of work does show, however, that analyzing differences among states in a 
federal structure yields novel answers to established research questions.   
                                                 
4 Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-1977: the Gradual Revolution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978); Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984); Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: the Political Economy of 
the Indian State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, 
Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural struggles in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and 
Popular Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000).  
5 Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty Reduction in India: the Politics of Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); Robert Jenkins ed., Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India’s 
States (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004); Aseema Sinha, The Regional Roots of Developmental 
Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2005).   
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To understand variation in secondary neoliberal reforms—many of which are the 
constitutional domains of state governments—one must adopt a subnational perspective.  
Studies of economic reform at an aggregate, country-wide level are of limited use in 
understanding federal or otherwise decentralized political systems.   
Furthermore, many studies of market reform and privatization do not differentiate 
between the many types of reform.6  In most countries that pursued statist policies in the 
post-war period, however, the state was a multi-faceted actor and an owner of a wide 
array of firms.  Just as opening capital markets has very different distributional 
implications from removing trade barriers, privatizing a steel plant has very different 
implications from privatizing a water or electric utility.  There is a need for a more fine-
grained examination of the politics of economic liberalization, and studies that look at 
individual sectors rather than liberalization in the aggregate might begin to account for 
the varied paths and patterns of neoliberalism over the last thirty years.7   
The next section of this chapter briefly describes the electricity industry to 
provide a global context in which to understand the Indian story.  The subsequent section 
examines the broader literature on the determinants of the pace and direction of economic 
reform, situating my argument in this larger field of alternative theories.  Following that, 
I flesh out the central assumptions, arguments, and actors that comprise my explanation 
of cross-state variation in energy sector reform in India.  The final section briefly 
describes the chapters that follow.  
                                                 
6 Luigi Manzetti, “The Political Economy of Privatization through Divestiture in Lesser Developed 
Countries,” Comparative Politics 25 (1993): 429-454.  
7 Raul Madrid, Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 2.  A similar logic drives Madrid’s decision to compare 
pension reform across countries in Latin America. 
    9
The Electricity Industry 
 
For most of the twentieth century, a near global consensus held that because 
electricity was a natural monopoly that required massive capital investments and had 
considerable implications for social and economic development, the sector would be best 
owned and managed by the state.  This consensus began to unravel in the 1980s in the 
face of capital scarcity, the ascendancy of a broad critique of state involvement in 
economic activities, and technological innovation that made smaller generating plants 
economically feasible.  Over the last two and half decades, countries around the world 
have revolutionized their electric power sectors, transforming the sector from one 
dominated by publicly-owned vertically integrated monopoly utilities to one in which 
public and private, integrated and independent companies share the field.   
While some countries, like Chile and the UK, implemented market-reforms early 
and quickly, others, like Egypt and Mexico, have not yet begun the process.  The leaders 
in the reform movement were the usual ones—within the industrialized cohort, the UK 
under Thatcher, and among developing nations, Chile under Pinochet.  Chile’s 
restructuring and privatization programs began in 1978.  Over the course of a decade in 
Chile, the different parts of the electricity business were separated from each other, and 
all transmission functions and most of distribution and generation firms were privatized.  
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Restructuring and privatization in the UK followed in 1990, largely along the patterns 
established in Chile.8  
In the literature on economic reform, the term “privatization” refers to a collection 
of diverse policies.  These include the outright sale of public assets, the partial sale of 
assets (or government disinvestment), and the liberalization of a sector in which there had 
previously been a public sector monopoly.  In the electricity sector, for example, the 
entry of private players in the generation side of the business through the construction of 
greenfield projects (new power plants), also gets described as privatization.  The politics 
surrounding each of these very different kinds of activities, however, likewise can be 
very different.  Another layer of distinctions can be made between the sales of different 
kinds of assets.  Privatization of a power generating plant has very different implications 
for various stakeholders than sale of a distribution system, for example.  To narrow the 
empirical focus, this thesis focuses on privatization of the distribution infrastructure, 
which occurred during the second phase of India’s electricity sector reform program. 
During the initial period of electricity reform in India, in the early to mid-1990s, 
the central government’s emphasis was on inviting private companies to build new 
generating plants, called independent power producers (IPPs).  Many Indian states 
successfully attracted such investment, augmenting the generating capacity available in 
their region in this way.  During the second period of electricity reform, only two states in 
India took what some consider the most crucial step in electricity sector reform, that of 
privatizing distribution.  Orissa privatized its electricity distribution system first, in 1999, 
                                                 
8 R. W. Bacon, “Privatization and Reform in the Global Electricity Supply Industry,” Annual Review of 
Energy and the Environment 20 (1995): 119-143. 
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and was followed by Delhi in 2002.  No other states privatized distribution prior to the 
passage of the EA2003.  Given the great deal of pressures on states in India to undertake 
electricity sector reform—and the ubiquity of utility privatization in other parts of the 
world including almost all of Latin America and much of Eastern Europe and Africa—
this resistance on the part of state governments is puzzling.  On the flipside, given that 
most states in India resisted these global trends, why did two follow the model of 
privatization? 
 
Crisis, Ideology, and External Pressure as Alternative Explanations  
 
The research design of comparing outcomes across states within a single country 
can examine or control for some variables that are prominent in the literature on the 
determinants of government policy, in particular electoral institutions and 
macroeconomic shock.  Strategic case selection allows me to consider other plausible 
variables, such as economic crisis, ideology, and external pressures.   
 One body of research evaluating economic reform looks to the presence or 
absence, and degree of severity of the economic crisis that often initiates the movement 
towards neoliberal reform.  Several well-known explanations of the Indian government’s 
decision to undertake market reforms in 1991 hinge on the occurrence of a severe balance 
of payments crisis in early 1991.9  As a response to this crisis, the Indian government 
                                                 
9 Jagdish Bhagwati, India in Transition: Freeing the Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Bimal 
Jalan, India’s Economic Crisis (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bimal Jalan, “Balance of 
Payments.” In The Indian Economy: Problems and Prospects, Ed. Bimal Jalan (New Delhi: Viking, 1992). 
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signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for a loan package, in 
exchange for which the government agreed to undertake certain structural reforms.  There 
are two types of causal explanations that identify economic crisis as a crucial variable.  
The first leaves political calculations aside and assumes instead that leaders act based on 
economic rationality.  This type of explanation for variation in reform—one that tends to 
ignore politics—can be found among international financial institutions’ analyses of 
reform, for example in this World Bank document that assesses India’s electricity 
reforms: 
Not surprisingly, states that have the weakest SEBs [State Electricity Boards] are 
the most willing to consider the radical reform of their power sectors. They can be 
logically expected to be among the first to conclude that an incremental approach 
of attempting to revitalize their SEBs is unlikely to bring about sustainable 
improvement, brought about by the realization of the magnitude of the power 
challenge and the inability of the public sector-SEB monolith structure to raise 
financing and deliver in the long term. States with better-performing SEBs feel 
less immnediate [sic] need to reform while several others are simply unable to 
take action.10  
 
The second type of crisis-explanations does take politics into consideration.  
Among these, some scholars contend that political leaders are able to muster sufficient 
popular support for economic reform only in the wake of economic crises.11  It is possible 
to construct a hypothesis about crisis and reform tailored to individual facets of the Indian 
economy.  By examining a single sector within the Indian economy—the electricity 
                                                 
10 World Bank, Energy and Infrastructure Operations Division. April 19, 1996. Report No. 14298-IN, Staff 
Appraisal Report, India: Orissa Power Restructuring Project. Washington D.C.: World Bank, (April) 
1996), p. 8. 
11 John Waterbury, “The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process.” In The 
Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State, ed. 
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Kurt Weyland, “The 
Political Fate of Market Reform in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe” International Studies 
Quarterly 42 (1998): 645-674; John Williamson and Stephen Haggard, “The Political Conditions for 
Economic Reform.” In The Political Economy of Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson (Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1994). 
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sector—we can examine whether financial or functional crises that are specific to this 
industry might account for policy variation among states.  The data on utility 
performance indicates that such an explanation, at least as the primary cause of reform 
variation, is insufficient.  
Table 1:  SEB rates of return (%)   
Source:  Tabulated using data from Planning Commission, Annual Report on the Working of the State 
Electricity Boards & Electricity Departments, Government of India, June 2001. 
 
Table 1 provides information about each state utility’s rate of return on net fixed assets in 
service, after providing for depreciation and interest charges, from the time the central 
government announced the need to reform in 1991 through the end of the decade.12  The 
figures represent the rates of return without taking into account the subsidies that most 
state electricity boards receive from the state governments.  Two sets of average returns 
                                                 
12 Hereafter, the state utilities will be referred to by their Indian acronym, SEB, which stands for State 
Electricity Board. 
 Average rate of return from 
1992-1993 to 1994-1995 
Average rate of return from 
1992-1993 to 2000-2001 
Andhra Pradesh -7.7 -51.5 
Assam -38.8 -34.5 
Bihar -17.2 -26.6 
Delhi -26.2 -36.0 
Gujarat -15.1 -35.3 
Haryana -28.4 -43.1 
Himachal Pradesh -5.6 -8.1 
Jammu & Kashmir -46.9 -55.4 
Karnataka -4.5 -26.5 
Kerala -13.6 -22.1 
Madhya Pradesh -12.6 -34.2 
Maharashtra 3.4 -1.0 
Meghalaya -6.3 -13.2 
Orissa -10.8 -16.7 
Punjab -20.1 -29.6 
Rajasthan -16.1 -23.9 
Tamil Nadu -6.2 -9.3 
Uttar Pradesh -15.6 -20.8 
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are given in the table:  the first encompasses data from 1992 to 1995 and the second gives 
the average for all years in the series.  The first break represents the time that the first 
state, Orissa, enacted its reform legislation and began the process of restructuring, 
although privatization of distribution did not take place until 1999.  We can consider this 
to be the beginning of distribution privatization, although it was initially laid out as a 
policy alternative even earlier, during a conference jointly sponsored by the World Bank 
and the Ministry of Power in 1993.   
Orissa represents an unlikely first state to have enacted a reform law, if financial 
compunction is taken to be the guiding logic of liberalization.  As the column giving 
average figures from 1992 to 1995 suggests, several SEBs had far greater financial 
difficulties than Orissa’s utility.  Other than the SEBs of Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, 
two provinces that have been beset by violence for much of this period, the SEB of West 
Bengal exhibits the worst financial performance for these years, and indeed for all the 
years from the 1992-93 period until the 1998-99 period, when Andhra Pradesh’s utility 
took this distinction.  Orissa has a higher rate of return than either West Bengal or Delhi 
in the first years of the decade, and by 1994-95, also performs better than Andhra 
Pradesh.  If economic crisis were a helpful predictor of the tendency to reform, we should 
expect West Bengal, and not Orissa, to lead this group of states in reform.  In fact, we 
observe that Orissa has been the leader in power sector reforms, anticipating by several 
years the central government’s injunction to create an electricity regularity commission, 
and unbundling its state electricity board in 1996, also before any other state.  Lending 
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some support to this hypothesis, however, the state of Maharashtra, which has done the 
least in terms of restructuring, has the most profitable utility. 
 The performance of the SEBs can be evaluated along a number of dimensions.  In 
addition to financial indicators, one could rate the electricity sectors of states according to 
their functioning.  If a public utility’s ability or lack of ability to provide services drives 
decisions to restructure or privatize it, then one would expect the worst performers to be 
privatized and dismantled most quickly.  A number of variables can be used to evaluate 
the performance of electricity sectors.  Among those that directly impact consumers are 
energy shortages resulting in number and duration of black- and brown-outs, and 
percentage of household electrification.  Until recently, the central government used 
village electrification as a benchmark for penetration of electricity throughout the 
country.  State governments therefore reported statistics about the number of villages 
electrified.  By this accounting, a village could be considered electrified as long as at 
least one electricity point existed in the village, irrespective of how many inhabitants of 
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Table 2: Village Electrification as of 1996 (% of total inhabited villages at time of 1991 Census) 
State  





Himachal Pradesh 98.61 
Jammu & Kashmir 96.53 
Karnataka 97.85 
Kerala 88.08 





Tamil Nadu 100.0 
Uttar Pradesh 76.81 
West Bengal 77.04 
Source: Calculated using data from 1991 Census and Annual Report on the Working of State Electricity 
Boards and Electricity Departments, 1998-1999 (New Delhi: Planning Commission, April 1999).  
 
Like the set of data on financial performance, these data on physical performance given 
in Table 2 are also inconclusive.  Although the electricity utility in Orissa, which is the 
most aggressive reformer, has the lowest level of rural electrification, other states that 
initiated restructuring are Andhra Pradesh and Haryana, both of which electrified 
virtually all of the villages in their territories.   
There is also a reason to believe that more extensive rural electrification would be 
a predictor of early privatization, particularly privatization of the distribution system.  As 
the next chapter will discuss, one of the principle rationales for the creation of public 
utilities was to increase the pace of rural electrification, which was negligible at the time 
of independence.  We might therefore expect that a state that has not electrified its rural 
areas to hold off on privatization, for the state still had much work to do.  This was not 
the case, however, as Orissa was the first to privatize.  Furthermore, the experience of 
post-privatization Orissa, where rural electrification efforts stalled, suggests that private 
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utilities are no more likely in the current period to undertake rural electrification than 
they were in the 1930s and 1940s.   
Another set of explanations for economic reform builds on those described above 
to propose that successful liberalization following a crisis hinges on the presence of a 
team of reformers with the necessary political clout and ideological proclivity to devise 
and implement economic plans.13  In the Indian context, while economic crisis is the most 
common explanation for the timing of reform in 1991, the pace and resilience of reform 
are often attributed to the ascendance in New Delhi of a technocratic elite with a 
neoliberal disposition.  A previous economic crisis in 1966 had also resulted in tentative 
steps toward market reform.  In that instance, however, once fiscal and monetary stability 
was re-established, the political and policy-making elite quickly retreated to traditional 
Indian state capitalism.  The reforms of the 1990s stand in contrast to this earlier episode.  
Some scholars suggest that the critical difference between the 60s and 90s is that 
although both were periods of economic crisis, by 1991 a group of economists and 
policy-makers, many of them western-trained, had come to play an influential role in the 
prime minister’s office.14  The now near-consensus explanation for the thrust towards 
market reforms in 1991 identifies both economic crisis and the prominence of liberal 
technocratic elite as critical factors.15  
                                                 
13 John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, 
Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
14 Rahul Mukherji, “A Path to Trade and Investment Liberalization.” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 
1999. 
15 Ronald Herring and N. Chandra Mohan. “Economic Crisis, Momentary Autonomy and Policy Reform: 
Liberalisation in India 1991-1995,” in The Post-Colonial States of South Asia, ed. Amita Shashtri and A. 
Jeyaratnam Wilson (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Devesh Kapur, “Ideas and Economic Reforms in India: 
The Role of International Migration and the Indian Diaspora.” India Review 3 (2004): 364-384. 
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One could infer from this literature an ideational account of reform as an 
explanation for inter-state variation in liberalization as well.  By this logic, we would 
expect state governments whose leaders present themselves as the most ideologically 
market-oriented, to reform their power sectors most quickly, and most closely along 
neoliberal prescriptions.  We might evaluate the ideological position of state governments 
with respect to economic liberalization along a number of axes.  One possibility is to 
examine the flows of foreign direct investment to the states.  While these are in part 
determined by factors such as existing levels of development, infrastructure provision, 
and the presence of suitably skilled labor forces, the literature on India during the period 
of reforms suggests that state executives, in particular chief ministers have been proactive 
in courting investment and creating hospitable investment climates in their states.  What 
might be more solidly in the hands of state executives is disinvestment of state-level 
public enterprises, although the success of privatization policies is still impacted by 
existing conditions.  
Again, the empirical record suggests that an ideational account alone cannot 
explain the observed variation in power reforms.  For example, the governments of both 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh have been very aggressive in terms of courting foreign 
direct investments and cultivating export-oriented industries.  Indeed, the man who was 
chief minister of Andhra Pradesh for much of the period under study, Chandrababu 
Naidu, was hailed by international financial institutions and press as the “CEO” chief and 
the “modernising chief minister.”16  Despite these monikers, and despite Naidu’s zeal in 
                                                 
16 “The state that would reform India,” The Economist, September 2, 2000. 
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implementing other kinds of pro-market reforms, Naidu was not as successful in tackling 
the power sector.  
On the other side of the ideological scale, the communist government of West 
Bengal, which has been rhetorically opposed to the policies and practices that make up 
neoliberal reform, has been quietly introducing measures that can only be read as 
advancing that very same agenda.   
One pair of scholars, in a study of the progress of market reform at the sub-
national level, organize the fifteen largest Indian states into three categories—reform-
oriented states, intermediate reformers, and lagging reformers.17  According to their 
rubric, Orissa is classed as an intermediate reformer while Maharashtra and Andhra 
Pradesh are coded as reform-minded.  However, in the area of power sector reforms, this 
rank-ordering would have to be reversed.  
Theories of policy convergence, whether emphasizing pressures of donor 
conditionality, capital scarcity, or technological change, would predict that as in many 
other countries of the world, the electricity industry in India too would follow established 
patterns of restructuring and privatization.  In Latin America, for example, after Chile, 
thirteen other countries privatized and restructured their electricity sectors.18  India, 
however, has proven to be resistant to a change that is commonplace in many other parts 
of the world, including most of Asia and parts of Africa.  One reason for this is the 
mismatch between the decentralization of decision-making, particularly in certain sectors 
                                                 
17 Nirupam Bajpai and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Progress of Policy Reform and Variations in Performance at 
the Sub-National Level in India.” Harvard Institute for International Development, Development 
Discussion Paper No. 730, 1999. 
18 Victorio M. Murillo, “Policymaking under Globalization Pressures: Reforming Public Utilities in Latin 
America.” Paper given at University of Pennsylvania’s Comparative Politics Workshop, April 15 2005. 
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including power, in India’s federal system and the centralized ways that multi- and 
bilateral organizations operate in India, and in other recipient countries.  Although many 
of the individual states of India are larger in terms of population than most of the world’s 
countries, most foreign aid organizations operate primarily in the capital city of New 
Delhi.  During my fieldwork in India, I came to appreciate the extent to which Delhi as 
India’s capital is inundated with conferences sponsored by the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and British and Canadian bilateral agencies that all advanced the 
agenda of electricity privatization.  Indeed, international influences are important in 
explaining the kinds of electricity sector policies that the Indian central government 
pursued from 1991 onwards.  India’s provincial capitals, however, were largely free from 
this vehicle of policy diffusion.     
Tracing the process of reform in these case studies also suggests that external 
pressures in the form of donor conditionality are not always a part of the set of factors 
that lead to privatization.  Many explanations for privatization in Orissa focused on 
World Bank pressure as the primary cause of the government’s policy choice.  My 
research indicates instead that there were complex domestic political incentives to 
privatize, and that the World Bank’s involvement allowed state leaders to finance 
preferences that they held independently.  More persuasive, perhaps, is the juxtaposition 
of Orissa and Delhi.  In the latter, privatization was undertaken without external pressure 
or conditional financing from multilateral lenders. 
 
 
    21
State-Society Relations 
 
As the preceding review suggests, economic crisis, ideology, and external 
pressure theses cannot supply the critical explanatory power to explain variation in 
electricity privatization across India’s states.  Another substantial portion of economic 
reform literature evaluates regime type as an explanation for cross-national variation in 
economic reform.19  Some scholars assert that authoritarian regimes are more capable 
than democracies of initiating sweeping economic changes because they are insulated 
from the vested societal interests that would mount the biggest opposition.  Others 
suggest, on the contrary, that reform-minded democratic leaders are just as able to make 
sweeping, and ultimately lasting, economic changes; because they benefit from the spirit 
of public debate and compromise that pervades democracies, they are able to forge 
coalitions in support of new policies.  Taken together, the empirical record for either 
democratic or authoritarian states as the more robust reformers has been inconclusive.  In 
recent years, scholars have added further nuance to the relationship between regime type 
                                                 
19 Among the work that examines the relationship between economic reform and democracy are many of 
the articles from Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1995); and the monograph by Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Politics 
of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992).  Other literature looks more generally at the relationship between regime 
type and economic development, also inconclusively.  The large-n, cross-national studies include Adam 
Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); and Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World 
Politics Vol. 5, No. 4 (July 2003):517-549. 
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and reform capacity, often by focusing on institutional variables that mediate policy 
outcomes.20  
 The simplest register of a regime-type explanation—separating states into 
democratic and authoritarian ones—is unpersuasive as an explanatory variable for 
differing reform success within India.  Although India’s democratic system hosts parties 
from a spectrum of political ideologies, from Marxist to Hindu fundamentalist, they all 
operate within the same procedural norms of democratic governance.  Examining 
divergent reform outcomes within a single country requires another set of analytic tools 
and causal explanations.   
 Scholars of Indian politics use the analytic construct of regime typology in a 
distinct way, to refer not to the structure of the state classified along a continuum from 
democratic to authoritarian, but to the ideological and class-based differences that are 
found among different political parties and the social forces that underlie them.  State-
level regimes have been typologized in this way in literature assessing the relationship 
between regime type and poverty reduction, which has been pursued more aggressively 
in some Indian states than others.  One body of scholarship defines regime type as a 
manner of democratic functioning that is a product of the balance of class power and the 
degree to which historically subordinated groups are incorporated into the regime.21  In 
these analyses, balances of class power are partly historical productions, which helps to 
                                                 
20 Frye, Timothy and Edward Mansfield, “Fragmenting Protection: The Political Economy of Trade Policy 
in the Post-Communist World.” British Journal of Political Science (October 2003) 33: 635-657. 
21 Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty Reduction in India: the Politics of Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); John Harriss, “How much difference does politics make? Regime differences 
across Indian states and rural poverty reduction” Working Papers, LSE Development Studies Institute, No. 
00-01 (February 2000). 
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explain much regional variation.  The evidence from India’s states leads to the conclusion 
that regime type, which is a function of balance of caste / class power and political 
organization, matters in determining the extent and nature of states’ attempts at poverty 
reduction.  Those states in which lower classes / lower castes were politically mobilized 
pursued poverty reduction policies more consistently than those states that continued to 
be dominated by upper classes and upper castes.22  The theoretical basis for examining 
the relationship between regime type and pro-poor policies posits that the greater the 
organization and representation of lower classes and suppressed castes, the greater will be 
the likelihood that a state will pursue policies that redistribute wealth and opportunities 
downward.   
Is there sufficient evidence between of a link between strategies of economic 
liberalization and regime type to suggest a similar line of argument?  If one takes the 
entire basket of economic liberalization measures, including exchange rate stabilization 
and capital account convertibility, as well as the steady withdrawal of the state from 
certain productive activities, the link between regime type and pursuit of economic 
reform is not immediately clear.  Some of these policies may cause short-term pains for 
the poor while others that may not have a disproportionate impact on any class or sector, 
are expected to enhance social welfare in the long run.  In India, as in other countries that 
pursued electricity privatization like the UK, the costs for residential consumers were 
expected to rise in the short term before beginning a secular decline that would ultimately 
lower prices for all.   
                                                 
22 Harriss, “How much differences does politics make?” 211-212. 
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 On the face of it, the empirical record from the first decade of the economic 
reform period suggests that there is no consistent relationship between the political 
organization of regimes, particularly their “class character,” and the likelihood of 
undertaking reforms.  As many others have pointed out, the reforms at the national level 
were initiated by a centrist Congress government in 1991, continued by a left-of-center 
coalition government from 1996 to 1998, and accelerated during the rule of the rightist 
BJP and its allies from 1998 to 2004.   
There is a similar indeterminacy in the relationship between partisanship and 
economic policy at the state-level.  State governments adopted a confusing mix of 
policies during the 1990s, some of which advance liberalization while others signal 
opposition to it.  West Bengal, for example, has been governed by the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist) for four decades, since 1977.  In 2002, presumably to compete with its 
neighbors for investments from information technology firms, the government classified 
the technology sectors as part of “essential services,” thus bringing them under the 
purview of protections against strikes afforded by the Essential Services and Maintenance 
Act.  Such a policy measure, which is deeply antagonistic to labor interests, suggests that 
even an ideologically guided party like CPI(M) is not immune to the pressures towards 
economic liberalization.  In addition, West Bengal has emerged as a popular destination 
for many kinds of private investment.  In other sectors of the economy, however, the 
CPI(M) has resisted liberalization policies, making an appraisal of CPI(M)’s overall 
stance on economic issues difficult.   
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Unbundling the basket of liberalization policies and focusing on just one subset—
privatization and restructuring of the electricity sector—has the benefit of clarifying this 
line of questioning.  The question can be re-framed to ask, in the domain of electricity 
policy, does regime type predict the timing or extent of liberalization?  The empirical 
research would then question whether there is a systematic relationship between regime 
type and the policies pursued by different state governments.  
As in Harriss (2000), I take regime type to refer to the class and caste composition 
of a state, expressed through formal political organizations, like parties, but also evident 
in the strength of actors in civil society.  Focusing on a single sector rather than the full 
class of liberalization policies might help us to untangle the relationship between regime 
type and economic policy.   
Electricity restructuring is one piece of India’s “second-generation reforms,” a 
term applied to structural changes that were largely excluded from the first decade of 
liberalization and that tend to delve “deeper into sectoral specificities.”23  Among these 
are agricultural, labor market, and electricity sector reforms.  Varshney posits that the 
difference between the first, easily enacted basket of policies and the second, more 
difficult one as rooted in the difference between elite and mass politics.24  The latter tend 
to arouse more popular passions and hence are often delayed.  Because these reforms are 
perceived to have broad distributional implications, they are more politically contested, 
and this accounts in large measure for their delay.  Given their redistributive nature, one 
                                                 
23 Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India, p. 335. 
24 Ashutosh Varshney, “Mass Politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in Comparative 
Perspective.” In India in the era of Economic Reforms, eds. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Ashutosh Varshney, and 
Nirupam Bajpai (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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would suspect that electricity sector reforms vary according to the character of state 
governments and the nature of coalitions at the state level.  
 
Distributional Conflict and Uneven Urban Bias  
The literature on distributional conflict and development is extensive.  The urban 
bias thesis represents one of the most influential formulations about distributional conflict 
in the context of late developing societies.25  The thesis posits that in the context of late 
development, states will extract surplus from the countryside to fuel development.  By 
contrast, in industrialized states, where the rural sector has shrunk to a shadow of its 
former size, the few remaining rural producers are the beneficiaries of extensive state 
subsidies.   
Since the theory’s earliest formulation, others have provided evidence that 
challenges and nuances its findings.26  In the Indian context, for example, Varshney 
contends that democracy has the potential to subvert the tendency toward urban bias.27  
As the numerically superior rural sectors are empowered by democratic institutions, their 
power through elected representatives will increase and the terms of policy will shift in 
their favor.  In India, he suggests, over the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, farmers 
had come to sway public policy in their favor.  He looks to a variety of national 
                                                 
25 The urban bias thesis was first formulated by Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor:  Urban Bias 
in World Development (London: Temple Smith, 1977); and extended by Robert Bates, Markets and States 
in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981).   
26 A special issue of the Journal of Development Studies titled Beyond Urban Bias and edited by Ashutosh 
Varshney, was devoted to scholarship that challenged the urban bias thesis with fresh evidence, and 
included responses by Lipton and Bates.   
27 Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
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government departments, like the Finance and Planning Commissions, and the federal 
government’s policies in terms of food prices and subsidies for fertilizer and farm 
procurement to give evidence of rural power.  Despite these interventions in the debate 
about urban bias, many scholars continue to operate with the assumption that the state 
continues to be partial to urban classes.  And many empirical findings from late 
developing countries continue to substantiate this assumption.28   
As the countryside’s power grew throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, as 
Varshney documents, agricultural producers secured for themselves a triad of important 
input subsidies (in addition to the subsidies for food prices, extension services, hybrid 
seeds, and credit).  These subsidies–for irrigation, power, and fertilizers—were requisites 
for Green Revolution technologies.  While there was no direct contest between rural 
consumers and other kinds of consumers for either surface irrigation or fertilizers 
(although there were opportunity costs of government funding for these), the subsidy for 
power had clear distributional implications.  In a scenario of electricity scarcity, the 
increasing use of subsidized power by farmers meant that other consumers either would 
pay ever-higher costs, or that their use would be curtailed by administrative rationing or 
via discriminatory pricing mechanisms.  In practice, since the public utilities used a 
system of cross-subsidies to recoup their losses in providing cheap electricity to farmers, 
industrial and commercial consumers were literally paying for the power that farmers 
used.  Whereas via these funding mechanisms rural electrification programs were vibrant 
                                                 
28 For example, see Stephen Wegren, “Democratization and Urban Bias in Postcommunist Russia” 
Comparative Politics vol. 34, Iss. 4 (July 2002): 457-477; Sumon Majumdar, Anandi Mani, and Sharun 
Mukand, “Politics, Information, and the Countryside” Journal of Development Economics Vol. 75, Iss. 1 
(October 2004): 137-165. 
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and aggressive in some states, implicating electricity deeper into the process of 
agricultural production, in other parts of the country, rural electrification was never so 
deeply subsidized and never became a developmental priority.  Examining these 
differences in electricity sector can provide a way to understand how different state 
governments allocated resources among different constituencies.    
Based on an analysis of this uneven pattern of electricity subsidy, my own 
contribution to the literature on urban bias is two-fold.  First, I argue that the rural-urban 
dyad is underspecified, as others have also suggested.29  Secondly, although Varshney is 
correct to highlight the strides that India’s farmers made once they captured a measure of 
political power, the countryside’s clout was very uneven across India.  Examples of the 
beneficiaries include wheat and rice farmers in Punjab, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh, 
and sugar cane farmers in western Maharashtra.  However, large swaths of the 
countryside never reaped the benefits of the new deal for Indian agriculture.  
Whereas the central government used marketing boards and price controls to 
favor certain kinds of crops and therefore certain groups of farmers, state governments 
used input subsidies to selectively favor farmers.  In the case of electricity, it was only 
those farmers who could afford expensive equipment to sink tubewells for irrigation, and 
only farmers in regions that had already benefited from state expenditures for rural 
electrification that profited from these policies.  So the new “rural bias” that Varshney 
points to was limited both by class differentials within particular regions of the 
                                                 
29 An early critique of Lipton’s focus on rural-urban conflict to the exclusion of all other social conflicts is 
found in Terrence Byres, “Of Neo-populist dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the myth of urban 
bias,” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 6 (1979): 210-244. 
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countryside, and also by differences in the level and nature of infrastructure development 
across regions.  The rural-urban dyad is insufficient in terms of capturing these deep-
seated, and perhaps no less politically significant intra-rural inequalities.  As the 
empirical chapters that follow show, particularly the chapter about Maharashtra, a more 
salient cleavage to understand politics in that state may be the one between elites that 
move between rural and urban spaces, and the larger majority of rural actors who have 
not profited from rural development programs.     
In existing scholarship that emphasizes the coalitional underpinnings of decisions 
to divest in the electricity sector specifically, most scholars consider the principle players 
to be labor, politicians, and bureaucratic managers.30 (Murillo 2000).  Policy-making in 
the electricity sector does engage these actors, but it also impacts the fortunes of 
electricity consumers.  Consumers are a much larger and more heterogeneous mix of 
agricultural, industrial, and residential users, each of which has a distinct set of 
preferences with respect to electricity policy that are conditioned by the prevailing prices 
and quality of electricity, and expectations about privatized utilities’ performance.  
Understanding cross-state differentials in electricity sector reform in a democratic 
country like India must therefore consider societal actors’ preferences and strengths, 
which vary regionally, in influencing policy decisions.  
Thanks to a tariff system that groups consumers in discrete categories according 
to the uses for which they require electricity, and the near-ubiquitous need for electricity 
across society, the electric power sector is one in which every sector of society has 
                                                 
30 Victoria M. Murillo, “From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin 
America.” World Politics (2000) 52: 135-174. 
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interests that can be delineated more or less clearly, and in which outcomes are often 
expected to be zero sum in the near term.  This is the result of the capital intensity and 
long gestation of investment projects in the sector.  Building a coal-fired generation plant 
takes anywhere from five to seven years, and laying transmission and distribution 
infrastructure is both costly and time-consuming.  In the situation of chronic undersupply 
in which most Indian states find themselves, the interests of classes of users can be 
understood, in the short-term at least, as in opposition to each other.   
The next section will specify different societal actors and define their interests in 
the electricity sector, and identify the mechanisms by which these interests impact the 
government, and in turn state policy.  The lines that delineate these groups and separate 
them from each other are not arbitrary.  Some, like organized labor in the public utilities, 
are obvious groupings.  Others, like industrial, agricultural, and residential users are 
categories of consumers used by the utilities themselves in determining tariffs.  Variation 
among states in policy is a reflection of differences in the biases of state governments 
with respect to specific constituencies.  The analysis finds that key variables in explaining 
variation in privatization outcomes include the political influence of agricultural elites 
relative to industrial consumers, and the strength of urban middle class consumers.  Labor 
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Agriculture 
The private electricity generators and distributors of British India had 
concentrated their activities in cities and larger towns because of the lack of profits in 
serving rural consumers.  The newly independent government elected to nationalize the 
electricity industry, motivated in great part because of this geographically skewed 
service.  The evidence from the annual reports of the SEBs shows that there was no 
system of subsidy for agriculture in the early decades of the public utility system, from 
the early 1950s when the SEBs were first established to the late 1960s.  The tariffs for 
agriculturalists was far higher than those of industrial consumers, reflecting the higher 
costs of providing service to such scattered customers compared to the densely 
concentrated industrial and urban consumers.  The allocation of electrification resources 
and the gradual lowering of agricultural tariffs began to tilt in favor of agriculture only in 
the late 1960s, coinciding with the beginning of India’s Green Revolution and the rise to 
power of farmers groups, particularly in certain states in India.   
Relative size of the rural population is a poor indicator of their influence in Indian 
politics, where states with vast rural populations nevertheless pursued development 
policies antithetical to rural interests.  Rather than size, it is the organization of rural 
interests either in pressure groups or working through state structures that determined the 
extent to which they successfully mobilized resources for agricultural production and 
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Table 3:  Rural-Urban distribution of population 
State % rural 





Himachal Pradesh 90.21 
Jammu & Kashmir 75.12 
Karnataka 66.02 
Kerala 74.03 





Tamil Nadu 56.14 
Uttar Pradesh 79.22 
West Bengal 71.97 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
 States in which rural interests, particularly those of wealthy farmers, are well-
represented in the government apparatus have opposed attempts to privatize and 
restructure the public electricity monopoly, with the goal of maintaining a beneficial 
status quo.  Maharashtra, where no restructuring and privatization have taken place, 
represents the most extreme case of the power of rural interests ability to block reform, 
while Andhra Pradesh, where rural interests are balanced by those of industry and urban 
consumers, has partially restructured but not privatized.  The only two examples of 
privatization have occurred where these interests are either not present (Delhi) or have 
been historically marginal to the interests and policies of the state (Orissa).  To explain 
why the strength of rural interests differs across states, this thesis will draw on literature 
about regional dominance and power in India.31   
                                                 
31 Among the most prominent examples in this literature are the essays in Francine Frankel and M. S. A. 
Rao. Eds. Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Vols. I and II (Delhi; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989).  There are region and state-specific literatures as well.  
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 There are multiple mechanisms by which rural power is manifest in state 
government policy.  These include the most visible and vocal forms of mass protest like 
rallies and marches.  The strength of farmers’ interests can be read in the manifestos of 
political parties, where parties made strident justifications for continuing input subsidies 
for farmers.  It is also the case, most clearly depicted in Maharashtra, that the rural elite 
has successfully built a vital presence working within political parties and government 
agencies like rural cooperatives.  Their power in these institutions ensures that they are 
able to tip the playing field in their favor when it comes to certain kinds of policies.   
 
Industry  
 The cost, quality, and availability of electricity are critical to energy-intensive 
businesses.  Industrial consumers of electricity in India pay more than the average cost of 
electricity production.  Tariffs became skewed due to a system of cross-subsidies that 
evolved over time, particularly as Green Revolution technologies in the late 1960s and 
1970s required cheap inputs (water, fertilizer, seed) for agricultural uses, and as farmers 
demanded subsidized rates for these inputs.  Public utilities used high tariffs for industrial 
consumers to offset the losses that resulted from under-market rates for agricultural and 
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Table 4:  Electricity Rates for Industrial Consumers, selected OECD and developing countries 
(USD/kilowatthour) 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
China  0.025 0.028 0.032 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
India .070 0.068 0.073 0.089 0.082 0.081 0.080 
Indonesia 0.064 0.064 0.062 0.051 0.020 0.027 n.a. 
Mexico 0.042 0.027 0.033 0.041 0.038 0.042 0.051 
Poland  0.035 0.040 0.040 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 
Russia  0.022 0.031 0.044 0.047 0.028 0.012 0.011 
Thailand 0.066 0.066 0.071 0.059 0.052 0.054 0.057 
Turkey 0.077 0.076 0.086 0.077 0.075 0.079 0.080 
UK 0.067 0.068 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.055 
US 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.046 
Source: United States Energy Information Agency, Annual Report various years. 
n.a.= not available 
 
Table 4 shows the rates for industrial consumers in a selection of developing and 
industrialized countries.  Of the countries listed in this table, Turkey and India 
consistently had the highest industrial tariffs throughout the 1990s.  In India, industrial 
tariffs hit their peak in 1997 before declining somewhat afterward, although they remain 
the higher than any other country’s and identical to Turkey’s.  The relative cost of 
electricity for industrial production is often cited by industrialists in support of their 
arguments for privatization.  The arguments are even more impassioned since India 
opened its economy to cross-border trade, putting Indian firms into more direct 
competition with their foreign counterparts.      
In addition, the perennial shortage of electricity, partly due to the fact that 
economic growth and therefore demand for electricity outstripped the growth of 
generating capacity, caused forced reductions in electricity for all classes of consumers, 
industry in particular.  Capital scarcity—particularly access to foreign exchange—and the 
long gestation period of building new capacity limited the expansion of supplies.  The 
government’s short-term solution was to selectively restrict consumption.  
    35
Some industries, particularly larger ones, responded to the rising costs, 
deteriorating quality, and erratic supply of energy by leaving the grid to generate their 
own electricity, referred to as captive power generation.  Until legislative changes in the 
1990s, industries were prevented from selling their excess captive power back to the 
public grid.  Once this was allowed, however, captive power production had the potential 
to become a much more financially viable alternative for industry, one however, that 
threatened the financial well-being of public utilities that relied on industrial consumers 
to make up for losses from other categories of consumers.  Even after the Electricity Act 
2003, state governments continue to dictate the terms under which captive power can be 
sold, including the tariff that the utility will pay and the charges that the SEB can levee 
for transporting (also called wheeling) the energy using the state’s transmission and 
distribution system.  This discretionary power allows SEBs to curtail the spread of 
captive power.  Openness to sales from captive power plants differs from state to state. 
Several aspects of electricity sector reform that are in the hands of state 
governments impact industrial consumers.  Among these are the creation of autonomous 
regulatory commissions with the mandate to end cross-subsides, privatization of public 
distribution systems, the introduction of open access, and favorable terms for the sale of 
captive power. 
As mentioned above, the spread of Green Revolution technologies and their 
concomitant effect on the political strength of rural India was very uneven across India.  
In those parts of India where rural power was not projected strongly onto the political 
stage, like Orissa, the state’s decision to privatize utilities was a means of satisfying its 
    36
industrial constituencies.  As the case study of Orissa demonstrates, the state had long 
been in the hands of an industrializing elite, and many in the political class came from 
industrial backgrounds themselves.  Once India’s liberalization program began in earnest 
in 1991, the state was finally able to take steps to create an environment hospitable to 
further industrial development.   
 
Residential consumers, urban middle classes 
 Residential consumers of electricity, like agricultural users, have benefited from 
subsidized electricity tariffs.  In a few states, the rates for residential users are on part 
with those of farmers, while in others the rates are higher but still well below the average 
cost of supply.   
Table 5: Consumer Category-wise Average Tariff, 1997-1998 (Paise/kilowatthour) 
State Domestic Commercial Agricultural Industrial 
Andhra Pradesh 165.58 369.04 16.12 340.00 
Assam 117.87 320.38 476.70 192.56 
Bihar 110.39 225.43 12.15 275.99 
Delhi 243.40 465.78 372.36 492.12 
Gujarat 164.00 330.00 18.00 338.70 
Haryana 203.95 337.82 61.08 372.20 
Himachal Pradesh 60.00 220.00 50.00 198.00 
Jammu & Kashmir 31.50 57.90 12.50 46.00 
Karnataka 166.00 489.12 11.55 415.05 
Kerala 77.99 279.88 54.63 163.20 
Madhya Pradesh 74.48 362.37 5.30 377.48 
Maharashtra 151.80 430.33 21.46 354.44 
Orissa 132.30 330.78 84.95 322.27 
Punjab 148.50 276.33 0.00 241.75 
Rajasthan 125.71 296.17 34.58 323.60 
Tamil Nadu 157.26 331.05 1.60 296.16 
Uttar Pradesh 104.95 303.61 49.65 383.45 
West Bengal 106.80 214.00 23.27 280.52 
Average of All SEBs 137.23 295.42 20.22 314.63 
Source: Annual Report on the Working of State Electricity Boards and Electricity Departments, 1998-1999 
(New Delhi: Planning Commission, April 1999). 
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For many consumers, particularly the urban and rural poor, electricity continues to 
represent a significant chunk of total income expenditures, so increased tariffs would 
depress consumption levels.  However, the case of Delhi suggest that affluent urban 
middle and upper classes in India are more willing to trade higher prices for higher 
quality and greater supplies of electricity.  This is partly based on the fact that these 
groups already own back-up, diesel-based generating sets that are costlier and more 
polluting than electricity from the public grid.  Given an option, they would prefer to use 
grid electricity at higher rates.  Where these groups are influential in policy-making, 
privatization is more likely, as in Delhi. 
 
Labor Unions 
 Many studies of economic reform have found that unions can play a significant 
role in stalling privatization.  However, to be successful union protest relies on broader 
public support, which in the case of the electricity sector is often absent.  Quite the 
reverse in India, where anger over the poor quality and insufficient supply of electricity 
frequently has put utility employees in personal danger, as irate consumers express their 
dissatisfaction with bricks and stones thrown at utility offices.   
In both cases of utility privatization (Orissa and Delhi), although the labor unions 
opposed the policy initially, their compliance was ensured through tripartite agreements 
signed by the government, the unions, and the new private owners.  These agreements 
secured the wages and benefits of current employees.  As these two case studies illustrate, 
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at least with respect to electricity privatization in India, union opposition is not a deal-
breaker.  
 
Organization of the thesis 
 
The next chapter of the thesis traces developments in the electricity industry at an 
all-India level, to provide the institutional and historical context in which individual state 
governments make sectoral policy.  Chapters 3-6 of the thesis are organized by case 
study.  Chapter 3, the first of four case studies, looks at Orissa, an overwhelmingly rural 
state on India’s east coast.  There, the absence of organized and influential rural lobbies 
pressuring the government to resist privatization allowed the state government, 
dominated by a regional upper-caste elite, to be the first in the country to dismantle 
public electricity institutions and privatize the distribution network.  This was a necessary 
first step for the state to pursue a development strategy of natural resource extraction and 
industrial production.  
Chapter 4 examines the case of Delhi to show how affluent urban consumers 
drove privatization, and the strength of large industry in the sector shaped its contours.  
For Delhi’s political leaders, the ability to court industrial capital and avoid middle-class 
dissatisfaction with sub-par public electricity service made privatization an attractive 
option.  
In Chapter 5, I examine the case of Maharashtra, where the rural elite’s political 
potency is magnified beyond their numerical strength thanks to the mediating social 
    39
institutions of caste and kinship.  In addition, cooperative institutions in the state funnel 
power into the hands of a small but powerful cadre of rural leaders.  Also of significance 
in Maharashtra, the largest concentration of middle class consumers of electricity in the 
capital city of Mumbai was effectively neutralized as a pro-reform lobby because 
Mumbai was one of a handful of privately-served zones in the country which eluded 
nationalization following Independence.   
In the final case study, about Andhra Pradesh, the pro-reform elite was able to go 
as far as restructuring the electricity industry, but time and again the government, 
beholden to an organized rural constituency, stopped short of its stated goals of 
privatizing and eliminating electricity subsidies.  Unable to eliminate cross-subsidies in 
tariffs by the standard means of privatization and autonomous regulation, the state has 
pursued other means of satisfying its industrial and high-technology consumers of 
electricity, namely a more liberal captive power policy that allows these consumers to 
leave the grid and establish their own supplies with some government subsidy. 
 In a concluding section, I summarize the argument that preceded and speculate on 
how an emerging set of politics involving outward-looking, commercially-oriented 
farmers may push electricity policy in the future.  
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The empirical puzzle at the heart of the dissertation focuses on decisions made at 
the subnational, or state, level within Indian politics.  Since the electricity sector falls on 
the concurrent list of the Indian constitution, both state and center can affect the overall 
institutional shape of the sector.  The center’s role has been to craft broad, enabling 
structures, but the task of implementing these policies was always intended to be the 
purview of state elites.  Since the central government itself entered the business of 
generating electricity and selling it to state-run enterprises in the 1970s, the center’s role 
has become more complex.   
This chapter details central government decisions that affected the shape of the 
Indian electric industry.  The first—the decision to nationalize the sector—was taken as 
the Indian constitution was being drafted in 1948.  The second—to open the sector to 
private capital—was taken in 1991 as the Indian government was confronted with capital 
scarcity, increasing unwillingness on the part of IFIs to lend to public utilities, and a 
projected surge in electricity demand.  The central government went through a succession 
of policy decisions after 1991, each of which had consequences for state governments 
and bureaucracies.  Altogether, this macro perspective is intended to illuminate the 
structures laid down by the central government, within which state legislators, 
policymakers, and societal actors have operated.  
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 The chapter begins with a statistical snapshot of the electricity sector and its post-
Independence expansion.  The succeeding section explores the creation of the state-run 
sector, especially its principal institutions – the SEBs – through an examination of their 
legislative history.  The last section turns to the 1990s reforms, broken up into three 
policy periods: independent power producers (IPPs); distribution reforms and regulatory 
mechanisms; and legislative reform auguring broad structural change in the sector.  
 
Statistical profile of the Indian Electricity Sector 
 
 India’s electricity sector has grown substantially since Independence. Installed 
capacity in 1950 was 1,713 MW; by 2002 it had grown to 104,918 MW.  However, per 
capita annual electricity consumption, which increased from 15.6 kWh in 1950 to 365 
kWh in 2001, remains low. For example, the figures for China and Brazil in 2001 were 
893 kWh and 1845 kWh respectively.32   
 There is also urban-rural unevenness in the spread of electricity access.  
According to the 2001 Census of India, 56.5% of rural households and 12.4% of urban 
households lack access to electricity.33  Although the number of electrified villages grew 
from 3,061 (0.54%) in 1951 to 587,258 (86%) by March 2001, what is meant by an 
“electrified village” is limited.34  Any village with a single connection to the grid 
                                                 
32 Per capita consumption for India, Brazil, and China from World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Database, 2003.  Indian consumption in 1950 is given in Central Electricity Authority (CEA), “Power 
Development in the Country: An Overview.” 
33 Census of India, 2001, “Table S00-019: Distribution of Households by source and location of drinking 
water and availability of electricity.”  
34 CEA,“Power Development in the Country,” and Planning Commission, Annual Report 2001-2002, 40.   
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currently counts as being electrified.35  Patterns of electrification are also geographically 
uneven; nine states claim to have achieved 100% village electrification, while the bulk of 
unelectrified villages are located in the populous northern and central states.  There is a 
similar unevenness in electrification across districts within many states.  
 The electricity sector has evolved a complex institutional structure. The Indian 
Constitution lists electricity as a concurrent subject, meaning that central and state 
governments share jurisdiction in the sector.  While the central government is principally 
responsible for laws governing the sector, state governments are the main implementers.  
Consequently, electricity institutions exist at both state and central levels.  Some were 
created by the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948, such as the SEBs and the Central 
Electricity Authority (CEA), while others were added in later years.  The SEBs are the 
main actors in the sector, accounting for the majority of generation and virtually all 
transmission and distribution.  The CEA creates national-level supply and demand 
forecasts, and evaluates proposed power projects.  The central government created the 
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and National Hydro Power Corporation 
(NHPC) in 1975 to provide additional generation, and became involved in transmission 
by forming Powergrid India in 1989.  The Ministries of Power at both state and center 
levels formulate policy, and as the history below illustrates, the involvement of state 
governments has increased greatly over the years.  The other significant actors in the 
electricity industry are the regulatory commissions at the central and state levels, which 
were formed starting in the late-1990s.  The mandate of the state commissions is 
                                                 
35 The Ministry of Power is seeking to revise the definition to capture measures of actual electricity use. 
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broadening with time, but their most important duty is setting tariffs for both public 
utilities and private companies.  
 Tables 6 and 7 provide more information about installed capacity and generation 
in terms of ownership and energy source.  In addition to the main ownership types listed 
here, electricity departments, mostly in the smaller Northeastern states, contribute small 
amounts of capacity and generation, mostly from hydroelectricity. 
Table 6:  Installed Capacity (MW), March 2002 
Ownership 
Type 


















-- 2,720 31,606 







Total 26,261 74,429 1,507 2,720 104,917 
% of installed 
capacity by 
energy source 
25% 71% 1% 3% 100% 
Source:  Annual Report (2001-2003) on the Working of the State Electricity Boards and Electricity 
Departments, Indian Planning Commission.  Figures in parentheses represent the contribution of each 
ownership type to capacity, by energy source. 
 
 
Table 7:  Gross Generation (million kWh), 2000-2001 





















Total 63,923 407,664 16,928 488,515 
% of gross 
generation by 
energy source 
13% 83% 3% 100% 
Source:  Annual Report (2001-2003) on the Working of the State Electricity Boards and Electricity 
Departments, Indian Planning Commission.  Figures in parentheses represent the contribution of each 
ownership type to gross generation, by energy source. 
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 The financial and technical performance of the SEBs has been deteriorating for 
several decades.  This has been the main justification given by international organizations 
and the central government for urging the states to reform, restructure, and privatize 
portions of the SEBs.  Their average transmission and distribution (T&D) losses have 
increased from 22.2% in 1995-1996 to 29.9% in 2000-2001.  The Planning Commission 
estimates that part of this increase is due to “more realistic estimates,” which were 
possible after reforms in some states allowed for a better accounting of electricity theft.36  
The cost of supply per unit has also been increasing throughout the 1990s, from 1.08 
rupee/ kWh in 1990-1991 to 3.27 rupee/ kWh in 2000-2001.  Rising costs coupled with a 
lack of commensurately increasing tariffs also drive the declining financial performance 
of the SEBs.  The average commercial losses of the SEBs increased five-fold since the 
latter half of the 1990s, from 46,740 million rupees (roughly US$935 million) in 1996-
1997 to 248,370 million rupees (roughly US$5 billion) in 2000-2001.37  The losses of the 
SEBs account for over 25% of the states’ gross fiscal deficits, which grew to 895,320 
million rupees (roughly US$18 billion) that year.38  The following section outlines an 





                                                 
36 Planning Commission, Annual Report (2001-2002), 5. 
37 Planning Commission, Annual Report (2001-2002), 7-8.   
38 Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey (2003-2003), Table 2.10 
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Political economy of the Indian electricity sector  
 
Prior to independence, electricity was generated and distributed only in cities and 
larger towns, primarily by private companies, but also by some municipal and provincial 
governments, who entered the sector in the 1930s.39  In 1948, the leaders of newly-
independent India undertook comprehensive electricity legislation as one of their first 
tasks toward building a new nation.  At the time, international conventional wisdom held 
that electricity was a fundamental instrument of economic development and belonged in 
public hands.  Indigenous Indian capitalists supported the idea of the State holding the 
“commanding heights” of the economy, investing in electricity and other essential 
manufacturing infrastructure.  Anticipating independence in 1944, eight prominent 
industrialists formalized this position in the “Bombay Plan,” which advocated State 
ownership of basic industries including electricity.40  
From the beginning, the sector faced a struggle in balancing the provision of 
electricity for industrial development – the promise on which the Bombay Plan was 
premised – and the promise of electricity to the masses to knit together a fissiparous and 
diverse nation.  Until the early 1970s, this balance was tilted in favor of industry, as 
industrial tariffs were set significantly lower than tariffs for other consumers, contrary to 
                                                 
39 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Irrigation and Power in the Three Plans (1951-66), (New 
Delhi: Government of India, 1968), p. 43. 
40 H. V. R. Iengar, “A Look at the Bombay Plan in the Light of Today” in The Bombay Plan & Other 
Essays, 2nd A. D. Shroff Memorial Lectures delivered under the auspices of Forum of Free Enterprise 
(Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1968). To what extent Indian capitalists supported planning and 
natinonalization is taken up again in Chapter 4.  As I point out there, there were important exceptions to the 
nationalization of the electric sector that preserved the most profitable zones in the country—in the 
industrial cities of Ahmedabad, Bombay, Calcutta, and Surat—for private companies. 
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the rhetoric of social transformation.  With secure electoral positions, the Nehruvian 
Centre and its allies in the states could sustain this dissonance between rhetoric and 
reality better than governments in later decades.  Populist subsidies were not an 
immediate political necessity, and the State could engage in development planning with a 
long time horizon.41  A further explanation is rooted in the political landscape at the time: 
rural interests were not yet as powerful as they later became, particularly at the state 
level.   
As the influence of agricultural interests over legislative bodies eventually grew, 
policies were tailored to their benefit, mainly in the form of subsidies. The growth of 
rural power seeking to reorient development policies was reflected in the rise of regional 
political movements.42  New parties arose to represent large farmers and the local 
bourgeoisie, eventually challenging Congress party hegemony.43  This all-India 
generalization includes significant deviations from this macro-story within individual 
states.  The substance of the subsequent chapters, organized around case studies of four 
states, will highlight the most important of these differences. 
By the 1970s, the Congress, which had ruled virtually unchallenged since 
Independence, lost its ability to craft compromises between capitalist and agrarian 
interests. Freed of central coordination, some state governments yielded to the new 
                                                 
41 Sudipta Kaviraj, “A Critique of the Passive Revolution,” in Partha Chatterjee, ed., State and Politics in 
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 64. 
42 Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: urban-rural struggles in India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
43 Sanjaya Baru, “Economic Policy and the Development of Capitalism in India: the role of regional 
capitalists and political parties” in Francine Frankel et al, ed., Transforming India: Social and Political 
Dynamics of Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press); T. V. Sathyamurthy, “Impact of Centre-
State Relations in India Politics: An Interpretive Reckoning 1947-1987” in Partha Chatterjee, ed., State and 
Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
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political compulsions by introducing a regime of electricity and fertilizer subsidies for 
farmers.  The Green Revolution drive for food self-sufficiency provided an additional, 
and more respectable, justification for a subsidy program.  While there is no doubt that 
electricity subsidies helped to establish India’s self-sufficiency in food production, it is 
also true that they primarily benefited larger landowners.44 The subsidy regime also 
benefited urban consumers, a less often mentioned beneficiary of state patronage, but a 
necessary constituency for political survival.  
Industries were made to subsidize farmers.  The protectionist policies of the 
Indian government might have served as a compensation of sorts, but once protectionism 
was gradually dismantled beginning in the 1980s and accelerating through the 1990s, the 
prevailing system of cross-subsidies for inputs also became unsustainable.  By the late 
1980s, electricity subsidies had burgeoned, perceptions of corruption in the sector were 
rife, and the lack of investment in technology and management of transmission and 
distribution systems had contributed to rising theft and waste in a destructive downward 
spiral.  In this context, the central government’s shift in policy in the 1990s toward 
private sector and market approaches can be read as the outcome of a realignment of 
interests among the most powerful consumers of electricity in India, which coincided 
with a shift in globally- and locally-held economic ideologies.   
The catalyst for opening up the sector to private investment in the 1990s was the 
held by many central government technocrats that capital scarcity was the biggest 
                                                 
44 Francine Frankel: India’s Green Revolution: Economic gains and political costs (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971).  Girish Sant and Santanu Dixit, “Beneficiaries of the IPS subsidy and the impact of 
tariff-hike,” Economic and Political Weekly, December 21, 1996, make a similar argument about subsidies 
in the 1990s. 
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obstacle to development.  The emphasis on capital investment coincided with and was 
shaped by an emergent “Washington Consensus” ideology that the state should refrain 
from controlling resources that markets could more efficiently allocate.45  Indeed, in this 
vision, retreat by the state was defined as a precondition for investor confidence. This 
view held that the state should focus its resources on a limited category of social 
spending, mainly health and education. In the private-investment-focused climate of the 
1990s, electricity was outside the shrinking core of acceptable social spending by the 
state.  This worldview had gained favor with a small but influential group of 
policymakers in India as well.  The policy changes begun in the 1990s and culminating in 
the Electricity Act passed in 2003 opened the way for industrialists to invest first in 
electricity generation and distribution, and later to seek out low cost power directly from 
private producers and sell their surplus captive power back to the grid.  The new Act 
promised the eventual end of subsidies to farmers and domestic consumers that had kept 
industrial tariffs high, but also a dramatic shrinking of the scope for using electricity as an 
instrument of development policy.  
 
1948-1969: The Consolidation and Erosion of Public Power 
 
In 1948, the framers of India’s constitution inherited a country with only 1713 
MW of power (less than two percent of India’s current capacity) and with about half a 
percent of its villages electrified. In response, they set out to create public institutions that 
                                                 
45 World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business, (Washington DC: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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would expand electricity generation and access. In goals and methods, they explicitly 
drew on international experience and prevailing wisdom.  The models for the Indian 
approach came from the centralized investment allocation and five year plans of the 
Soviet Union, the UK’s nationalized electricity system, and the massive public works of 
the US Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).  India’s private corporations were supportive 
of government plans to build large publicly owned utilities and plants to produce needed 
inputs for manufacturing.46  Enterprises like steel and electricity required enormous 
capital investment, long construction periods, and still longer time horizons to attain 
profitability, and thus business agreed that the state was the instrument of choice. 
Prior to Independence, the Indian Electricity Act, 1903 (amended 1910), laid out 
the rules by which private firms were to be granted licenses by the state to supply power.  
India’s electricity sector was composed of hundreds of private supply and distribution 
companies, located almost exclusively in cities and larger towns and the industrial 
regions surrounding them.  While the majority of these were British owned, there were a 
few prominent Indian players, notably the Tata conglomerate.47  As the cities and larger 
towns were becoming increasingly well-lit from the 1910s to the 1940s, smaller towns 
and villages in between were largely untouched by this new technology.   
The existing arrangements were equal neither to the task of lighting up India, nor 
to powering its industrial development.  These were the goals of the Constituent 
Assembly when it sat down in August 1948 to forge a new Electricity Act.  The stated 
                                                 
46 Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 40. 
47 V.R. Muraleedharan, “The Electrification of Madras City, 1905-1914” (paper presented to the Third 
World Economic History and Development Conference, University of Manchester, 13-15 September 
1991), 4. 
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objectives of the 1948 Act were to reorient the sector to “provide for the rationalization 
of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive 
to electrical development.”48 Through the Act, the Assembly members created public 
institutions—the Central Electricity Authority and SEBs—that became the nodal 
agencies in the sector.  Although this legislation did not reserve electricity as an entirely 
public domain—a task accomplished by the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956—it did set 
the stage for much broader government involvement in the sector.  
 The Constituent Assembly debate filled many days.  The debate record is 
crowded with references to global ideologies and practices in the sector, underscoring the 
role of ideology in the creation of India’s electricity institutions.  Consistent with the 
thinking of the time, there was near-universal agreement that the State should become the 
primary actor in the sector. But there was less agreement about how quickly, to what 
extent, and in what manner the State should take control, and how to accommodate 
existing industrial interests in the sector.   
 In supporting nationalization, many members were concerned with overcoming 
existing patterns of electrification reflecting regional imbalances, a legacy of the diversity 
in development objectives and success among former princely states and colonial 
provinces.  They contended that the State must involve itself in the sector until load 
centers emerged in rural areas and small towns, or until incomes rose sufficiently for 
rural citizens to afford electricity at its cost of supply. Providing electricity to these areas 
would be unprofitable, and no private entity would undertake the investment.   
                                                 
48 Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, Act No. 54 of 1948, preamble. 
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 Many of those who advocated complete nationalization, which would have meant 
buying out all extant private power firms, argued that this was in keeping with accepted 
global practices.  The legislative drafting committee, or Select Committee, was aided by 
experts on loan from the British government, and individual members of the Constituent 
Assembly drew ideological succor from the UK and US for their arguments in favor of 
public-sector led growth in electricity.  One member after another referred to British 
nationalization and Roosevelt’s TVA, the latter as an explicit model for the Damodar 
Valley Corporation.  One assembly member, Shibban Lal Saxena, from United 
Provinces, argued: 
 
… we know that England has nationalized its electricity, coal and some other 
industries.  In their Electricity Act they have provided for compensation to 
present manufacturers…I do not think England today is abounding in wealth.  
She has to keep her life going today with the help of America and yet although 
the country is in such bad days she has taken over the key industries.  I think 
India is much more solvent than England and she can afford to take over these 
concerns and pay compensation to the owners of the companies by spreading it 
over a number of years…49  
  
 The nationalizers also argued vehemently that the records of private electricity 
companies demonstrated disregard for the role that electricity should play in advancing 
the social good.  A. Ayyanger, a member from Madras Province, where 90% of 
generation and most of distribution had already been nationalized, spoke for many in his 
scathing portrayal of private power firms: 
 
But what these [private] corporations did was to take away the cream of income 
from the public and not contribute even a little or a farthing to the expansion of 
power to the rural areas…Corporations were easily established in towns [where] 
for lighting and other purposes they were charging at the rate of 4 annas per unit 
whereas under the terms of license they were obliged to supply power for 
agricultural and industrial purposes at the rate of 9 pies per unit. Therefore, these 
                                                 
49 Government of India (GoI), Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD), Vol. VI, Part II, 1948, Aug 9-31, 54 
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Corporations always concentrated their efforts only in cities where on account of 
lighting they would get the largest portion of income, but they tried least to get 
into the villages and giving [sic] power to lift up water from wells and so on.50  
 
 Opponents of full nationalization argued that India did not yet have sufficient 
technological expertise and skilled manpower to fully take over the private sector.  As we 
will see in the case of Maharashtra, at least one member of the Constituent Assembly 
referred directly to the presence of the Tata industrial group in the lucrative electricity 
market of Bombay, and declared that it would be unwise for the government to displace 
their operations.   
Ultimately, the legislation that was passed fell short of full nationalization and 
instead represented a compromise between the government and private operators. 
Nehru’s need to reduce tensions between socialists and economic conservatives was also 
a likely factor in the compromise.51  Existing private licenses were to be honored, with 
state governments allowed to decide about license extensions when they expired.  
Subsequently, some state governments, such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, were 
quite aggressive in nationalizing the sector fully while others, such as Maharashtra, 
continued to extend the license period of private operators for decades, including some 
into the current period. 
 Despite the explicit recognition that the state would have to bear the costs of 
electrifying smaller towns and villages, the legislation did not include an overt directive 
to this effect.  Instead, the 1948 Act mandates that the Boards must arrange for “the 
supply of electricity…and for the transmission and distribution of the same in the most 
                                                 
50 GoI, CAD, vol. VI, part II, 9-31 Aug 1948, 41 
51 Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1978), pp. 71-94.  
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efficient and economical manner with particular reference to those areas which are not 
for the time being supplied or adequately supplied with electricity.”52  However, the exact 
manner in which this was to be accomplished—the speed and method of finance—was 
left to the discretion of individual states.  Accordingly, there was a wide variation in the 
way the states undertook the task of rural electrification over the ensuing decades.53     
 A second issue that emerged during the Assembly debate was SEB autonomy, a 
discussion that in many ways anticipated contemporary debates about the electricity 
sector.  Those who were concerned about the uneasy relationship between the SEBs and 
the state governments sound much like contemporary critics of the SEBs.  In some 
regions, like Madras and Mysore (now Tamil Nadu and Karnataka respectively), the state 
governments were already the primary owners in the sector.  Electricity had become a 
powerful tool to control resource-allocation and generate revenues.  Representatives from 
these regions therefore opposed the creation of SEBs, insisting that the same work could 
be done more efficiently within a department of the state executive branch.   
Supporters of SEBs anticipated the problems of increasing interference by elected 
leaders, presciently envisioning a time when electricity would come to be a tool wielded 
to fashion and sustain political constituencies.  These members argued that the SEBs 
should be given full autonomy.  The words of K. Santhanam from Madras Presidency, 
who was also a member of the Select Committee, exemplify this sentiment:  
 
What are [sic] the British Government doing? ….Then again even in America when they 
wanted to start a national undertaking they established a Tennessee Valley Authority.  
                                                 
52 Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, Section 18(a). 
53 Report on the Evaluation of the Rural Electrification Programme. New Delhi: Programme Evaluation 
Organisation, Planning Commission, 1965, 32. 
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These democratic governments knew what nationalization meant; they knew that these 
industrial undertakings should not be left to the vagaries of ministerial change…Ministers 
may change, and changing Ministers may have changing policies; but the day to day 
administration of industrial undertakings should be continuous and should not be 
disturbed by political considerations.”54   
 
Again, an uneasy balance was struck to pacify two opposing camps.  The legislation 
mandated that all of the states would eventually create autonomous corporations, but 
allowed states sufficient time—initially two years from the passage of the 1948 Act, but 
with the explicit promise of further extensions if they proved necessary—to establish 
these bodies.55  All the states took full advantage of this provision, and many waited to 
establish their Boards until the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Given the regional 
differences within the still-unstable union, this kind of compromise was necessary to 
garner sufficient support to enact the bill into law.  
Over time, successive amendments to the Act further eroded SEB autonomy by 
gradually diminishing the Boards’ freedom to set tariffs and imposing greater political 
oversight in personnel decisions.  An amendment in 1949 permitted the states to appoint 
their own chief engineers and other members of the government to become chairmen and 
members of the SEBs, which collapsed the interests of the boards and the state 
governments.  A 1956 amendment added a vaguely worded provision that the SEBs 
would take “policy directives” from the state government.56  The same amendment also 
retracted the SEBs’ ability to set tariff levels independently; instead the Boards would 
                                                 
54 GoI, CAD, vol. VI, part II, 9-31 Aug 1948, 50. 
55 Section 5.1 of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 reads that the “State Government shall, as soon as 
may be after the issue of the notification under subsection (4) of section 1, constitute by notification in the 
Official Gazette a State Electricity Board…”  
56 Section 10.5, which was added by Act 101 of 1956, states, “If the Board fails to carry out its functions, or 
refuses or fails to follow the directions issued by the State Government under this Act, the State 
Government may remove the Chairman and the members of the Board and appoint a Chairman and 
members in their places.”   
    55
have to secure government approval.  This was driven by dissatisfaction with existing 
tariff levels.  Tariffs for agricultural consumers reflected the higher costs of serving 
remote rural areas, whereas industrial consumers were charged relatively less to reflect 
the lower cost of serving consumers who were concentrated geographically and 
consumed in large quantities.  By subjecting the tariff-setting process to state government 
approval, conditions were created for departing from narrow economic rationality.  
Whatever else might be said for it, this opened the door for electoral considerations to 
influence the tariff-setting process.   
 
1970s and 1980s:  states’ populism and creeping centralization 
 
Decreasing bureaucratic autonomy and increasing scope for political control over 
SEBs ultimately led to financial crises in the sector.  As discussed earlier, the emergence 
of powerful new farmers’ organizations in the 1960s and 1970s and associated political 
formations within the Indian states were an important contributing factor. They 
demanded increased support for agricultural inputs, particularly irrigation and fertilizer.57  
Beginning in the late 1970s, state after state responded by subsidizing electricity, a policy 
that was also justified because of the precedent set by subsidized canal irrigation rates.58 
Over this period, many states also switched from metering agricultural consumption to 
                                                 
57 Partha Chatterjee, A Possible India: Essays in Political Criticism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
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58 Mona Sur and Dina Umali-Deininger, “Public Expenditures and Subsidies in Indian Surface Irrigation:  
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flat-rate billing.  The lack of metering allowed SEBs to hide transmission and distribution 
losses and theft of power under the category of agricultural consumption. To offset the 
losses from lower tariffs for agriculturalists and concealed theft, SEBs gradually began 
charging higher rates for industrialists, resulting in a system of cross-subsidies.  
Eventually this led in the 1980s and 1990s to many industrialists eschewing high-cost 
power from the state grids in favor of in-house captive generation, leaving the SEBs with 
fewer financially valuable customers. 
India’s self-sufficiency in food production and other compelling (if difficult to 
quantify) social equity gains are oft-cited, and also oft-debated, benefits to the subsidy 
policy.  Whatever their ultimate merits, the absence of clear oversight and financial 
guidelines for subsidy delivery placed increasing financial strain on the SEBs.  Moreover, 
in a self-reinforcing cycle, agricultural subsidies had the political effect of further 
strengthening rural interests within the states, which in turn made the subsidy regime 
difficult to reverse. 
 The performance of the SEBs also deteriorated due to corruption.59  The 
management of the SEBs was subject to political interference that ranged from personnel 
decisions to the awarding of contracts for construction and manufacturing in the sector.  
Selective granting of contracts proved profitable for politicians eager to swell their 
campaign coffers.60  As the financial position of the SEBs worsened, the utilities were 
                                                 
59 Corruption is alluded to broadly in the press, government reports, and conversations with people 
connected to the industry, but to my knowledge there has been no systematic study of employee-aided 
corruption.   
60 For example, N. S. Vasant, a former SEB chairman, stated that in a particular northern state, the list of 
contractors hired for projects in the electricity sector changed with a change in the party in power; 
interview by author, New Delhi, 25 October 2002.   
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less able to add generating capacity and maintain transmission and distribution networks, 
resulting in technical deterioration and lost efficiency. State finances were caught up in 
the downward spiral, as state governments were ultimately responsible for the financial 
health of SEBs.61   
 A significant consequence of the ailments plaguing the SEBs was their inability to 
generate capital.  Beginning in the late 1960s, the central government responded to the 
problem of capital scarcity by creating central institutions first to finance state 
organizations and later to independently build new capacity. In 1969 the central 
government established the Rural Electrification Corporation with World Bank aid to 
finance transmission extensions.  In the mid-1970s the central government, again with 
World Bank assistance, established the NTPC and the NHPC to expand electricity 
generation.  The development of NTPC especially had far-reaching implications, shifting 
the balance of power towards the center in a sector the states had dominated alone.   
Although central government intervention staved off capacity shortages in the 
short term, electricity was increasingly a constraint on economic growth.  By the end of 
the 1980s, industry was increasingly dissatisfied with low quality power, high tariffs, and 
restrictions on private production.  However, it took a seismic change in global thinking 
on electricity to topple the consensus on public power and set in motion fundamental 
changes in the sector. 
 
                                                 
61 Due to recommendations made by the Venkataraman Committee, appointed to review the financial ills of 
the sector, the 1948 legislation was amended to stipulate that tariffs must generate a 3% return on the value 
of the SEB’s fixed assets.  Often, this condition was met only because of subventions from state 
governments; it was more common for the Board to fail in meeting its target, and the state government to 
fail in providing a subvention.  
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Liberalization in the 1990s 
 
 The second significant historical moment in the Indian electricity sector occurred 
in the 1990s. In the face of managerial and fiscal failures in the sector, industry 
dissatisfaction, and a national macroeconomic crisis, the central government announced 
in 1991 that it would encourage private investment in power. Over the following decade, 
state and central governments began to re-organize the sector around the market, 
encouraged by a new global electricity paradigm that favored private ownership and 
competition over publicly owned monopolies.  India’s reforms proceeded in three stages: 
in the first, the central government encouraged private investment in generation; in the 
second, a response to the inadequacies of the first, the central government encouraged 
privatization in distribution and the formation of regulatory commissions; in the third, the 
Electricity Act of 2003 re-wrote the basic laws and re-shaped the institutional 
infrastructure governing the sector.   
 
Phase One of Reforms:  Independent Power Producers  
 In 1991, while battling a balance of payments crisis, the central government 
amended the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 to make the sector more attractive for 
private investment.  Introducing the Lok Sabha debates, Minister of State Kalp Nath Rai 
argued that the amendment was necessitated by a paralyzing scarcity of financing for the 
sector.  This argument was echoed by both enthusiastic and reluctant supporters. 
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Remarkably, the concerns that were so passionately argued in 1948 – regional balance, 
urban-rural balance, and the broader public interest – were almost entirely absent.  Even 
the left opposition ignored broader issues in favor of a focus on labor.  In 1991, the 
concerns of policy-makers with regard to electricity were far removed from those in 
1948; the idea of electricity as an instrument of social development no longer aroused 
political passions. 
 That the electricity debate took place under the shadow of a severe 
macroeconomic crisis is one reason that the 1991 reforms went largely unchallenged.  
Also important, however, is the broader context.  Influenced by the Reagan-Thatcher 
1980s, economists and policymakers in India questioned Nehru-era policies of 
centralization and state ownership.  Industrialists no longer supported government control 
of the commanding heights, and embraced the new ideology of reduced state involvement 
in the sector, which offered industry a way to expand electricity supply options and 
extricate itself from the financial drain of cross-subsidies.  State governments also came 
to favor increased private investment.  Leaders began to understand that sector finance 
and supply shortages threatened development in their regions. By the early 1990s, most 
SEBs were locked into providing highly subsidized electricity to agricultural and 
residential consumers, and most were prevented by state governments from increasing 
tariffs to match increases in production costs.  While the price of coal and the cost of 
transporting it to generating stations increased, SEB revenues remained unchanged. As a 
result power utilities were increasingly unable to pay their bills.  Because coal and 
railways belonged to the central government, their inability to collect payments from 
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SEBs became a source of tension between the center and the states, and a reason for the 
center to demand a change in the status quo.  The states also came under pressure from 
international financial institutions, which demanded reforms in the SEBs before granting 
new loans.62  The twin pressures from the central government and international lenders 
led state governments to welcome the private sector. 
 In addition, the inadequacy of power sector data contributed to the momentum for 
private generation.  Transmission and distribution (T&D) losses by SEBs – including 
theft -- were consistently under-reported, while agricultural consumption was inflated.  In 
reality, inadequate metering of farmers permitted misreporting of theft as agricultural 
consumption. This erroneous reporting contributed to the view that the main problem of 
the Indian power sector was inadequate supply rather than mismanagement, theft, and 
corruption.  Since the early 1990s, one SEB after another has upwardly revised their 
figures for T&D losses, suggesting that capacity addition alone could never have solved 
the sector’s difficulties.63  At the time, however, there was a near consensus that power 
deficit was the main problem, spurring the IPP policy.  
 While all of these forces were operating to advance the government’s 1991 reform 
amendment, there were few countervailing pressures opposing it.  In the early 1990s, 
there was not yet a broad-based opposition to neoliberal reform, and following on the 
heels of the economic crisis of mid-1991, the public was prepared to support policy 
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changes that would avoid future crises. Although the public utilities constitute one of 
India’s largest employers, labor unions in the sector had not yet organized effectively to 
oppose privatization.64  Indeed, the IPP policy was not initially perceived to threaten 
labor or public utilities, so there was not a strong incentive for labor opposition.  
Similarly, there was no broad agitation from farmers against the reforms because the IPP 
policy was not discussed in the context of eliminating subsidies, which continued and 
even expanded throughout the 1990s. 
 Taken together, macroeconomic crisis, political and economic pressures on the 
states, flawed data that highlighted generation-scarcity, and the lack of organized 
opposition explain the rapid passage of the 1991 amendment. The incentives to private 
power investors were substantial. The initial licensing period for private generators was 
extended from twenty to thirty years, and the subsequent renewal period was increased 
from ten to twenty years.  Similarly, the rate of return on capital investments, formerly set 
at 2% over the Reserve Bank of India rate, was increased to 5% on all investments made 
after the legislation came into effect.  Foreign equity participation was liberalized, and an 
expedited single-stop approval process was created to replace the multi-ministry approval 
process of the past.65 
 After the 1991 amendment was passed, private firms rushed to sign Memoranda 
of Understanding (MOUs) with central and state governments.  In 1992, the central 
                                                 
64 Wide-spread labor opposition to electricity reform did not begin in earnest until the late 1990s, when 
states began to dismantle the SEBs.  The National Coordination Committee of Electricity Employees and 
Engineers was formed only in 2000, when large-scale labor protests in Uttar Pradesh followed the state’s 
announcement of plans to unbundle its SEB.  B.S. Meel, General Secretary, Electricity Employees 
Federation of India, interview by author, New Delhi, 5 December 2002.  
65 The Gazette of India, No. 237, New Delhi, Tuesday, October 1991.   
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government assigned eight IPP projects “fast-track clearance,” which allowed these 
projects to leap over licensing hurdles in order to expeditiously address the capacity 
shortage.  In just five years time, by 1996, the government had received 190 proposals 
from IPPs, which, if completed, would have produced over 75,000 MW of electricity.  Of 
these only 15 went on to the stage of applying for a techno-economic clearance from the 
Central Electricity Authority.66  MOUs were signed for plant construction all over the 
country. Of these, the largest, most capital-intensive, and the one that would have 
resulted in the highest-cost power, was signed by Enron and the Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board (MSEB) in 1992 to construct a gas-fired, 2,000 MW power plant in 
Dabhol, in coastal Maharashtra. 
From the start, the wisdom of Enron’s Dabhol project had been widely 
questioned. Both state governments and the Enron corporation were accused of acting 
with a lack of transparency and regard for the public interest. 67 A range of actors from 
the CEA to the World Bank to activists questioned the economics of the project, pointing 
out that the high projected cost of power and the dollar denomination of the contract 
would expose the power purchaser, the Maharashtra SEB, to financial risk. 68  Activists 
and agrarian communities also protested the environmental and social costs of the 
project, including inadequate compensation to farmers and potential human rights abuses 
                                                 
66 Jayanta Sarkar, “Letter from India: Political balkanization continues to poison IPP environment,” 
Electrical World (November 1996): 66.  
67 There is an extensive literature about the Dabhol project.  See Abhay Mehta, Power Play: A Study of the 
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associated with project construction. 69  The project also became a central issue in state 
politics, with two Hindu nationalist parties campaigning on an anti-Enron plank, only to 
cancel and re-negotiate the contract when they came to power. Ultimately, fears of 
financial unsustainability proved true. With state and central governments refusing to 
honor their financial guarantees of payment, the plant has been idle since 2001, and 
embroiled in a bitter dispute between the various parties. 
 
Phase Two of Reforms:  Distribution Privatization and Independent Regulation 
 By the mid-1990s it was clear that a focus on private investment in generation 
was an insufficient, and possibly counterproductive, policy.  Not all PPAs were 
controversial, nor did all fail as spectacularly as Enron’s did.  Nevertheless, the saga of 
Enron in Dabhol, ending as it did in a high-profile contractual dispute, clearly 
demonstrated the difficulties with expecting IPPs to solve the sector’s problems.  As long 
as private generating firms had to sell their power to insolvent SEBs, financial risks 
would remain intolerably high.  By attempting to weaken the link between politicians and 
electricity bureaucrats, privatization and independent regulation were intended to address 
the problem of political interference with the SEBs, which kept subsidies too high and 
collections too low for SEBs to pay their bills. 
 The first solution proposed was to privatize electricity distribution, and the second 
was to establish regulatory institutions.  These mechanisms were intended to alter the 
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relationship of the state utilities to consumers, and of state governments to utilities.  Their 
intent was to remove electoral considerations from electricity governance.  
 These reforms were quite clearly drawn from the playbook of the World Bank, 
which, in 1993, had re-written its policy to emphasize private participation in the power 
sector. Its global reach and cheap capital made the World Bank the primary vehicle for 
propagating the new private power paradigm, in India as elsewhere. In the second half of 
the 1990s, various Indian states experimented with distribution privatization and 
regulation.  While some states fully privatized distribution, others have only recently 
unbundled their SEBs.  In large measure, these differences reflect variations in the 
balance of power among different social and economic actors in the states.    
The first state to undertake distribution privatization was a seemingly unlikely 
locale.  Orissa, a state that lies along India’s eastern coast, is most often mentioned in the 
international media as the site of tropical storms that have devastating effects on the 
state’s economy and infrastructure.  It has one of the lowest per capita GDPs in India.  
Other factors, however, favored Orissa as a site for privatization, chief among which 
were the small size and organizational weakness of its agricultural sector.  
 Orissa unbundled the state SEB in 1996, and later privatized the four resultant 
distribution zones. Private entities were expected to lower the transmission and 
distribution losses; increase management efficiencies; and make capital investments to 
improve the technical performance of the sector. According to an official Government of 
Orissa appraisal committee report, the vision for the reforms emanated entirely from the 
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World Bank and depended on Bank loans for project support.70  Additionally, the reforms 
were executed with the aid of consulting firms—most of them foreign—paid using 
bilateral and multilateral funds.  When the state initially invited bidders for 51% equity 
stake in the four distribution zones, only a single Indian firm—Brihanmumbai Suburban 
Electric Supply (BSES)—qualified to purchase the assets.  Another firm, US-based AES, 
already had a generation presence in Orissa, and was persuaded by the Orissa government 
to bid for one distribution zone as well.71   
 There is now a widespread consensus that privatization in Orissa was a failure, 
although the causes of failure are fiercely disputed.  Proponents of privatization argue 
that the government continued to interfere in the functioning of the sector, preventing the 
private firms from eliminating electricity theft in order to avoid electoral repercussions.72  
In its own review, the World Bank concludes “reform in Orissa has shown that 
privatizing distribution through the sale of assets is a feasible option in India” but 
suggests the need for modifications in approach.73  These include expanding the size of 
the distribution zones to ensure financial viability; extending the tariff-setting process 
from annual to every five years; and cultivating more transparent regulation and possibly 
mandating that regulators consider the financial health of the regulated companies. 
Opponents of privatization argue that the private firms, wholly concerned with profits, 
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72 Edwin R. Lim, Country Director, World Bank, “Conference on Distribution Reforms” 12-13 October, 
2001.”  The conference was jointly organized by FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry), Powergrid (a central public sector undertaking), and the union Ministry of Power.      
73 “Power Sector Reform in India: Lessons for other states in India,” World Bank, p. 2.  Available from 
<http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ppiaf/activity.nsf/files/INDIA.pdf/$FILE/INDIA.pdf>.  
    66
failed to make capital investments to improve the technical efficiency of the sector, and 
were shielded from being forced to reduce theft because of the nature of their contracts.  
Citing information provided in the official appraisal report, some have charged that the 
bulk of the funds meant for reforms went into the pockets of international consultants, 
who were the only real winners in the reform process.74   
Whatever the causes of Orissa's failure, there is little doubt that the experiment 
has left the state's electricity sector in a shambles.  The state transmission company is in 
dire financial straits, hoped-for improvements in service have yet to materialize, and one 
private investor, AES, has abandoned the experiment altogether.75   
 The only other state to successfully privatize distribution is the capital territory of 
Delhi, which did so in July 2002.  Delhi’s Electricity Board was unbundled into three 
distribution zones, two of which were bought by Reliance Energy (then BSES) and one 
by Tata Power Company, parts of two of India’s largest industrial conglomerates.  
Reliance in particular is expanding its presence in the energy sector.  However, there is 
fear that if these are the only two Indian companies able to purchase the large distribution 
segments that result from unbundling, these firms will have undue control over the sector. 
 The second strategy employed to “depoliticize” the sector was to create 
autonomous institutions to regulate tariffs.  The Central Government passed the 
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Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act in 1998.  Several states had preempted the 
central government in creating State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs), the 
first being Orissa.  The differences in the legal frameworks governing the various SERCs 
are minimal, but their operations vary from state to state, in some cases including 
activities such as plant licensing.  While restructuring and privatization have proceeded 
slowly, and only in a handful of states, almost all states have now established a regulatory 
commission. 
 The main criticisms of the new regulatory regimes have focused on their 
relationship to elected leaders, which some consider far too cozy.76 The regulators 
themselves are chosen from among retired or nearly-retired bureaucrats, many of whom 
naturally have pre-existing relationships with government from having served in other 
bureaucratic capacities.  Additionally, some state governments have not granted sufficient 
financial resources to the commissions, prompting the worry that governments will use 
this leverage over finances to exact politically convenient decisions.   
Still others are cautious in holding up regulatory commissions as the solution to 
the industry’s ills because of the possibility of regulatory capture by private companies 
and utilities.77  Theoretically, independent regulators are charged with establishing tariffs 
that balance the competing interests of private companies, utilities, consumer groups, and 
the public interest.  In theory, each of these groups is able to represent its interests before 
the regulator.  In practice, however, private companies and public utilities are better able 
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to organize to represent their interests than are consumers.  Moreover, there are 
considerable inter-state differences in how regulatory commissions function.  The sole 
comprehensive study on performance of regulatory institutions in India indicates 
variations in the level of resources and autonomy granted to the SERCs; the degree of 
transparency and public participation in the regulatory process; regularity in publishing 
annual reports and holding consultative committee meetings; and the nature of state 
government and utility interaction with the regulators.78  
 The potential but also the challenge of effective regulation is illustrated by an 
example from Maharashtra. The first task of the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (MERC) in 1999 was to evaluate the merits of a tariff increase proposed by 
MSEB. MSEB requested that tariffs be increased by almost 10% to enable the Board to 
earn a surplus of 4.5% of the value of its fixed assets.79  The public was then invited to 
submit comments on MSEB’s proposal, a document of about 40 pages. Prayas, an NGO 
that has been active in energy issues in India, immediately requested that MSEB supply 
additional information to justify the tariff increase, and to detail its other revenue-
enhancement measures. MERC ruled that Prayas had the right to make such a request, 
and ordered MSEB to provide additional information.80   
 This anecdote suggests the presence or absence of competent and organized 
consumer groups is a key variable in determining the success of regulation. 81  This point 
is often lost amidst the chorus from policymakers, donors, and bureaucrats in Delhi on 
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the importance of financial and managerial autonomy for regulatory commissions and the 
associated freedom from political interference. While regulation does create conditions 
for greater transparency and accountability in tariff-setting, in order for the process to 
work in the public or consumer interest, they must be adequately represented.  Ironically, 
Maharashtra is in the forefront of consumer advocacy in power because Prayas and 
several other groups were galvanized into action by the Enron controversy. In the absence 
of such groups, it is unclear whether the MERC would be an equally effective instrument 
to promote the public interest.  
 
Phase Three of Reforms: Electricity Bill 2003 
 While state reforms have scarcely been a runaway success, they did have the 
merit of attempting to focus on the central problems at hand – distribution reform and 
SEB losses – albeit with far from satisfactory outcomes.  With distribution reform firmly 
on the agenda, the central government re-entered the fray with an attempt to replace ad 
hoc state efforts with an overarching framework to guide reform.  Thus, in contrast to 
World Bank-led state reforms, the Electricity Act 2003 represented the internalization of 
the new global ideology of electricity at the highest levels of India’s central government. 
The new legislation, passed in May 2003, replaces all existing legislation in the sector 
and prepares the ground for a fundamental restructuring of the Indian electricity sector. 
The intent is to deepen and formalize the transition that is already underway in some 
Indian states.  To critics of the legislation, by focusing on private participation the Act 
establishes the conditions for electricity to be managed solely as a commodity rather than 
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as a social good that the state is obligated to provide to its citizens.  Many expect the 
result to be a return to the pre-Independence conditions that had originally spurred the 
creation of SEBs, when electricity flowed primarily to cities, areas with concentrated 
loads and robust purchasing power.82 
 The Ministry of Power submitted a draft of the Electricity Bill to the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy in August 2001, a bi-chamber, all-party 
committee that debated the bill for fifteen months.  A number of changes were suggested 
to strengthen competition.  For example, the revised legislation stipulated a firm timeline 
for the implementation of open access, meaning the ability of industry to buy power 
directly from private generators.  After being passed by the Committee, with notes of 
dissent from the Communist parties, the bill returned to the Ministry of Power in 
December 2002.  The Ministry accepted only some of the Parliamentary Committee’s 
suggested changes.  Notably, a timeline for the introduction of open access was again 
omitted in the bill.  The new version of the bill was passed by the Indian Parliament in 
May 2003.  In contrast to the debate on the 1948 Electricity Act five decades earlier, the 
debate in the Lower House was brief—just over an hour—and was sparsely attended. 
   The scope of the act is wide, with implications for the structure, functioning, and 
regulation of the sector. First, while retaining transmission functions in government-
owned companies, it allows for open access in transmission and the phase-in of open 
access in distribution, along with scope for power trading. Undoubtedly the most 
controversial provision of the Act, as evidenced by the repeated insertion and deletion of 
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a timeline for this measure, open access would open the door to industrial flight from 
public power.  Second, to complete the agenda begun in 1991, it eliminates licensing 
requirements for generation, including captive generation by industries.  Third, it 
introduces a series of measures to address the management and finances of distribution 
utilities.  Specifically, the Act introduced mandatory metering and stringent provisions 
against electricity theft, together with a requirement that subsidies must explicitly be paid 
for out of state budgets.  Fourth, the Act decentralizes responsibility for rural 
electrification to local bodies, non-governmental organizations, cooperative societies, and 
private licensees.  It calls for universal electrification to be completed but contains few 
specifics regarding how this is to be accomplished.  Fifth, the Act introduced various 
consumer protection measures, notably creation of an Appellate Tribunal to hear cases 
appealed from the state or central regulatory commissions, and established an 
Ombudsman to hear consumer grievances.   
The basic thrust of the Act is to open the sector to private involvement and scale 
back the role of state governments.  But for many the Act does not do this fast enough or 
surely enough; the legislation is said to harbor an incumbency bias that protects the 
interests of existing utilities at the expense of consumers. In an editorial on the Electricity 
Act 2003, one of its early drafters, who had pushed unsuccessfully for including strict 
guidelines for the introduction of competition in distribution, argues that “delay in 
introducing open access means delaying competition and private investment.  Shortages 
will continue and consumers will have to rely on the public sector, which does not have 
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the resources for meeting the entire demand.  This seems a sure recipe for power 
shortages and high tariffs.”83  
 Another reading of the legislation is that numerous revisions have resulted in the 
inclusion of contradictory policy principles.  As one news article states, the act 
“incorporates viewpoints, ideas, concepts, constraints and requirements from a wide 
range of interested parties and has thereby undergone a number of changes.”84  The 
resolution of these contradictions will require several additional policy directives.  For 
example, the Act mandates a gradual reduction in cross-subsidies, which will entail 
dramatic tariff increases for rural and residential consumers.  Such a move would not 
only have electoral consequences, it is also not clear whether poor Indian consumers, 
particularly from rural areas, can afford cost-of-supply tariffs.  The Act also stipulates 
that whatever subsidies the states want to grant must come in a direct form, through a 
transparent payment to whichever utility is serving those customers.  However, since the 
early 1990s, and accelerating in the mid-1990s, the states’ fiscal resources have come 
under greater strain.  A direct subsidy might be possible in wealthier states, but for the 
majority of middle- and low-income states—the ones with the greatest number of middle- 
and low-income consumers—this is not feasible. 
 In sum, the Act no doubt represents a concerted effort to address the core issue of 
the distribution sector and its mismanagement, subsidy, and metering problems.  It also 
makes efforts to address broader public concerns, such as rural electrification and 
                                                 
83 Gajendra Haldea, “Empower Consumers: Plug Loopholes in the Electricity Bill,” Times of India, 16 
April 2003. 
84 “Empowering Contradictions in the Electricity Act,” Financial Express, 27 July 2003. 
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consumer protection. However, the zero-sum trade off between the core provision of 
open access, subsidies to agricultural and urban consumers, and the fiscal burden on the 




In the 1950s, India’s industrialists supported public control of the sector, a 
position that was buttressed by unchallenged global norms of state-led development.  At 
the time, low tariffs for industry reflected the lower marginal cost of supplying large 
urban customers, and India’s large farmers were not yet sufficiently organized or 
politically represented to pose a challenge.  Moreover, the country was governed by a 
single dominant political party in which disagreements between disparate interests were 
negotiated internally rather than on the electoral battlefield.   
By the 1970s, in some parts of India, the rural elite were better organized, and 
regional parties had emerged to represent these new interests.  Agricultural subsidies 
were adopted to increase India’s food supply after successive years of drought and under-
production.  Gradually, industrial tariffs rose relative to those for other consumers, and 
given the growing political importance of farmers in many states, industry had little room 
for negotiation with state governments.  
It is in this context that important differences in state political economies impact 
the kinds of policies that state governments pursue in the 1990s.  The coalitions that have 
a voice in government are distinct in different parts of India, and these important 
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differences in the array of the “dominant proprietary classes” impacts states’ policy 
choices, as we will see in the forthcoming chapters.  
At the national level, however, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new global 
ideology that emphasized private over state ownership provided a ready vehicle for 
industrialists to articulate dissatisfaction with the high cost and poor quality of electricity.  
Many industries were producing their own power and sought to sell the excess back to 
the SEBs.  After several state-level experiments, demands for a fundamental shift in 
electricity policy were satisfied by the passage of the Electricity Act 2003, which 
mandates significant institutional changes, like the dismantling of the SEBs and the 
introduction of competition in distribution.  However, many state governments have been 
reluctant to adopt policies that would be politically damaging, particularly with respect to 
tariffs.   
During the 1990s, differences emerged among India’s states in terms of how, and 
how fast, marketization took hold.  It is these differences that the following four, state-
level case study chapters address; when looked at together they provide a picture of the 
varying trajectories of electricity policies in India.   
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Chapter 3:  Orissa:  The leading edge of utility privatization  
 
Hard Decisions are a must.  No development is possible without human sacrifice.  Be it 
Ashoka or Peter the Great, human lives perished but that is how their great empires 
flourished. In Chernobyl or Bhopal, human sacrifice was the cost that one had to pay for 
development.  When aeroplanes first started, people were sacrificed.  The development of 
rockets sacrifice scientists.  So for any human development, there have been human 
sacrifices galore.  So why do we shy away from paying a price for development? 
-Biju Patnaik85 
 
In a scenario where the world situation is changing fast we should be poised to grab the 
opportunities that come our way and do away with dilatory bureaucratic fetters which 






Throughout the 1990s, an aggressive global consensus advocated that capital-
scarce economies with growing energy needs should turn to private sources to set up new 
generating plants.  By the late 1990s, however, it had become clear to many of these 
same advocates that the electricity sector could not be fixed merely by allowing private 
companies to sell power from new plants to existing state-owned electricity companies to 
distribute to consumers.  Since this realization dawned in India, as Chapter 2 outlines, the 
central Indian government and multi- and bilateral donor organizations have been 
advocating privatization of electricity distribution utilities.  Despite this strong urging, 
however state governments have resisted privatization.  By 2004, almost a decade after 
                                                 
85 Biju Patnaik, “Soft State, Hard Decisions” Times of India, June 13, 1993, as told to Sabina Seghal; 
Reprinted in “Brainstorming Deliberations of Biju Patnaik,” Orissa Review (February-March) 2005: p.42. 
86 Biju Patnaik, Meeting of the National Development Council, June 18-19, 1990. Reprinted in 
“Brainstorming Deliberations,” Orissa Review, p. 31. 
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the first national-level conference was organized to promote the policy in Jaipur, 
Rajasthan, only two regional governments, in Orissa and Delhi, had privatized 
distribution systems.   
This chapter and the next analyze the political economic conditions in which these 
two cases of privatization unfolded.  Although we can identify for each case a unique 
combination of proximate causes of privatization, in both cases the lack of organized 
rural consumers and the fact that neither state had strong ties to rural interests were 
important factors in explaining the greater policy autonomy in Delhi and Orissa 
compared to other states in India.  
Pairing Orissa and Delhi also offers a way to test whether privatization is 
primarily driven by the policy preferences of actors outside the state, like national elites 
in Delhi or multinational elites at the headquarters of the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, as other explanations of privatization in Orissa have emphasized.87  
However, Delhi, which privatized its distribution system a few years after Orissa, did so 
without pressure from international institutions.  In that case, the critical factors were 
politics internal to Delhi and to some extent, dynamics between central government-
owned generating companies and the Delhi government.   
In both states, the all-important agricultural lobbies that had benefited from 
subsidized power were absent.  As Delhi grew from the 1960s to the 1990s, the rural and 
agricultural hinterlands were taken over for industrial, urban residential, and commercial 
                                                 
87 A. Thillai Rajan, “Power sector reform in Orissa: an ex-post analysis of the causal factors” Energy Policy 
28 (2000): 657-669 provides a typology of three layers of causal factors—context, trigger, and facilitator—
and lists a number of variables in these categories, including World Bank lending terms, OSEB insolvency, 
state fiscal crisis, support of OSEB chairman, weak farm sector, and support from state and central 
government.   
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uses.  This process meant that by the 1990s, there were very few agriculturalists and only 
a small quantum of power was put to agricultural use in Delhi.  In Orissa, by contrast, a 
majority of the population depended on agricultural for their livelihoods.  However, 
agriculture historically had suffered from underdevelopment, including a neglect of rural 
electrification.  Whereas some state governments could claim that 100 percent of their 
villages were electrified as early as the late 1980s, rural electrification covered less than 
80% of villages in Orissa by the early 2000s.   
One possible reading of modern Indian political history is as a process of 
progressive democratization.  In such a reading, the point of origin might be in the 
colonial period, when the British conceded limited suffrage to Indians in provincial 
legislative bodies.  The franchise expanded gradually during the colonial period, and then 
increased exponentially following independence when the Indian constitution guaranteed 
universal suffrage in the first national elections held in 1952.  Within the framework of 
universal franchise, the social composition of the political class changed slowly over 
time, as the logic of numbers in the electoral game, and political organizing along lines of 
caste and community brought new social groups to power.  In some parts of India, this 
process began even before independence, when peasant castes challenged the social, 
political, and economic dominance of high caste groups primarily through non-Brahmin 
movements, which were particularly strong in parts of south India and western India in 
the 1920s and 1930s.  Following independence, numerically strong, middle peasant castes 
seized state power in other regions of the country, as in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh from the 
late 1980s to the present.  
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This process, in which old, or traditional, elites were first challenged and then 
displaced by aspiring social groups, has not affected Orissa nearly as much as other parts 
of the country.  The political class of present-day Orissa is very similar in terms of both 
socio-economic profile and caste identity (high caste with professional and industrial 
backgrounds), to the political class that formed during the nationalist era.  Many of the 
same personalities remain in place, or in some cases their sons, wives, and sons-in-law 
have stepped in to fill their roles.   
The vision of development that has held sway in Orissa likewise has not changed 
significantly over time.  The focus, as the chapter suggests, has been a supply-side model 
of development with an emphasis on industrialization, and it is in this context that 
privatization of electricity became important for the state elite’s agenda.  Infrastructure 
bottlenecks were a significant reason that the state could not attract private industrial 
activity.  But the efficiency gains that would accompany privatization were believed to be 
sufficient to turn around Orissa’s industrial fortunes.  Privatization promised to deliver 
more reliable power to industrial consumers at lower costs, an outcome that has largely 
been achieved in Orissa.  The anticipated negative consequences of privatization were 
higher tariffs for rural and residential consumers and the decline of the state’s rural 
electrification program.  Yet, as the quote that opens this chapter suggests, the chief 
minister who initiated privatization, Biju Patnaik, discounted these related welfare costs. 
These were simply the necessary price to be paid for development.   
     In 1993, the government of the eastern state of Orissa started a process that, 
three years later, would result in the complete overhaul of the state’s electricity system.  
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By 1997, significant portions of the utility were privatized, sold to one Indian and one 
American electric power company.  Unlike previous attempts to reconfigure electricity 
systems in India, which had focused mainly on changing the mix of publicly and 
privately generated electricity, the plans in Orissa involved changing the ownership 
structure of the system in its entirety, not only its generation but also distribution and 
transmission systems.   
By most measures of economic rationality, Orissa was the least likely candidate 
for such a radical experiment.  Not only was the state among the poorest in India on many 
indicators of human, social, and economic development, but electrification had proceeded 
much less rapidly in Orissa than in other parts of India.  As Chapter One details, rural 
electrification was among the foremost concerns driving nationalization of the sector in 
the late 1940s, prompted by the track record of the colonial-era private electric companies 
that had concentrated their energies in India’s towns and cities, largely bypassing its 
villages.  If the completion of publicly subsidized rural electrification was the marker of a 
mature electricity system, one ripe for a change in form and function, a more advanced 
state, like Punjab or Haryana would have made a likelier candidate for privatization than 
Orissa, which still had a great many un-electrified villages.   
Why did the government of Orissa privatize given these constraints?  I suggest 
that the explanation lies in the contours of social and political power in the state.  Most 
existing accounts for Orissa’s unlikely privatization focus on the lending terms imposed 
by the World Bank.  Those studies that do mention the importance of state-level factors, 
like features of Orissa’s political economy, do so only in passing.  While the importance 
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of actors like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Indian central 
government should not be discounted, this analysis focuses on the state’s political 
economy.  I suggest that privatization of the electricity sector—with all of the promises 
that it afforded—was a pragmatic decision taken by a political elite committed to 
development through large-scale industrialization.  
Although Orissa’s population is primarily rural, there have been no significant 
agrarian political movements in the state of the kind seen in other states to translate the 
numerical majority of the countryside into political power in the state legislature.  This is 
primarily the result of the state’s socio-economic structures, and how post-independence 
politics served to concentrate power within a primarily urban political class located in the 
coastal districts of the state.  Although close to half of the state’s population are below 
the poverty line, no movements have emerged to steer government policy in a pro-poor 
direction, especially no state-wide movements linking the poor, the lower castes, and 
tribal populations from the coastal and hill regions of the state.  The nature of social 
fragmentation along caste and tribal lines might play some part in explaining this 
absence.  Privatization of public enterprises—in this case the public electricity utility—
was therefore allowed to proceed in the absence of resistance from those communities—
rural and poor—who would be most negatively impacted.  Among the handful of existing 
analyses provide explanations for Orissa’s privatization program, some note the low 
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levels of electricity consumed by the farm sector as an important factor.88  Here I account 
for why Orissa’s farmers were less reliant on electricity than those in other parts of India.     
I also suggest that in analyzing the political economic context surrounding 
Orissa’s decision to privatize, it is important to consider not just the low agricultural 
consumption but the huge potential for industrialization in Orissa.  The existence of 
significant coal, bauxite, and iron ore among other resources in Orissa held out to its 
political leaders the promise of rapid industrialization through natural resource extraction.   
The politician who initiated Orissa’s privatization program, Biju Patnaik, had a history as 
a champion of industrialization that stretched right back to the nationalist period, when he 
himself was briefly among the state’s leading industrialists.  Patnaik’s rise to political 
power in the 1990s coincided with larger shifts in government policy that opened up 
industrial production to the private sector, making the kind of industrialization he had 
long envisioned viable, not through the public sector as he had earlier imagined, but 
through private capital.  In contrast to the period of the 1990s when the machinery of the 
state was applied in earnest to the task of industrialization, in earlier periods the 
industrializing agenda of political leaders was thwarted, first under British colonial 
governance and after independence, due to Orissa’s weak bargaining position vis-à-vis 
other states in India’s federal system.   
                                                 
88 Navroz K. Dubash and Sudhir Chella Rajan, “Power Politics: Process of Power Sector Reform in India” 
Economic and Political Weekly (September 1, 2001): 3367-3390 suggests that Orissa privatized because 
the state had no rural opposition and its chief minister believed the state utility would be imminently 
bankrupt.  One government perspective, articulated in D.V. Ramana, Banikanta Mishra, and Birendra K. 
Nayak, “Power Sector Reform in Orissa: A Case Study of Restructuring” in Orissa Development Report 
(New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 2001), 376-408, points to the poor performance 
of OSEB as the main cause of the reform program.  A second government perspective, contained in 
“Report of the Committee on Power Sector Reform of Orissa” (Bhubaneshwar, Orissa: Government of 
Orissa, October 2001), also proposes that the primary reason for the reforms was OSEB’s inadequacy, but 
further suggests that the shape of the program was guided by World Bank plans. 
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The argument that follows examines the leading faction of the state’s political 
elite to delineate the developmental vision of Orissa’s political class, one that envisaged 
industrialization through Orissa’s mining and mineral resources.  Some studies within the 
literature on the political economy of reform—both scholarly and journalistic—examine 
state-level variables, as opposed to external pressures.  Often such work references the 
elusive “political will to reform.”  This study attempts to account for the presence of such 
a will in the poor state of Orissa.  I situate the events of the 1990s in a longer political 
economic history, of which economic liberalization is merely the most recent chapter.     
In the case of Orissa, electricity sector privatization was the outcome of a 
confluence of factors:  a driving belief in industrialization within the state’s political elite, 
coupled with a lack of political pressure from the rural sector and the ascendancy of a 
new global model that promoted private sector-led development, particularly in the 
energy sector.  The case shows that explaining privatization as the product of external 
pressures (from the World Bank or the central government) is insufficient, given that this 
pressure is sometimes applied to little effect, as in other Indian states.  State-level 
political economic variables comprise the structural conditions that allow such external 
pressures to find their mark.  
 
Two Orissas:  the Coastal Plains and the Inland Hills 
 
Orissa is not unique in having stark differences among its various geographic 
regions.  Differences between regions in India’s states can be categorized in a number of 
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ways.  Sub-regions can have different political histories.  The majority of Indian states 
comprise both lands that were formerly governed by indigenous rulers, called princely 
states, as well as ex-British territories.  The integration of regions with such disparate 
pasts into single, unified states has been difficult in many instances and has had varying 
degrees of success.89  Sub-regions can also differ according to linguistic communities. 
Many of these differences got sorted out by the States Reorganization Act of 1956, which 
rationalized the chaotic administrative divisions of the British Empire to approximate 
linguistic homogeneity within each state.  Regions can also have very distinct social 
profiles; for example, caste and community hierarchies are distinct in each region and 
sub-region of India.  Sub-regions within modern Indian states also differ according to 
their economies, due to differences in physical attributes that favor some kinds of 
economic activities over others, and to the legacies of differing political economic 
institutions, like agrarian property rights.  
The two regions of Orissa—the coastal plains and the inland hills—are starkly 
different along most of these dimensions.  And integration within the single state of 
Orissa for the last fifty years has not successfully erased or even attenuated these 
differences.  If anything, the existence of a single political apparatus has thrown into 
relief the economic, political, and social domination of the people of the coastal plains 
over those of the inland hills.90   
                                                 
89 John R. Wood, 1984, “British versus Princely Legacies and the Political Integration of Gujarat,” Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (November): 65-99. 
90 Manoranjan Mohanty, “Class, Caste and Dominance in a Backward State:  Orissa” in Dominance and 
State Power in Modern India, Volume 2, ed. Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (Delhi, New York: 
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The language spoken by the majority of Orissa’s approximately 36.8 million 
residents is Oriya, although the language has numerous regional dialects.  Of the total  
 
Map 2.  District map of Orissa, 2001 
Source: Office of the Registrar General, India 
Copyright: Public domain 
 
population, 16.5 percent is part of the Scheduled Castes, and 22.1 percent is from the 
Scheduled Tribes, giving Orissa the highest total concentration of these two historically 
marginalized communities among India’s major states.91  The coastal districts have a 
relatively smaller percentage of SC and ST residents compared to the inland districts.  
For example, in the coastal districts of Puri and Cuttack, SCs and STs comprise 19.1 and 
23.7 percent of the populations respectively.  In the inland districts of Mayurbhanj in the 
                                                 
91 The following demographic data are drawn from Census of India 2001, “Table 00-005: Total Population, 
Population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and their proportions to the total population” (New 
Delhi: Government of India, 2001).  Article 46 of the Indian Constitution enjoins the Indian state to provide 
special protections for the educational and economic interests of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), or former ex-
untouchables; and Scheduled Tribes (STs), also called adivasis, or indigenous people.   
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north, Sambalpur in the west, and Koraput in the south, SCs and STs make up 64.9, 44.9, 
and 69.3 of the populations respectively.92 
In addition to the differences in social composition of the two regions, there are 
physical differences that continue to impact the kinds of economic activities practiced in 
each region.  Whereas a more traditional sedentary agriculture is dominant in the fertile 
coastal plains, in much of the inland districts villagers still practice a kind of slash and 
burn agriculture, and additionally rely on resources from the forest itself.  Orissa has 
abundant mineral and mining wealth; the state hosts 98% of the country’s chromite 
reserves, 35% of nickel, 23% of manganese, 23% of dolomite, 24% of coal, and 22% of 
iron ore.93  These resources are concentrated in the inland districts, which is also the case 
in many other hilly parts of India that are inhabited by scheduled tribes.94   
Orissa’s most important natural resources are coal and bauxite.  Bauxite, 
primarily used in the production of alumina, has been found in the inland districts of 
Bolangir, Sambalpur, and Kalahandi, all in the western hills.95  Currently, the bulk of the 
bauxite is mined in Korpaut, another inland district, by NALCO, the National Aluminum 
Company Limited, which is owned by the central government and is India’s—and one of 
the world’s—largest exporter of bauxite.  Orissa and the state of Bihar in northern India 
have more than half of all of India’s coal reserves.  Orissa has 47.9 billion tons of proven 
                                                 
92 B.N. Sinha Geography of Orissa, 3rd edition, (New Delhi:  National Book Trust, India, 1999), 182.   
93 S.N. Johri, “Nalco’s role in Orissa’s Development” in Reference Orissa: An Indian State of Eastern 
Region (New Delhi: Enterprising Publishers, 2000), 342-346. 
94 Jharkand, which was carved out of Bihar and made a separate state in 2000, is one such example.  It is 
wealthy in natural resources and heavily populated by scheduled tribes.  
95 B.K. Mohanty, “Mineral Development Prospects” in Reference Orissa: An Indian State of Eastern 
Region (New Delhi: Enterprising Publishers, 2000) 453-458. 
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coal reserves, which amounts to 23% of all of India’s coal wealth, whereas Bihar has 67.8 
billion tons, or 33% of the total.96   
The coastal areas of Orissa (primarily the original districts of Puri, Cuttack, and 
Balasore that were further divided into smaller districts in 1993) were a part of the British 
territories, as were a few districts in southern Orissa (Koraput and Ganjam).  These 
regions consist of very fertile agricultural lands which further benefited from early 
irrigation infrastructure.  A private British company constructed Orissa’s first canal 
system in the early 1860s.  This was augmented by the British administration in the early 
1900s, spurred by a famine in 1865-66, giving agricultural production some degree of 
freedom from the vicissitudes of the monsoon.97   
The modern political differences between coastal and inland Orissa have their 
roots in the late-colonial period, when the elites of the two regions had very different 
engagements with the national independence movement.  In the 1910s and 1920s, leaders 
from the British regions first were politicized through a movement called the Utkal 
Sammilani that demanded the unification of all Oriya-speaking areas, spanning British 
and princely regions.98  Most of its leaders—men like Madhusudan Das, Gopabandhu 
Das, and Gopabandhu Chaudhury—came from the southern coastal areas ruled by the 
British, and were of upper caste backgrounds.99  Rank-and-file support for the Utkal 
                                                 
96 U.K. Mohanty, “Potential for Coal Mining” in Reference Orissa: An Indian State of Eastern Region 
(New Delhi: Enterprising Publishers, 2000) 459-466. 
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Sammilani came mainly from the middle classes in coastal Orissa.  Typical of 
Anderson’s “creole nationalists,” the elites of British Orissa parleyed English-language 
educational opportunities into employment in the British administrative services.100  
Although initially theirs was a regional cause, they were later well-integrated with the 
national independence movement of the Congress party.  Along with elites from other 
regions of India, they pushed the national Congress leadership in 1920 to accept linguistic 
identity as the organizing principle of states within the new nation.101  With this, the 
fortunes and activities of the regional movement were more directly tied to those of the 
national movement.   
The remainder of Oriya-speaking territory was governed by myriad princely 
states.  The princes served as intermediaries through whom the British collected taxes, 
which was in marked contrast to the practice of direct taxation in the coastal regions.102  
Relations between the princely rulers and British crown were at times antagonistic but 
during the nationalist period, the princes often cooperated with the British to suppress 
political dissent.103  During the late colonial period, the Congress movement helped to 
                                                 
100 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verson, 1983). 
101 This was part of the Congress resolution adopted in 1920 in Nagpur and laid the groundwork for the 
linguistic federalism that followed independence, in which new states were created to unite linguistic 
communities. 
102 Mohanty, “Class, Caste and Dominance,” 320.  The British inherited the system of treating the coastal 
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Rath, The Law of Zamindari Abolitiion (Cuttack, Orissa: Lark Books, 1965), 19-20.  The book by Rath 
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103 Biswamoy Pati, Resisting Domination: Peasants, Tribals and the National Movement in Orissa: 1920-
1950 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993), 62-69 documents the rajas complicity with the British during the non-
cooperation movement of 1920-22. 
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establish ancillary organizations, called Praja Mandals, in each of these feudatory states 
to inculcate nationalist sentiments there.  The leaders of these cells mostly hailed from 
the middle-classes that had migrated from the coastal areas to the inland areas to seek 
expanded administrative opportunities.104  This means that at a critical moment in the 
nationalist era, the Congress party failed to incorporate the royal families of these 
princely states, choosing instead to ally with an immigrant elite.  The effect of this was to 
consolidate the locus of political power in the post-independence Congress party with the 
coastal elites rather than sharing party power between the elites of two regions.  The 
numerical superiority of the coastal districts over the inland districts ensured that in the 
representative framework of independent India, Congress remained the strongest party in 
the state.  
The lack of political cooperation between the Congress party and the erstwhile 
princes continued through independence.  In the 1946 elections, one year before 
independence, the Congress won an overwhelming majority.  Rather than give ministerial 
posts to any princely leaders, two members of the Praja Mandals were given positions.105  
In 1948 after the creation of Orissa, two ex-princes, Singh Deo and P.K. Deo, 
spearheaded the effort to form a new party. 106  The party, based among the former 
princely states in the inland regions, was named the Ganatantra Parishad (GP).  The 
party’s success in subsequent state elections was due largely to the feudal ties that 
continued to bind tribal and lower caste populations of the former princely estates to their 
                                                 
104 Mohanty, “Class, Caste and Dominance,” 348. 
105 Jena, “Political Parties in Orissa,” 486.  
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erstwhile lords.  The existing historical, social, and economic differences between the 
coastal and inland areas were also useful to these feudal elites in consolidating their 
position as legitimate rulers.  They could articulate a set of distinct interests for inland 
Orissa, and claim that the Congress party’s domination by coastal elites rendered that 
party an ineffective representative organ for non-coastal citizens.107   
Following independence the coastal areas were merged with twenty-four of the 
twenty-six Oriya-speaking princely states that covered the northern and northwestern 
parts of modern Orissa.  In the three elections to the legislative assembly of unified 
Orissa, held in 1952, 1957, and 1961, the electoral contest was a bipolar one between the 
Congress party and the GP.  While each party contested seats in both coastal and hilly 
districts, the election results demonstrate that the GP’s base was in the hills while the 
Congress dominated in the coastal districts.108  Although both parties were dominated by 
upper castes, the economic profiles of the two parties’ members differed.  In the 1957 
election, of the members of the legislative assembly from the GP party, the two largest 
socioeconomic groups were ex-princes or zamindars (20%) and cultivators (20%), but 
almost no businessmen.109  The membership of the Jana Congress and the Utkal 
Congress, two major offshoots of the Congress party in Orissa based in coastal Orissa, 
included landowners as well as professional politicians, administrators, and businessmen.  
In the case of the Jana Congress for example, the overwhelming majority (64%) of 
legislators were upper castes; 44% were social or political workers, 16% were ex-
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zamindars, and none were cultivators.110  Of the Utkal Congress MLAs in 1974, 34% 
were cultivators, 20% were businessmen, and 14% were school teachers.111   
Orissa was among the earliest states to enact land reforms when the government 
passed the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951.  However, the implementation of this 
legislation, and a later piece that placed upper limits on land ownership called the Orissa 
Land Reforms Act of 1960, however, was not uniform across the state.  The large estates 
in coastal areas were abolished for the most part, whereas the large estates of inland 
Orissa were left intact.112  Both of the above-mentioned acts had explicit provisions that 
served as loopholes for land landholders.  In the case of the earlier act, although the 
preamble states that the act “extends to the whole of the State of Orissa” and that “it shall 
come into force at once,” for an estate to become vested, that is revert to state ownership, 
the state government had to issue a notification.113  Requiring an act of government for 
the legislation to take effect created possibilities for delays or selective implementation of 
the legislation.   
The 1960 legislation to eliminate large landholdings also contains important 
exceptions to the law.  In this case, the government exempted “efficiently managed 
farms, orchards or plantations situated in compact blocks in which heavy investments or 
permanent structural improvements have been made and whose break up is likely to lead 
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to a fall in agricultural or industrial production.”114  A later study of the effects of this act 
determined that close to 90% of the cases that were prosecuted under this legislation 
came from the four coastal districts of Puri, Cuttack, Balasore, and Ganjam, again 
suggesting that the large estates in inland areas were spared.115  The result of this was a 
greater fragmentation of estates in coastal areas and a progressive weakening of rural 
interests there. 
As Januzzi argues, one important reason for the differential implementation of the 
law was the lack of clear historical records of land ownership.  Although this situation 
obtained across India, the problem was particularly severe in the eastern regions 
(including Bihar, West Bengal, and Orissa), and ex-princely states where the zamindaris 
and landholders themselves held the only records of land ownership and tenancy.116  
Although smaller socialist and communist parties were active in Orisas, these 
were concentrated in the coastal areas.  In contrast to West Bengal to the north, no 
political movements of rural poor emerged in Orissa.  Partly this was the product of how 
caste and class interacted in the state.  The largest peasant caste in Orissa, or backward 
caste, are the Khandayats.117  In the absence of political mobilization by communist or 
socialist parties, arguably, this community would have been the most likely base from 
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which a broad-based, cross-caste, and pro-poor movement could have emerged.  The 
analogs of the Khandayats in the states of Bihar and Maharashtra are the Yadav and 
Maratha caste clusters, respectively.  In Orissa, however, wealthier Khandayats tended to 
identify upwards, with higher castes, in a form of sanskritization whereby as a 
community becomes more prosperous its members claim a higher status in the social and 
ritual hierarchy of caste.118  Less well-off Khandayats invariably were lumped with lower 
caste groups.  As Kumar proposes, the Khandayats were thus divided along class lines 
and therefore unlikely to emerge as the basis of a broad-based, backward caste revolution 
in Orissa like the ones that emerged in north India in the 1990s.119  
In 1962, the GP merged with the Swatantra party, which was then the second 
largest party at the national level and had a profile as India’s major conservative party, 
one opposed to the Congress’s state intervention and land reforms policies.  Swatantra 
represented a union of multiple species of Indian conservatism, including those coming 
from business, bureaucratic, and rural elite backgrounds.  The incorporation of traditional 
rural elites was accomplished partly by way of co-opting regional associations of landed 
elites, of which the GP is a prime example.120  In Orissa, the Swatantra and the Congress, 
whose leadership had by then changed hands to a younger generation of leaders, 
continued to be the two largest parties through the 1960s, each aligned at different 
moments with smaller parties formed by defectors from the Congress.   
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In 1970, the national government passed a constitutional amendment abolishing 
the hereditary and financial privileges (called “privy purses”) of the ex-princes, privileges 
that had been granted by the Indian government as part of the accession agreements of 
the princely states to the new India union.  With this, the Congress party at the center 
ensured the eventual dissolution of princely political formations, and what had been a 
fairly sharp political split between coastal and inland Orissa began to fade.121  The 
election held in 1974 was the last in which the Swatantra Party made a strong showing.  
In the three elections prior to the GP’s merger with Swatantra (held in 1951, 1957, and 
1961), the party secured between twenty and twenty-nine percent of the total vote.  As 
Swatantra, the conservative base in Orissa garnered 22.6% of the vote in the 1967 state 
assembly election, 17.4% in 1971, and only 12.1% in the 1974 election, the last in which 
it contested.122      
Although in the early decades inland Orissa was dominated by the GP—the party 
of the ex-princes—the new SC and ST politicians that emerged in these areas, due largely 
to reservations, found their home in the Congress party.123  This continued in subsequent 
decades.  In the seven state elections from 1971 to 1995, twenty-two seats were reserved 
for SC candidates, and between thirty-three and thirty-four for ST candidates in an 
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assembly of between 140 and 147 members.124  Reserved seats comprised between thirty-
eight and forty percent of the total.  Although the ST members of the assembly constitute 
the largest social group in the legislature, neither they nor the SC members form a 
cohesive political lobby in the assembly, instead always occupying a subordinate position 
to upper caste leaders within the mainstream political parties, primarily the Congress.125  
The subordination of the leaders from poor and historically marginalized communities 
within the Congress apparatus also explains why no broad-based, pro-poor political 
movement emerged in Orissa. 
 
The possibilities for industrial development  
Since the colonial period political leaders of coastal Orissas had a vision of 
industrializing the state, one that was stymied by different factors under different political 
regimes.  In the colonial period, British policies reduced levels of industrialization all 
over India, and Orissa was no exception.  In the postcolonial period, Orissa found itself in 
a weak bargaining position in India’s federal system.  Central investments, key to 
development during these decades of capital scarcity and in an industrial policy climate 
that limited the potential of private capital, were often directed at more politically 
influential states.  The 1990s, however, brought a radical break with previous policy, 
opening up industrial sectors to both indigenous and multinational capital.  The major 
obstacle to industrialization in Orissa in this period, however, was limited infrastructure.  
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Privatization of electricity was willingly embraced by Orissa’s political elites as a means 
of signaling that the state was committed to economic liberalization and committed to 
providing industry’s basic infrastructure requirements—power and transport.   
Since the early nationalist period, the political class in Orissa emphasized the 
potential for industrialization in the state.  Madhusudan Das, the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century leader of the Utkal Sammilani, the movement to unify Oriya speaking 
areas that originated in British Orissa, requested the colonial government for funds to 
establish industries in British Orissa, which were denied.126  One generation later, in the 
late colonial period, Gopandhu Das studied the economy of pre-British Orissa and was 
convinced that British colonial policy had de-industrialized Orissa, destroying what were 
once flourishing indigenous salt and textile industries.  He lobbied the British, again 
unsuccessfully, to establish a Department of Industry and an engineering school to 
facilitate industrial growth in the state.127  That these two men and those who inherited 
their political legacy came from among the urban middle classes of British India is no 
accident.  Their beliefs were shaped by their position as English-speaking functionaries in 
the British administration; their understanding of economic development came from their 
familiarity with British and European trajectories of economic growth and 
industrialization.128  
After Independence the Congress party continued to draw support from the urban 
middle classes and affluent peasants in coastal Orissa.  In 1971, a large contingent of 
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Congress leaders defected to form another party.  This party, initially called the Utkal 
Congress, joined the broad-based coalition that opposed Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule 
from 1975-1977, changing its name first to the Janata Party and later to the Janata Dal.  
The leader of Janata Dal in Orissa was a charismatic politician named Biju Patnaik, who 
had entered politics during the nationalist period, using his skills as a pilot to the benefit 
of the nationalist movement and working within the fold of the broad-based Indian 
National Congress.  Very much in the mold of Jawaharlal Nehru, Patnaik had a vision of 
Orissa’s development that focused on large-scale industrialization with an emphasis on 
science and technology education.  He believed that Orissa would only emerge from the 
ranks of India’s poorest states by taking advantage of its abundant natural resource 
wealth.  Patnaik first undertook to industrialize the state as a private entrepreneur in pre-
Independence India; his firm, B. Patnaik & Co. was Orissa’s first private limited 
company, founded in 1944.129  After several years of building an industrial house based 
in Orissa comprised primarily of textiles and steel, Patnaik entered politics and gradually 
relinquished his industrial holdings.130   
One biography recalls that Patnaik often said that “business and politics were the 
two sides of the same profession,” suggesting that the shift from one to the other was a 
natural one for him.131  Other interpretations suggest that Patnaik turned to politics after 
realizing that the emergence of a regional bourgeoisie, something he hoped his own 
entrepreneurial activities would spearhead, would be delayed in the case of Orissa for two 
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reasons.  First agricultural activity in the state did not yield a surplus, critical to the 
development of such an industrial bourgeoisie in other Indian states.132  Secondly, the 
state lacked the requisite communications, energy, transport, and educational 
infrastructure to entice substantial investment.  Patnaik’s vision for the development of 
Orissa—one alert to these lacunae—is summed up in the following statement: 
 
Produce more power from water and coal, take it to villages, set up 
suitable industries at every stage, the village, the group of villages and 
the region and organize technical schools not in isolation but as integral 
parts of the industrial fabric on the one hand and the educational stream 
on the other.  Improvements in transport and communication and other 
items of economic and social overheads will of course have to be 
dovetailed into the above patterns.133 
 
 In the absence of a regional capitalist class, Patnaik thought of the state as the 
most promising vehicle for investment.  Patnaik spent his early political career firmly 
entrenched in state-level affairs to advance the agenda of state-led industrialization, first 
serving as chief minister from 1961 to 1963 while still a Congress politician.  He was not 
able to serve a full term then due to national-level political developments.134   
Until 1970, he was closely allied both ideologically and strategically to the 
Congress Party at the center, led by Nehru for the bulk of that time.  He was a proponent 
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of central planning and development led by a mix of public and private investments.  As 
his earlier incarnation as an industrialist suggests, he was not idologically opposed to the 
private sector.  Rather his support of central planning and public investment was strategic 
and pragmatic.  Ironically, however, these strategies may partly explain why Orissa never 
developed according to Patnaik’s vision, despite his influence in state politics and even 
occasionally at the national level.   
Under India’s central planning regime, investments were meant to be spread 
across the regions to secure balanced growth.  This meant that Orissa’s large natural 
resource wealth could not be exploited with the immediacy that the state’s political elite 
imagined.  Orissa frequently received even less than its fair share of investments, due to 
the political dynamics played out within India’s federal structures. Many states in India 
complained of “step-motherly” treatment from the central government.  Orissa was no 
exception.  Responding to this inequity, at one point in his political career when his own 
allies were in power at the center, Patnaik theatrically threatened secession.135  Within 
this framework of a dominant center and centralized planning, states that sent large 
contingents to parliament in Delhi exercised the greatest amount of influence over 
investment decisions.  Orissa’s relatively small population meant that the state accounted 
for a small number of members of parliament.  The state could never wield the political 
clout of more populous states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, or Tamil Nadu.  
Data on the state-wise per capita expenditures in India’s central plans, for example, show 
that for most of India’s five-year plans, per capita expenditures in Orissa were lower than 
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those in the more politically influential states of Punjab, Maharashtra, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu.136   
During his first term as chief minister, Patnaik fought fraught political battles to 
secure central investments in Orissa.  In 1962, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., the public 
sector company that was India’s most significant producer of aviation equipment and 
engines, was selecting sites for new plants that would build Mig fighter planes in 
collaboration with the Soviet Union.  Y.B. Chavan, the chief minister of Maharashtra, 
jostled with Patnaik, each hoping to draw the investment to his own state.  Only after 
Patnaik threatened resignation did the central government decide to locate a new factory 
in the Koraput district in southern Orissa.  Two other factories were built at the same 
time, one in Nasik and another in Lucknow, located respectively in Maharashtra and 
Uttar Pradesh, two far more populous and politically influential states.137  After moving 
from state politics to the center, Patnaik continued to work towards channeling 
investments to his home state.  As a cabinet minister in the two Janata national 
governments that followed Indira Gandhi’s Emergency, first in the role of Minister for 
Steel and Mines from 1977 to 1979 and Minister for Steel, Mines, and Coal from July 
1979 to January 1980.138  As Union Minister, Biju Patnaik brokered a deal for the 
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construction of an aluminum plant—NACLO—the construction of which was begun in 
1981 under a Congress government elected to Orissa in 1980.139   
 
A feudal hold-out 
The dreams of industrialization that so clearly captured the imagination of elites 
in the colonial period and of others, like Patnaik, in the post-Independence era, were not 
shared universally.  In a study of the relationship of federalism to central planning in the 
Fourth Plan Period (1969-1974), we can read the ambivalence of elites from inland 
regions of Orissa towards large-scale industrialization.140   
In 1965, during the Third Plan Period, the Indian government commissioned a 
private company to conduct a study of possible locations for new steel plants in the 
country.  The company, M.N. Dastur and Co., was instructed to consider technical and 
economic factors in their analysis, including sourcing of raw materials like ore and coal, 
and access to major transport facilities.  The company’s report concluded that two sites in 
Orissa, one in the northwestern Sundargarh district and another in the central Nayagarh 
district, were the most suitable for the construction of large-scale integrated steel plants.  
One year earlier, in 1964, the governor of Orissa had submitted a study to the national 
government that also made a case for these two sites and one other in Orissa as being 
ideal for constructing new steel plants.   
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By 1969 it was clear that the central government intended to initiate three new 
steel projects.  In 1970 Indira Gandhi announced unexpectedly that three new plants 
would be built during the Fourth Plan Period, one each in the southern states of Andhra 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka.  In making this announcement, she failed to 
mention the rationale for their selection or the logic of excluding Dastur’s 
recommendations in Orissa.  Das, who provides a careful account of this episode, blames 
party politics and the ad hoc nature of planning for this suboptimal outcome.141  In 1970, 
Indira Gandhi was a fighting for supremacy against an opposition stronghold within her 
party, known as the Syndicate, and in pouring such huge investments in these three 
southern states she was guided by a logic of political survival.  Some of the most 
dynamic leaders of the Syndicate like Kamaraj, Sanjiva Reddy, and Nijalingappa, came 
from the favored southern states, and by locating central investments in their home states, 
Indira was attempting to build alternative allies and undercut her opposition.   
The southern governments also effectively lobbied for the investments.  The chief 
minister of Tamil Nadu, Karunanidhi, threatened to reject the Fourth Plan entirely unless 
his state was given a steel plant.142  In the state of Andhra Pradesh, there were widespread 
and occasionally violent popular demands for a new steel plant.  In explaining why some 
government leaders lobbied for investments while the chief minister of Orissa claimed to 
be unaware of the new projects, Das focuses on politics at the center.  As he argues, had 
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the policy process been guided by very clear directives, then each state’s chief minister 
would have known about the proposed investments. 
What Das neglects, however, are the potential explanations for this non-event that 
come out of a reading of Orissa’s political economy.  The Orissa government from 1967 
to 1971 was formed by a coalition of the Swatantra party, composed of feudal elites from 
the inland districts, and the Jana Congress.  The chief minister was R.N. Singh Deo, an 
ex-maharaja (ex-prince), of Patna, a nineteenth-century kingdom that was located in the 
present-day district of Balangir in western Orissa.143  The main electoral and political 
base of the coalition was in the west, the region most ideally suited for new steel projects.  
A new plant would have required the government to claim land from local landlords and 
villagers, causing the destruction of some villages in their entirety and certainly effecting 
a radical transformation of the environment in and around the proposed plant, which 
might have engendered popular protests.   
In 1946, the then-British government started to construct the Hirakud Dam on one 
of the major rivers flowing through Orissa, the Mahanadi (literally “great river”).  The 
dam was built in the inland Sambalpur district but the benefits of flood control would 
accrue primarily to the coastal residents.  In the rhetoric of the agitations, the “Katkis,” (a 
pejorative term used by Orissa’s inland residents to describe the people of the coast 
derived from the name of the city Cuttack), were destroying the lives of the inland 
villagers for their own benefit.  R.N. Singh Deo, at that time an emerging local leader, 
and other ex-princes were crucial supporters of the agitation, from which they gained 
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significant popular support.144  Whereas Singh and the others could have emphasized the 
irrigation benefits that would also flow from the dam and accrue to the villages in the 
area, instead they used the anti-dam protests to consolidate an inland political identity, 
one pitted against the powers of the coastal elites.   
In light of this history, then it is not surprising that the same Singh Deo as chief 
minister in 1970, failed to press the central government for a steel plant in Orissa.  Singh 
Deo publicly claimed ignorance of the proposed investments, which seems unlikely given 
that so many parliamentarians and legislators from Orissa, as well as the chief ministers 
of other states, had full knowledge of the plans.  The author of this study, B.C. Das reads 
the Orissa government’s failure to lobby the center for a steel plant in 1970 as “directly 
related to the ad hoc nature of decision-making process at the centre itself” rather than a 
strategic move by the chief minister to avoid a project that would more than likely 
alienate his political base.145   
Eschewing industrialization, the Swatantra-Jana Congress coalition of the late-
1960s enacted several pieces of legislation that favored the interests of landowners.  The 
government eliminated land revenue requirement and reduced irrigation fees, both of 
which measures benefited larger landowners, particularly those with access to irrigation 
facilities, rather than smaller landholders or agricultural laborers.146  
These policies were reversed, however, once the strength of the feudal elites 
declined in the mid-1970s.  After that point, political power was almost entirely in the 
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hands of an upper caste modernizing elite, ensuring that such an episode would not be 
repeated.  At that time in other parts of the country, a new class of commercially-oriented 
farmers was rising to prominence in state-level politics following the Green Revolution.  
In Orissa, where the Green Revolution never firmly took hold, no new agriculturally-
oriented elites emerged to contest the authority of the remaining political class, most of 
whom continued to be upper caste and have either professional or business backgrounds.  
From that time forward, the state government seemed firmly committed to large-scale 
industrial projects.  Although there was a flourishing two party system for much of the 
period from the mid-70s to the mid 90s, there was bipartisan agreement on development 
policy.  The pace of development, however, was restricted by Orissa’s weak bargaining 
position in the federal system. 
 The Congress party led by J. B. Patnaik, ruled Orissa throughout the 1980s.  
During the 1980 election, when candidates in neighboring states, like Andhra Pradesh, 
were making populist promises of subsidized electricity for farmers and subsidized grain 
for consumers, J. B. Patnaik pledged to bring the state “1000 industries with 1000 crore 
in 1000 days.”  One of the biggest obstacles to the promised industrial growth, however, 
was a paralyzing lack of electrical power.147  The central government had nominally 
approved the construction of a new thermal power plant during the 6th Five Year Plan, 
but the plan was never implemented.  As a consequence, industrial growth in terms of the 
value added to the state’s gross domestic product, slowly considerably during the 1980s 
relative to earlier decades.  
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Table 8: Decadal Growth in Orissa’s Industrial Sector (average % growth rate during the decade) 





1960s 3.61 5.98 23.45 
1970s 4.25 2.05 21.05 
1980s 2.6 3.22 16.38 
Source: Vinod Vyasula and A. V. Arun Kumar, “Industrialisation in Orissa: Trends and Structure,” 
Economic and Political Weekly Vo. 32, No. 22 (May 31, 1997): M46-M53.       
 
The dismal growth rates of the industrial sector are also reflected in the sectoral 
composition of the net state domestic product.  From 1987-88 to 1999-2000, whereas the 
percentage share of the primary sector in Orissa declined by 4.91% and the secondary 
sector share declined by 66.27%, the share of the tertiary sector increased by 22.62%.  
The share of Orissa’s secondary sector declined more sharply than in any other state in 
India.148 
Against the economic backdrop of industrial stagnation, continuing widespread 
poverty, and an inattention to agriculture, changes in the state’s political party structure 
masked deeper continuities in the social composition of the state.  The electoral field was 
dominated by two parties until 1967 (Congress and GP), by three parties in the 1971 and 
1974 elections (Congress, the Congress offshoot Utkal Congress, and Swatanra), and by 
two again from 1977 to 1995 (Congress and Janata Dal).  Throughout the last period, the 
Congress and the Janata Dal drew their electoral support and financial backing from the 
same social groups in the eastern part of the state.149  Many of the ex-princes from the 
western districts joined the national Bharatiya Janata Party during the course of the 
                                                 
148 Planning Commission, Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007) Volume.3 (New Delhi: Government of India, 
2002), p. 38. 
149 Kumar, “Janata Regionalized.”  As Kumar argues, the Janata Dal’s profile as an upper caste party 
strongly contrasts with its backward caste identity elsewhere, particularly in Bihar.  This analysis of the 
social bases of Congress and Janata Dal is also made in Mohanty, “Caste, Class and Dominance,” 356.   
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1980s, and by the late 1990s, the Janata Dal—renamed the Biju Janata Dal after the 
doyen of the party died in 1997—contested elections jointly, and formed the government 
elected in 2004.   
From its creation as an independent state to the present, the social composition of 
Orissa’s political class has come primarily from the two dominant high castes—Brahmins 
and Karans (often translated as Writer caste), and from urban, professional and business 
backgrounds.   
Table 9:  Social Background of Orissa’s Chief Ministers 
Dates Name of Chief Minister Caste background Social / Professional background, 
nationalist leader 
1952-1957 Nabakrishna Choudhury Karan From landowning family, nationalist leader 
1957-1961 H. K. Mahatab Kshatriya (Rajput) Founded the Oriya news daily, Prajatantra, 
nationalist leader 
1961-1963 Biju Patnaik Karan Former industrialist; during nationalist 
period published Oriya edition of Bengali 
newspaper Amrit Bazar Patrika; published 
Kalinga from 1960-1967, nationalist leader,  
1963-1965 Biren Mitra Karan Helped to publish news daily, Janasakti, 
nationalist leader 
1965-1967 Sadasiba Tripathy Brahmin  
1967-1971 R. N. Singh Deo Kshatriya (Rajput)  Former prince of independent feudatory, 
Balangir-Patra; landowner 
1971-1972 Biswanath Das Brahmin Lawyer 
1972-1976 Nandini Satapathy Brahmin Owner of publishing company, Daily 
Newspapers of Orissa, starte Oriya daily, 
Dharitri, in 1974 
1976-1977 Binayak Acharya Brahmin Teacher / Headmaster 
1977-1980 Nilamani Routray  Editor of Prajatantra, Nationalist leader 
1980-1989 J. B. Patnaik Karan Editor of editor of English-language 
Eastern Daily and Oriya Prajatantra; 
Founded Saraswati Press  
1989-1990 Hemananda Biswal Member of Scheduled Tribe Teacher 
1990-1995 Biju Patnaik See above See above 
1995-1999 J. B. Patnaik See above See above 
1999 Giridhar Gamang Member of Scheduled Tribe  
1999-2000 Hemananda Biswal See above See above 
2000-present Naveen Patnaik Karan Son of Biju Patnaik 
Source: R. P. Shastry, “History of Press in Orissa” Orissa Reference Annual 2005 (Bhubaneshwar: Government of 
Orissa, 2005): 198-203; “Bio-data of Chief Ministers of Orissa” Orissa Reference Annual 2004 (Bhubaneshwar: 
Government of Orissa, 2005); In most cases, caste identity can be imputed from last name.  
 
During the nationalist period, many prominent leaders in Orissa and elsewhere started 
regional language presses as a way to stimulate and spread anti-colonial sentiment.  Many 
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of the first generation of Orissa’s political class, then, had direct experience in the printed 
public sphere, with backgrounds in journalism and publishing.  The strong link between 
the political and publishing worlds continues to characterize present-day Orissa.150  The 
table above lists the chief ministers of Orissa to the present along with their caste and 
professional backgrounds.  In many other parts of India, the political strength of the 
countryside had always found a strong reflection in state elections.  Starting in the late 
1970s, the countryside’s influence consolidates at the state-level and spreads even to 
India’s central institutions.  In 1952 only 22.5% of parliamentarians in India’s lower 
house came from farming backgrounds; by 1989, this had increased to 40.4%.151  These 
trends largely bypass Orissa.  Although a more exhaustive study of the entire state 
legislative assembly is beyond the scope of this chapter, it would provide more 
substantial evidence for the proposition that the social composition of the Oriya state 
changed little over time.   
 
Political-Economic Context for Privatization in Orissa 
 
In elections that were held in 1990 in Orissa, Biju Patnaik, arguably the most 
influential leader in Orissa’s postcolonial history, returned with an overwhelming 
majority to the chief ministerial office.  In his second stint as chief minister Patnaik 
served a full five-year term.  Not only was this a complete term, but it can be considered 
a more successful one in that he was able to steer development policy towards greater 
                                                 
150 Robin Jeffrey 
151 Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside, 88-89. 
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industrialization.  From his early belief in private entrepreneurship during the nationalist 
and independence periods, to a commitment to state-led development during the Nehru 
years, by 1990 Patnaik returned full-circle, frustrated that four decades of central 
planning had not benefited Orissa and newly energized by the possibilities of private 
capital.   
1991 is often marked as the start of liberalization in India.152  Following a foreign 
exchange crisis, India entered an agreement with the IMF in 1991.  In that year, a number 
of policy measures were enacted to liberalize the trade and investment environments, 
chief among them increasing foreign ownership limits in certain sectors.153  The 
electricity sector was among the earliest impacted by these changes, as Chapter 2 
describes.  The cumulative effect of these measures was to send a signal that India was 
open for business to both foreign and indigenous private companies, which responded 
with a raft of investment proposals.   
Biju Patnaik’s election campaign in 1989 consisted of three major planks.  The 
first was for a new steel plant in the state, and the other two were to reduce farmers’ loan 
                                                 
152 A number of studies are devoted to dating and explaining the start of economic liberalization.  Most 
recently, Atul Kohli, “Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005” (forthcoming, Economic and 
Political Weekly, 2006) contends that a significant shift in government policy occurred as early as 1980, 
under Indira Gandhi.  Kohli describes the shift as a prioritization of productivity and growth over questions 
of distribution, and the new liberalizing policy as one modeled as a pro-business (rather than pro-market) 
strategy, intended to mimic the successes of East Asian economies.  
153 Ministry of Industry, Government of India “Statement of Industrial Policy, July 24, 1991.” The first 
industrial policy was passed in 1948, as the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948.  This was updated in 
1956, and periodically amended and emended (1973, 1977, 1980) before the most recent statement was 
released in 1991.  The 1991 statement focuses on relaxing industrial licensing requirements, facilitating the 
entry of foreign investment and foreign technology, introducing competition to areas that were once the 
preserve of public sector firms, relaxing anti-trust policies through changes to the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), and finally, taking measures to “unshackle the Indian industrial 
economy from the cobwebs of unnecessary bureaucratic control.”   
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burdens and to confront corruption in the government and bureaucracy.154  Politically, 
Biju Patnaik was initially in a strong position to carry out his election promises.  His 
party had won the elections with an enormous majority.  Out of the 147 seats in the state 
legislature, Janata Dal (JD) politicians won 129, easily displacing the Indian National 
Congress (INC) government that had held the executive branch previously.155  The 
remaining seats were filled by independent politicians and members of the communist 
parties.  The JD’s victory was not so overwhelming, however, when judged by actual 
votes; 54% of the votes cast went to the JD, whereas its main opposition party, the INC, 
won roughly 30% of the votes but only ten seats.156   
Analyses of the election suggest that Patnaik’s personal charisma was responsible 
in large part for the Janata Dal’s success, suggesting that his command over his own 
partymen would be considerable.  One of Patnaik’s fellow party-men stated “Biju-baba is 
the heart and soul of this government. The remaining could at best be termed ringside 
spectators.”157  That Patnaik held a similar view of his importance in the party and 
government became clear by the way he formed his government.  In addition to 
occupying the chief minister’s post, Patnaik also reserved for himself several other 
cabinet ministries; Patnaik held the home, general administration, industries, mining and 
geology, and planning and coordination positions.  The list itself is suggestive of what 
Patnaik believed would be critical during his term—anything related to the industrial 
development of the state. 
                                                 
154 Ruben Banerjee, “Iron hand: Biju Patnaik asserts himself,” India Today, April 15, 1990, 45, 48.   
155 Ruben Banerjee, “Clean sweep:  Biju’s charisma carries the day,” India Today March 31, 1990, 57, 59.   
156 Election Commission of India, “Statistical Report on General Election, 1990 to the Legislative 
Assembly of Orissa” (New Delhi: Election Commission, 1990). 
157 “Clean sweep,” India Today. 
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During a speech given early in his term, Patnaik expressed dissatisfaction that 
during the previous forty years Orissa had been able to neither “improve the relative 
position vis-à-vis other states in the matrix of economic development” nor change the 
“pattern of intersectoral contribution to the net domestic product over the years.”158  That 
is, Orissa remained an overwhelmingly agrarian state, and central planning had been 
unable to alter this.  The share of the primary sector in the net state domestic product 
(NSDP) fell from 55.09% in the early 1980s, to 47.04% one decade later, and to 39.23% 
at the end of the 1990s.159  Despite the shrinking economic contribution of agriculture, 
the population of the state continues to be overwhelmingly rural and tied to the land.  
This suggests that agricultural has suffered from a steady decline in productivity.   
Between 1950-51 and 1988-89, the primary sector (including agriculture, forestry, 
and mining and quarrying) grew at an average annual rate of 2.25%, in contrast to the 
4.13% growth of the secondary sector (including manufacturing, construction, and 
electricity) and the 3.5% growth of the tertiary sector (trade, hotels, transport, banking, 
real estate, public administration).160  The tertiary sector—the engine of growth in the 
state—made up 30.5% of the NSDP in the early 1980s and expanded to 46.03% in the 
late 1990s.  Relative to the rest of India, Orissa has extremely low levels of 
industrialization.  In a ranking of the fifteen largest states in the country in 1986-87, 
Orissa occupied the fifteenth position in terms of the percentage of value added by its 
                                                 
158 Biju Patnaik, remarks made to the Meeting of the National Development Council on June 18-19, 1990.   
159 Sakti Padhi, “Economic Growth, Structural Change and Workforce Characteristics” in Orissa 
Development Report (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 2001), 71-106.  Padhi’s 
contribution is Chapter 3 of the report, and the data on sectoral composition of the GDP is from Table 3.4, 
76. 
 
160 Padhi, “Economic Growth, Structural Change and Workforce Characteristics,” Table 3.2, 74.  
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factory sector.161  This was roughly the same position Orissa occupied in the preceding 
three decades.   
Foreshadowing the radical turn that Orissa would make towards the private sector, 
in the same speech Patnaik also complained of “dilatory bureaucratic fetters which stifle 
initiative and growth.”162  And in a later interview, he condemned the inefficiencies of the 
public sector, which “employ five men where one is required.”163  He also betrayed an 
authoritarian streak, asserting that “no development is possible without human sacrifice.  
Be it Ashoka or Peter the Great, human lives perished but that is how their great empires 
flourished…So why do we shy away from paying a price for development?”164  Patnaik’s 
course of development has been followed assiduously by numerous successive 
governments in the state.  Privatization of electricity, which is arguably the most 
significant economic input for any industrial activity, was a critical means of forging the 
path.   
 
FDI in Orissa 
 The government of Biju Patnaik that came to power in 1991 in Orissa inherited a 
state with severely restricted investment capacity, an abundance of natural resource 
wealth, and a new central government policy meant to encourage private industrial 
                                                 
161 Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy, Vol. 2: 
States, (Mumbai: CMIE, 1990 and 1991), cited in Keshab Das, “Industrialisation in Orissa: Structure, 
Policy and Prospects” in Orissa Development Report (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning 
Commission, 2001), 200-222.  Das’s contribution is Chapter 6 of the report. 
162 Biju Patnaik, remarks made to the Meeting of the National Development Council on June 18-19, 1990. 
163 Biju Patnaik, interviewed by Sabina Seghal, Times of India, June 13, 1993.  
164 Biju Patnaik, interviewed by Sabina Seghal, Times of India, June 13, 1993.  
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investments.  Orissa thus emerged as an important destination of private investment 
interest, particularly for large-scale projects.   
 
Table 10:  Break down of Industrial Entrepreneurs Memoranda (IEMs) from 1991 to 1995, selected states 
 IEMs filed 
8/91-12/95 









Andhra Pradesh 1432 352910 246 
Bihar 211 50660 240 
Delhi 432 62530 145 
Gujarat 3559 935420 263 
Haryana 1530 157590 103 
Karnataka 845 198550 235 
Kerala 240 51190 213 
Madhya Pradesh 1416 404430 286 
Maharashtra 4374 873860 200 
Orissa 160 55800 349 
Punjab 1245 160690 129 
Rajasthan 1298 227530 175 
Tamil Nadu 2055 278290 135 
Uttar Pradesh 2282 464230 203 
West Bengal 906 149720 165 
Source: For number and size of IEMs, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, Annual 
Report 2001-2002, available via www.indiastat.com.  Remaining column calculated by author. 
 
While the total number and size of proposed investments was much larger in other states, 
particularly the more industrially advanced states, the average size of the proposed 
investment was largest in Orissa, as Table 10 above documents.  The average size of all 
the investment proposals given in the table below is 205.8 billion rupees, whereas the 
average size of investments proposed in Orissa was 349 million rupees.  As a percentage 
of the state’s gross domestic product, these investment proposals were also far more 
significant in the poor state of Orissa than in other, more developed states.     
 Orissa’s share in total investments in India also increased from the pre-reform 
period to the post-reform periods.  The increase was even sharper in the heavy industries 
sector, which includes manufacture of non-metallic minerals, metals, metal products, 
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machinery, and transport equipment. Table 11 below gives the percentage of industrial 
investments for India’s large states during the pre-reform and post-reform periods.  The 
pre-reform period includes all industrial units in operation in 1993, so includes 
everything during the first four decades of centralized planning.  The post-reform period 
includes investments made from 1992-1998.  
 Table 11: Industrial investment in Indian states before and after liberalization 
State All industrial 
investment – pre-
reform share of 
national total (%) 
All industrial 
investment – post-
reform share of 
national total (%) 
Investment in 
heavy industry – 
pre-reform share of 
national total (%) 
Investment in 
heavy industry – 
post-reform share 
of national total 
(%)* 
Andhra Pradesh 8.55 6.22 11.30 5.29 (-53%) 
Assam 0.75 2.19 0.14 0.12 (-14%) 
Bihar 6.09 3.74 12.24 7.33 (-40%) 
Delhi 1.00 0.15 0.70 0.03 (-96%) 
Gujarat 10.05 16.89 5.60 7.80 (39%) 
Haryana 2.53 2.36 4.25 2.63 (-38%) 
Karnataka 3.66 7.17 4.96 8.69 (75%) 
Kerala 1.96 1.30 0.72 0.68 (-6%) 
Madhya Pradesh 6.33 7.94 8.86 11.66 (32) 
Maharashtra 18.11 13.44 16.42 14.98 (-9%) 
Orissa 4.67 5.96 7.12 11.85 (66%) 
Punjab 3.86 3.94 2.16 1.57 (-27%) 
Rajasthan 3.89 3.71 3.30 4.02 (22%) 
Tamil Nadu 8.48 8.71 5.27 9.46 (80%) 
Uttar Pradesh 10.68 8.15 5.39 6.32 (17%) 
West Bengal 7.30 5.64 10.16 5.59 (-45%) 
Source: Sanjoy Chakravorty, “Industrial Location in post-reform India: patterns of inter-regional 
Divergence and Intra-regional convergence,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (December 
2003): 120-152.  
* Figures in parentheses are the percent change in state’s share from the first to the second time periods. 
 
The share of investment in heavy industry as a portion of total heavy industrial 
investment in the country increased in six of the sixteen states given in Table 2.  These 
can be divided into roughly two categories.  In the first are Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and 
Gujarat, which were all middle to high-income states in the pre-reform period with 
dynamic economies anchored by a significant urban zone (Bangalore in Karnataka, 
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Chennai in Tamil Nadu, and Ahemdhabad and Surat in Gujarat).  Rajasthan, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Orissa—the three other states whose shares of investment increased—are all 
low-income states.  Given these large initial differences between these two groups, the 
dynamics of growth are most likely different for each.  Theories of agglomeration and the 
tendency for capital to “crowd-in” would predict investment to continue to flow to parts 
of the country that already had significant industrial activity, like the first category of 
states.  Of the three states in the second category, Orissa’s increase in investment (66%) 
was twice as large as the increase of Madhya Pradesh (32%), and three times as large as 
the increase in Rajasthan (22%).   
In 1990 and 1991, Orissa’s mineral and fossil fuel resources in particular were 
garnering international attention.  One such investment possibility was a joint-venture 
project between the state government of Orissa and the Jindal group of industries, another 
prominent Indian industrial house.  The joint-venture project was intended to fulfill an 
election promise.165  After that plant failed to materialize, Orissa formed another joint 
venture, this time with UK-based Caparo Industries to build a steel plant at Duburi, in the 
Jaipur district.166  The Indian public sector company, National Aluminum Company 
(NALCO), planned to build an export-oriented alumina refinery in tandem with Hydro 
Aluminum of Norway, to be located in the southern district of Koraput.167  In the same 
district (where the bulk of the state’s bauxite is found), two of India’s leading private 
                                                 
165 The first steel plant in Rourkela, Orissa was also the first public sector steel plant to be built by the 
Indian state under the company name Hindustan Steel Private Limited, which was later changed to the 
current name Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL).  Biju Patnaik promised that he would build a second 
steel plant for the state during his election campaign. 
166 Kunal Bose and Reuter, “Indian steel plant planned” Financial Times, January 5, 1993.  
167 Kunal Bose, “Indian alumina export project planned” Financial Times, October 15, 1992. 
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industrial houses, Indal (part of the Aditya Birla Group) and Tata Industries planned to 
build an alumina refinery.168  Similarly, Orissa’s chrome ore deposits,169 discoveries of 
platinum,170 and large reserves of granite171 were also garnering international attention.  
The sector that received the most private sector attention, however, was 
undoubtedly the electricity generation sector.  Orissa’s massive coal reserves were 
emerging in this period as the cornerstone of the Indian government’s plans to augment 
generation capacity.  The Central Electricity Authority had authored a plan to develop 
fourteen coastal thermal power plants, to be built and operated by the National Thermal 
Power Company (NTPC), whose history is discussed in Chapter Two.  These were to be 
considerably larger than existing plants, to benefit from economies of scale.172  NTPC 
planned to build the first five of these large-scale power projects all in South India, 
which, since these states are far away from the coal deposits in eastern and northern 
India, had come to rely on hydro power and were therefore dependent on the vagaries of 
the monsoon.  Although Orissa was not selected as an early site for the new plants, (three 
of which would be in Tamil Nadu, and one each in Kerala and Karnataka), the bulk of the 
coal to fuel these plants would be taken from the coal fields in Talcher in southeastern 
                                                 
168 Kunal Bose, “Indian companies link to build alumina plant” Financial Times, November 3, 1992. 
169 Kunal Bose, “Indians press for ban on chrome ore export” Financial Times, May 10, 1991. 
170 “Commodities at risk; Oil’s poor relations” The Economist, September 1, 1990. 
171 Kunal Bose, “India aims to boost granite exports” Financial Times, August 31, 1990. 
172 Central Electricity Authority, “Report of the Committee to Recommend Next Higher Size of Coal Fired 
Thermal Power Stations” (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Power, November 2003).  This 
report discusses the findings of an earlier committee, the Advisory Group on Technology Development, 
housed within the Ministry of Irrigation and Power.  This group submitted its first report in April 1986, was 
reconstituted in 1989 and completed an additional report in April 1990.  They recommended increasing the 
average size of new power plants to 750 MW.  
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Orissa and from Ib Valley in northern Orissa.173  There was even a tentative plan to 
export coal to France in exchange for joint-venture support from Charbonnage de France 
to Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., the Orissa-based subsidiary of Coal India, the public sector 
company in charge of all coal mining in the country.174  
In addition to the plans to export coal from Orissa, several other Indian and 
foreign firms, many of them American, initiated plans to build coal-fired power plants in 
the state.  By the 1990s, the integration of India’s transmission system was well-
underway.  This meant that technically, electricity could be generated where it made the 
most economic sense—close to coal mine pitheads and other fuel sources—and then 
efficiently carried to the industrial and urban load centers via high tension wires.   
Southern Electric International (SEI) started negotiations with the Orissa 
government in 1991, kick-started by a visit from Chief Minister Biju Patnaik to the 
headquarters of SEI, a subsidiary of the Atlanta-based Southern Company.175  SEI 
planned to build a Rs. 60 billion ($2.3 billion), power plant of 2,020 MW in the Ib 
Valley, one of Orissa’s two major coal sites, located in the far northwestern districts of 
Jharsugada and Sundargarh.176  The size and cost of the project, which the US company 
was to build, own, and operate, were unprecedented in Orissa.  A preliminary 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the vice-president of SEI and 
                                                 
173 “South Indian coal-fired schemes cleared by Delhi” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, January 14, 
1991. 
174 International Coal Report, “India plans to export to France” FT Energy Newsletters—International Coal 
Report, June 26, 1992. 
175 “US group considers big coal BOT scheme in Ib Valley” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, 
December 16, 1991. 
176 “US group win BOO deal in Orissa state” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, February 10, 1992. 
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Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in December 1991.177  A second US firm, Northeast 
Energy, planned to build a 500 MW plant located in the eastern Cuttack district, at a cost 
of Rs. 15 billion ($576.9 million).178  In 1992, an American firm, International 
Contracting and Marketing Corporation, based in New York, was attempting to put 
together a consortium of US firms to build several power plants in India, among them a 
coal-based plant in Orissa.  This was partly a product of the efforts of both the US and 
Indian governments to encourage American investments in the Indian energy sector.  In 
June 1992, an Indian delegation traveled to the US to encourage potential investors; this 
visit was reciprocated later in the same month when USAID hosted a seminar in New 
Delhi for US power companies.179  In the following year, AES Transpower, a relatively 
young US power company that was rapidly internationalizing its businesses, signed an 
MoU with the government of Orissa to build a 420 MW unit in Ib Valley.180  By then, 
SEI’s plans to build a megaplant in the same area had been discarded, and the 
government of Orissa through its electricity board, OSEB, was building a more modestly 
sized plant, consisting of two 210 MW units.  In October 1993, Pioneer Energy Inc., a 
consortium of US firms including giant energy companies like Duke, signed an MoU to 
build a 250 MW plant also in Ib Valley.181   
Like Orissa, other state governments were also hurriedly signing MoUs with 
private power companies, again mostly American ones.  The most active were Tamil 
                                                 
177 “US groups win BOO deal,” FT Energy Newsletters. 
178 “US groups win BOO deal,” FT Energy Newsletters. 
179 “More US groups join privatisation jamboree” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, July 13, 1992. 
180 “AES supplants So. Electric in Ib Valley project” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, January 18, 
1993. 
181 “Orissa fields draw bucks from US groups” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, October 25,1993. 
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Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka, all states that had huge future power demands due 
to the growth of the southern information technology hubs in Bangalore, Hyderabad, and 
Chennai (formerly Madras).  Orissa was in a different position from these other states in 
that its biggest growth potential lay in the power sector itself.  As mentioned earlier, the 
growing integration of the Indian electricity system through the expansion of high tension 
transmission lines that crossed state borders meant that Orissa could potentially serve as 
the power source for the economic growth of other states.   
The central government’s Power Grid Corporation was constructing the physical 
infrastructure of a national grid, which essential for power generated in Orissa to 
efficiently meet demand in other states.  Several state-level institutions remained as 
obstacles to this plan however.  Although the 1991 amendment to the Electricity Act of 
1948 opened generation to the private sector, distribution and transmission were still in 
the public sector.  From a monopoly, the system was transformed into a monopsony, one 
in which the sole buyer—the Orissa State Electricity Board—was an insolvent actor, 
saddled with debt, inefficiency, and electricity tariffs that were too low to cover the costs 
of either generating power in-house or purchasing from private companies.  Even as the 
heads of foreign companies were busily signing memoranda to build power plants, they 
were expressing worries about “tardy payment flow” from the SEBs.182   
Unlike other state governments, the government Orissa was quick to reassure 
private investors, resorting to a number of financial and political instruments.  The Orissa 
                                                 
182 “Siemens bids to build up stakes in power sector” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, March 9, 1992. 
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government’s first response was to provide a governmental counter-guarantee.183  The 
government also agreed that private companies could provide power directly to industrial 
consumers with governmental permission.   
In the negotiations with AES, the Orissa government took a further step.  After 
first signing a counter guarantee, the government later signed an additional tripartite 
agreement with AES and the central government, which guaranteed that if the company’s 
invoice was not paid, the amount would be deducted form planned assistance from the 
central government.184  The central government itself then signed a counter-guarantee.  In 
May 1993, OSEB signed a thirty-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with AES, the 
first such agreement in India.185  Between the PPA and the initial financing arrangements 
for the deal, it was clear that the government of Orissa and the Indian government were 
willing to shoulder considerable burdens to ensure the success of what was at the time the 
largest private investment in the energy sector.186   
The government of Orissa also took the unusual step of increasing electricity 
tariffs at a time when most other state governments were reducing or eliminating them.187    
                                                 
183 “Orissa yields on private sector payment guarantees” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, November 
30, 1992.  Orissa was the first to provide such a guarantee, although the practice became more common in 
later years. 
184 “AES supplants So. Electric in Ib Valley project” FT Energy Newsletters. 
185 “Financial Close nearly set for AES Ib Valley scheme” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, September 
19, 1994.  PPAs were routinely negotiated by multinational power companies, particularly for their projects 
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186 The financing structure allowed a 3.2 to 1 debt to equity ratio, higher than the norm at the time.  The 
equity contribution between the Orissa Power Generation Corporation (OPGC) and AES was $50 and $80 
million respectively.  Furthermore, although the US Exim Bank was providing a loan to cover 85% of the 
cost of US goods and services, four Indian public sector banks provided a guarantee for this loan, which 
shifted the risk to Indian institutions.  See “Financial Close nearly set for AES Ib Valley scheme” FT 
Energy Newsletters.     
187 “DESU slams in rate rises” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, September 13, 1993. 
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And in late 1993, the Orissa government declared that it would abandon all new 
generating projects.188  It also first began negotiating with a private company, Calcutta 
Electricity Supply Corporation (CESC), to take over distribution services.  CESC was 
one of a handful of existing Indian private utilities, serving Calcutta.  
 
The World Bank in Orissa 
 It was against this backdrop of ongoing negotiations for foreign investment that 
the World Bank was negotiating with the Orissa government to fund the Upper Indravati 
hydroelectric project.  The project, which was to serve the needs of electricity generation 
and irrigation, had a decade and a half of prior history.  It was first approved by the 
Orissa government in 1979, and initially received World Bank funding in June 1983.  The 
project suffered several delays throughout the 1980s, in 1991 due to floods, and again in 
1992, when a coffer dam built by one of the project’s contractors burst.  In 1991, the 
Orissa government agreed at the Bank’s behest to reorganize the Upper Indravati project, 
The Bank suspended its loan for the project in December 1991, in anticipation of the 
imminent reorganization.  Power sector reforms were a pre-condition to continued 
funding for the Upper Indravati initially.189  However, because of delays to the power 
sector reform project (because these required legislative and institutional changes), the 
Bank’s own documentation states that the two were technically unrelated.190 
                                                 
188 Power Asia, “Orissa tries privatisation” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, November 22, 1993. 
189 “OSEB gets set to restructure” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, October 31, 1994. 
190 Energy and Infrastructure Operations Division, Country Department II, South Asia Region, “Staff 
Appraisal Report, India: Orissa Power Sector Restructuring Project” (New Delhi: The World Bank, 1996), 
12-13.  (Hereafter referred to as World Bank, SAR: Orissa.)  Much of the following narrative about 
Orissa’s reform program is drawn from this lengthy report and another produced by the government of 
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In the early 1990s, the World Bank had re-evaluated its lending policies in the 
energy sector, deciding to “lend only to states that agreed to totally unbundle their 
electricity boards [separating them into discrete generation, distribution, and transmission 
entities], privatize distribution, and facilitate environmental reform and the private 
sector’s involvement in power generation.”191  From 1993 to 1996, the bank withdrew 
over $2 billion in non-performing loans to entities in the energy sector throughout India, 
and did not make any new energy sector loans.192  From that point on, all of the Bank’s 
energy and finance in India was directed toward restructuring SEBs, which it started to 
implement with loans between 1996 and 1999, of which Orissa was the first recipient.   
Biju Patnaik formally conveyed the Orissa government’s commitment to power 
sector reform in a letter to the Bank in November 1993.  The first step of the reform 
project included improving the financial and operational performance of OSEB, 
underwritten by a Bank loan initially granted in 1993, extended twice, and ultimately 
used in 1994 and 1995.  This first loan was also used to establish the reform program, 
hire consultants, and solicit funds from other bilateral and multilateral agencies, including 
the Asian Development Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development.  
In order to carry out the Bank’s restructuring vision, the Orissa legislature had to 
pass a new law.  The legislation dismantled the OSEB; created an independent electricity 
                                                                                                                                                 
Orissa:  Report of the Committee on Power Sector Reform of Orissa” (Bhubaneshwar, Orissa: Government 
of Orissa, October 2001).  The World Bank’s document sets out the aims of the project and how it is to be 
operationalized, while the latter is an assessment of the program two years after privatization was 
completed.   
191 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, “Reforming India’s Energy Sector (1978-99)” Precis 
No. 206 (Spring 2001), 2.  
192 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, “India: The Challenges of Development, Overview of 
Sectoral Assistance Evaluations” OED India CAE Working Paper Series No. 16 (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2002), 63-68. 
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regulator; guaranteed that tariffs would be set on commercial terms, to cover the cost of 
supply and yield a profit; and privatized transmission and distribution functions.193  The 
law was passed by the assembly in 1995 and ratified in January 1996, after an intervening 
election in 1995 returned the rival Congress party to power.  The new chief minister was 
a man named J.B. Patnaik (no relation to Biju Patnaik), who had been chief minister for 
much of the 1980s.  Although the government changed hands from the Janata Dal to the 
Congress, the new government continued to implement the existing development agenda, 
including the power sector reforms.  One month after taking office in March 1995, the 
new chief minister issued a formal statement of its power policy on April 20, 1995 that 
committed the government to the program and outlined a timeline.  In a press conference, 
J.B. Patnaik expressed the hope that “by the year 2000, Orissa will become the 
powerhouse of the country.”194   
 
Orissa State Electricity Board (OSEB) 
 
The overall financial and operational performance of OSEB was not dissimilar to 
that of SEBs in other states, as discussed in Chapter One.  For most years, the utility 
relied on government subventions to earn the mandatory 3% rate of return.  In 1990 this 
amounted to 7% of the utility’s revenues and in 1995 to 20%.195  
                                                 
193 Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995 (Bhubaneshwar: Government of Orissa, 1995).  The Act was passed 
on November 28, 1995, received presidential assent in January 1996, and came into effect in April 1996.  
194 Quote cited in “Power house in order” Outlook, September 18, 1996. 
195 N. Sreekumar, “Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics: A Case Study of Power Sector Reforms in Orissa” paper 
presented at the Asia Power Sector Reforms Workshop, 2002. 
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There were several characteristics of the Orissa electricity system that were 
distinct however.  The most important was its consumer profile.  As the earlier section on 
politics made clear, political control for most of the postcolonial period, (barring a brief 
moment from 1967-1971), rested with elites from coastal Orissa, whose electoral and 
financial base lay with middle class, upper caste, and urban residents and the more 
prosperous middle peasant farmers of the coastal districts.  Public investment over the 
decades largely reflects the urban and industrial bias of successive governments.  
Although rural electrification was a slow process everywhere, made especially difficult in 
the hilly terrain of western Orissa, the pace in Orissa was slower than in most other states.   
 
Table 12:  Classification of connected load, 3-31-1960 
 Industrial (%) Irrigation (%) 
Andhra Pradesh 47.4 13.3 
Assam 21.7 0.00 
Bihar 77.5 2.6 
Bombay 63.8 2.1 
Madras State 40.4 29.5 
Mysore State 62.9 10.7 
Orissa 89.3 0.14 
Punjab 41.1 14.2 
Rajasthan 33.5 5.3 
Uttar Pradesh 51.9 12.9 
West Bengal 64.0 0.00 
Source: Calculated using data from Central Water and Power Commission 
(Power Wing), Public Electricity Supply. All India Statistics: 1959-60 (Simla: 
Ministry of Irrigation and Power, Government of India, 1960), 48-49.  The state 
names reflect those of pre-linguistic states reorganization, so for example 
Bombay is present day Maharashtra and Gujarat, Mysore State is Karnataka, and 
most of Madras State is present day Tamil Nadu. 
 
In 1960, a much smaller quantum of electricity went towards irrigation in Orissa than in 
other states.  Orissa’s industrial connected load made up 89.3% of the state’s total 
connected load, whereas the connected load for irrigation use was .14% (see Table 12).  
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The only states which had a more skewed ratio were West Bengal and Assam.  The sales 
of electricity from this period reflect the same bias towards industrial consumption.196   
In the third plan period (1961-1965), which was the first period after OSEB’s 
formation in 1961, Orissa set lower targets and committed fewer resources to its rural 
electrification program than most other states.197  Orissa planned to electrify 165 villages 
(.34% of the total villages in Orissa according to the 1951 census) and allocated Rs. 14 
million, whereas Andhra Pradesh set its target at 925 villages (3.5% of all villages) and 
allocated Rs. 90 million.  The only states that invested less in rural energy than Orissa 
were West Bengal and Rajasthan.    
Orissa’s lax approach to rural electrification continued in subsequent plan periods.  
By 1983, only 43% of villages in Orissa were electrified.198  The only states with a worse 
record were Bihar (34%) and Assam (31%).  According to data on village electrification 
in 1991, Orissa continued to lag behind most other states.  Of Orissa’s villages, 67% were 
electrified.199  The only states with lower rates were in the underdeveloped northeast, 
such as Tripura (60%), Meghalaya (46%), and Mizoram (63%).  In contrast, Maharashtra, 
                                                 
196 Central Water and Power Commission (Power Wing), Public Electricity Supply: 1959-60, Table XLI, 
“Segregation of Sales in States,” pp. 56-57. 
197 Programme Evaluation Organisation, Report on Evaluation of the Rural Electrification Programme 
(New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 1965), particularly table giving “Provision, 
Expenditure, Targets, and Achievement of rural electrification during the three plans,” p. 18. 
198 Department of Power, Report: 1983-1983 (New Delhi: Ministry of Energy, Government of India, March 
1983), cited in Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Current Energy Scene in India (Mumbai: 
CMIE, May 1983), 60. 
199 “Department of Power, Annual Report 1990-91” (New Delhi: Ministry of Energy, Government of 
India), 12. 
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Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and Harayana boasted of 100% 
electrification.200  
Another way to gauge the extent to which agricultural production relies on 
groundwater resources for irrigation, and therefore on rural electrification, is by looking 
at the groundwater capacity in different parts of the country.  In states like Punjab and 
Gujarat, the groundwater table has receded rapidly due to excessive use of irrigation 
pumpsets, causing an ecological crisis in some parts of the country.  In Orissa, there are 
no parts of the state that the Central Groundwater Board (part of the central government’s 
Ministry of Water Resources) declares “over-exploited,” “critical,” or “semi-critical,” and 
according to one estimate in 1993, only 5% of the state’s groundwater capacity has been 
exploited.201   
By the 1990s electricity subsidies had emerged as one of the most important input 
subsidies to agriculture in India, one increasingly blamed for the poor fiscal health of the 
state governments.  Orissa was largely free of this problem.  Although farmers in Orissa 
were charged very low tariffs as they were in most other states, the amount of electricity 
consumed by farmers was negligible, constituting only 3.8% of all consumption in 1990-
                                                 
200 The village electrification data indicate only whether the electricity grid has reached a village; these data 
do not indicate household electrification, which remains low even in states that claim 100% village 
electrification.  In Orissa, there are additional reasons to believe that the official electrification rates are 
overly optimistic.  Tribal populations living in the hills often inhabit several settlements dispersed in a 
region.  Usually the government enumerates one of these—the one with the largest revenue generation—as 
the primary settlement.  Even when the core settlement is electrified, the ancillary hamlets most likely are 
not, because of which the electrification rate most likely is still lower.  See Rajkishor Meher, 
“Infrastructure” in Orissa Development Report (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 
2001), 54-70.  Meher’s contribution is Chapter 6 of the report.   
201 K. R. G. Nair, “New Economic Policy and Development of Backward Regions:  A Note on Orissa,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 9 (May 1993): 939-941. 
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91, when the national average was between 30% and 40%.202  By 1994-1995, agricultural 
consumption in Orissa had grown to only 5.1%.   
The second distinction between OSEB and other SEBs was in the degree to which 
the former relied on external sources of generating capacity.  OSEB was heavily reliant 
on electricity from NTPC.  The few generation assets that OSEB did own were privatized 
even before the distribution and transmission systems were sold, although the 
government retained ownership of the hydro sources.   
When the World Bank changed its lending practices to the energy sector, this had 
repercussions not just for the SEBs but also for utilities owned by the central government, 
like NTPC.  The World Bank’s requirement that energy utilities operate along 
commercial principles meant that NTPC had to better manage its bill collections from its 
largest customers, the SEBs.  One of the strategies NTPC employed to meet the Bank’s 
requirement was to negotiate with individual SEBs to take over generating plants as a 
way to eliminate debt.  NTPC reached such an agreement with Orissa in 1995, when the 
state sold its 460 MW power plant at Talchar to the central utility.  The two utilities 
initially disagreed about the value of the asset, which an outside consultant estimated to 
be Rs. 3.49 billion ($116 million).203  Ultimately, the plant was sold for Rs. 3.65 billion 
($121.7 million).204 
The other non-hydro generating capacity was managed by a separate public 
company, the Orissa Power Generation Corporation (OPGC), which was established in 
                                                 
202 Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Profiles of States (Mumbai: CMIE, March 1997), 297. 
203 “NTPC appetite for troubled units” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, May 30, 1994. 
204 “NTPC complete take over of Talchar units” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, June 12, 1995. 
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1984.  OPGC’s first plant—a 420 MW plant at Ib Valley—became operational in 1995.  
It was clear by the early 1990s that the state utility would not have sufficient resources to 
expand the project further, prompting the government to accept the bid from AES 
Transpower to build an additional 420 MW plant at the same site.  AES’s presence in 
Orissa’s generation sector was to play an important role in the course of distribution 
privatization.      
 
Restructuring and Privatization 
 In April 1996, after the reform legislation came into the effect, OSEB was 
dismantled and the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) was formed.  
OSEB was split into the Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO) and the Orissa Hydro 
Power Corporation (OHPC).  The former was further subdivided into four geographic 
zones that were to form the basis of the future privatizations.  Gridco remained as the 
public company in charge of transmission.  Several other departments within OSEB were 
disbanded and not reconstituted elsewhere, like the rural electrification division.  Much of 
the accumulated debt of the electricity system remained with Gridco in order that the four 
distribution companies could show positive net worth prior to privatization.205 
The formal agreement for the reform program was signed in July 1996 by four 
parties:  the World Bank, the Orissa government, the Indian government, and Gridco.  
                                                 
205 Balaji C. Mouli, “India: package to rescue Orissa power reforms under way” Financial Times, 
November 10, 1999.  
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The entire cost of the program was estimated to be $997 million, of which the World 
Bank’s contribution was to be $350 million.206   
In the initial design of the program, privatization of the four distribution zones 
was to occur sequentially, to benefit from iterative learning.207  A mini-privatization in 
1995 was meant to serve a demonstration effect, to prove that a private company could 
increase revenues and operational efficiency.  It would also give the state and the private 
company time to arrive at a mutually agreeable sale price.  The government invited bids 
for a two-year management contract to take over distribution services in most of 
Dhenkanal and Cuttack districts and the capital city of Bhubaneshwar.208  Of the four 
companies that bid, BSES, the private company that at the time operated only Mumbai, 
won the contract.209  The contract was later postponed for one year and transformed into a 
three-year contract.  The greatest challenge for the private company was to lower the 
transmission and distribution losses, which were estimated to be 45%; BSES promised to 
reduce these to 25% by the end of three years.210  A second challenge was to improve 
billing and collection, which at the time was between 75-80%; BSES pledged to increase 
this to 95%. 
 Less than one year later, in April 1997, the government revoked its contract with 
BSES on the grounds that the company had failed to honor one of the terms of the deal.  
                                                 
206 World Bank, “SAR: Orissa” 
207 “Report of the Committee on Power Sector Reform of Orissa” Government of Orissa, Section 3.5. 
208 “BSES b’thru in Orissa” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, October 30, 1995. 
209 Because of decades of state monopoly in the electricity sector, there were only a handful of private 
companies with sufficient expertise or interest in entering the distribution business.  A number of other 
states also were considering offering urban distribution zones to private companies under limited-term 
management contracts.  At the forefront of these efforts was Andhra Pradesh.  See Soutik Biswas and Sunil 
Dasgupta, “Switching to the private sector” India Today, April 15, 1995, 110-111.   
210 “Distribution deal for BSES” FT Energy Newsletters – Global Private Power, September 30, 1996. 
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According to Gridco, the successor to OSEB that retained distribution and transmission 
functions, BSES’s revenue collection from October 1996 to March 1997 had fallen short 
of its target.  For its part, BSES claimed that the failures were the fault of Gridco staff, 
who remained outside of the company’s administrative control under the terms of the 
contract.211  
 There were additional reasons for the contract’s termination.  When the 
distribution companies, or DISTCOs for short, were hived off from the other parts of the 
erstwhile OSEB, much of the debt was retained with Gridco, the company that remained 
state hands.  This was done to ensure that the distribution segments were attractive for 
private bidders.  From the time that the distribution zones were corporatized, however, 
they began amassing their own liabilities.  Some in the government worried that this 
decreased the likelihood of finding buyers.212  The state government also came to believe 
that a privatization process stretched out over a long period of time would create needless 
uncertainties in what was already an uncertain process, the first state-wide privatization 
of a public electricity utility in India. 
 The state initiated privatization of the four distribution companies in November 
1997.  The terms of the offer included full protections for current employees of the 
distribution companies, to avoid opposition from labor unions.  Initially twenty 
companies expressed interest in the offer by purchasing the government’s tender 
offers.213  Of these twenty, twelve companies and consortia submitted bids to the 
                                                 
211 “Orissa power privatisation runs into trouble” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, May 27, 1997. 
212 “Report of the Committee on Power Sector Reform of Orissa” Government of Orissa, Section 3.8. 
213 “India’s Orissa launches sale of distribution assets,” FT Energy Newsletters – Global Private Power, 
December 1, 1997. 
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government by April 1998 for 51% ownership of four distribution companies, known as 
Western Electric Supply Company (WESCO), Northern Electric Supply Company 
(NESCO), Southern Electric Supply Company (SOUTHCO), and Central Electric Supply 
Company (CESCO).214  Despite this initial enthusiasm from foreign and Indian 
companies, in the end only three firms submitted bids for the four distribution zones.   
 
Table 13:  Competitive offers received from three private consortia 
 value of 51% of 
distribution assets 
BSES Grasim Tata Electric 
Companies 
WESCO 248.1 545.9 369.8 16.4 (in million $) 
NESCO 336.1 336.1 No bid 7.1 (in million $) 
SOUTHCO 192.0 288.1 No bid 5.7 (in million $) 
CESCO 370.8 334.1* No bid 410.0* 
* offer made during second round of bidding 
Source: K. Ramanathan and Shahid Hasan, Privatization of electricity distribution: the Orissa Experience 
(New Delhi: TERI (The Energy and Resources Institute), 2003), 37. 
 
The government at this point was stipulating that no single company or 
consortium could take over more than two of the four zones.215  By April 1999, however, 
the government was forced to change this policy due to the paucity of reasonable offers.  
Ultimately, BSES assumed 51% ownership of three distribution companies, in the west, 
south, and north.  All are regions where there were few residential and agricultural 
consumers.  Gridco would continue to own 39% equity in the firms, and an employees’ 
trust would hold the remaining 10%.216   
 For the fourth zone, in central Orissa, the government received an offer from a 
consortium of Tata Electric Companies and UK-based Viridian company.  The 
consortium asked for the government to issue a six-month letter of credit, which was 
                                                 
214 “Orissa receives distribution system submissions” FT Energy Newsletters – Global Private Power, April 
1, 1998. 
215 “Orissa Distribution schemes find few bidders” FT Energy Newsletters – Global Private Power, January 
1, 1999.  
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meant to safeguard the company from an additional burden placed on this zone. In an 
earlier agreement, revenues from this zone were guaranteed to an escrow account to pay 
for power generated from OPGC, which was the result of the earlier privatization of this 
generating unit.          
 In 1998, 49% equity and management control in OPGC had been sold to the 
American firm AES, which was also in long-standing negotiations with the state to build 
additional coal-fired power plants at the same site where OPGC operated, in Ib Valley.217  
From the time the thermal plants of OPGD became operational, the company faced 
persistent problems in recovering bills from the state-owned Gridco.  In order for the sale 
of OPGC to be acceptable to AES, given this prior record of Gridco’s, the state had to 
provide an escrow account that guaranteed that revenues collected from the central region 
would go directly to the power generator. 
 Once the condition placed by the Tata-led consortium was deemed unacceptable 
to the government, the only private company that expressed interest in taking over the 
central zone was AES itself.  An earlier ban that prevented generating companies in the 
state from bidding for the distribution zones was lifted, clearing the way for AES to take 
over the central distribution company, or CESCO, as of September 1999.218 
 Gridco remained as a state-owned company in control of transmission functions 
in the state, which entailed buying power from generating plants and moving it along 
high tension wires to the distribution companies’ transformer sites.  The state remained, 
                                                 
217 “Report of the Committee on Power Sector Reform of Orissa” Government of Orissa, Section 5.32. 
218 “Orissa advances distribution company sales” FT Energy Newsletters – Global Private Power, May 1, 
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therefore, as a middleman between two sets of newly privatized entities: on the one hand, 
four private distribution companies; and on the other, private generating companies that 
owned both greenfield projects as well as formerly state-owned plants.  
 
Breakdown of reforms 
 From the start, all four of the new private distributors expressed dissatisfaction 
with the terms of the sale and the state’s tariff policy, which was established by the 
Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission.  On each occasion of a tariff revision, the 
distributors asked for a much more substantial tariff increase than OERC ultimately 
awarded.  Furthermore, the private companies claimed that the system losses were much 
higher than what the government had told them prior to privatization, on the basis of 
which they valued and bid for assets.  According to the project estimates, transmission 
and distribution losses averaged 39.5% in 1996-1997.  The reforms were meant to reduce 
these to 23% by 2002-2003.219  Almost immediately after assuming control of 
distribution, the private companies revised the T&D losses.   
 
Table 14:  Post-privatization estimates of T&D losses (%)  
 CESCO NESCO WESCO SOUTHCO GRIDCO’s 
estimate of total 
system losses 
1996-97 52.9 44.4 42.1 45.1 49.5 
1197-98 47.9 42.1 38.4 35.2 49.2 
1998-99 48.6 44.6 44.6 43.7 48.6 
1999-00 44.8 43.4 43.4 41.9 43.8 
2000-01 44.9 44.4 44.4 42.5 43.4 
Source:  “Report of the Committee on Power Sector Reform of Orissa,” Government of Orissa, Section 
4.21. 
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While three of the private entities owned by BSES continued to operate under sub-
optimal conditions, AES, which owned CESCO, eventually abandoned the distribution 
project entirely in 2001.  AES refused to pay for the power that it purchased from Gridco, 
which in turn claimed that its loss of revenues meant that it could no longer pay for the 
power that it purchased from OPGC, owned by AES since 1998.   
There were numerous reasons that this part of the privatization program failed.  
The terms of the contract governing the sale were unclear, leaving loopholes for 
malfeasance on the parts of the government as well as the private owners.  And according 
to an audit by India’s Comptroller and Auditor General, the government showed AES 
undue favor in the terms of the deal, suggesting the considerable lengths that the 
government was willing to stretch in order to find sufficient private buyers.220   
 AES cited myriad reasons for its dissatisfaction, including “deep-rooted flaws in 
the regulatory, policy and administrative environment.”221  The company also complained 
of recalcitrant employees, who were protected under the terms of the contract, and 
government and bureaucratic delays in releasing World Bank loan funds meant to be used 
for making capital investments in the distribution system.  The company also complained 
that some of its most delinquent customers were state enterprises and municipal 
bodies.222  This suggests that while the privatization program had support at the very top 
levels of Orissa’s governing class, those in the middle ranks of the government and 
bureaucracy were not as supportive. For its part, the government, Gridco, and the OERC 
                                                 
220 “Orissa power setback has a long history” The Statesman, August 4, 2001. 
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complained that from the start AES (and also BSES) failed to improve operational 
efficiency and invest in capital improvements.223   
 
The Benefits and Costs of privatization 
The Orissa government’s power sector reforms earned the state high marks in the 
initial period, and were useful as a way of spurring private investment to the state.  At the 
Indo-US business summit held in Calcutta in 1997, the United States secretary of 
commerce, William Daley, predicted that Orissa’s capital would be Southeast Asia’s 
most important commercial city in the next century.224  Private capital was equally 
hopeful.  Whereas the ratio of public to private investment in most states was about 
50:50, in Orissa, private capital counted for 71% of the total investment in the state, 
which may speak as much to the state’s own diminished capacity as its attractiveness for 
foreign investors.   
The primary “losers” of the restructuring and privatization programs were the 
residential and agricultural customers, whose tariffs rose steadily from the early 1990s 
onwards, and whose supply did not become more reliable in the privatized system.  Other 
casualties of the program were communities and households that had never been 
connected to the state’s electricity grid.  These were disproportionately located in the 
inland districts (although even the most electrified districts in Orissa still had dismal rates 
of electrification compared to prosperous districts in other states), and composed of 
                                                 
223 “OERC blames BSES, AES for Orissa power crisis” Financial Express, June 28, 2002. 
224 Cited in Nikhil Mookerjee, “Why Tomorrow Belongs to Kalinga” Outlook, December 29, 1997. 
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scheduled caste and scheduled tribe communities.225  As mentioned earlier, the rural 
electrification wing of the erstwhile OSEB was disbanded, and not reconstituted in any 
other government ministry.  The government expected the private distributors to carry on 
with rural electrification but did not provide any institutional or financial incentives, 
which meant rural electrification came to a halt following privatization.226     
Tariffs in Orissa rose steadily throughout the 1990s, although not at a pace to 
satisfy the new private owners.  The government raised tariffs as early as 1992 to signal 
its commitment to transforming the sector.  From 1992 to 2001, the average tariff 
increased 267%, although the increases were not the same for all categories of 
consumers.  Initially the tariff increases were concentrated on the industrial and 
commercial consumers, with the guarantee that the state would reduce the duration of 
forced power outages from ninety minutes each day to thirty minutes.227  From 1996-97 
to 2000-01, the largest increases were shouldered by domestic, commercial, agricultural, 
and small industrial consumers.  Tariffs for large industries remained largely stable over 
this period.228  It is likely that for industrial and commercial consumers, particularly the 
medium to large ones, the trade off between better quality supply and slightly higher 
prices was an acceptable one.  For the 50% of households subsisting below the poverty 
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line in Orissa who had access to electricity, however, even a modest increase in tariffs 
would have constituted a financial strain.  
 The project proposal agreed to by the World Bank and the government in 1996 
states that the most “important beneficiaries” would be the industrial consumers: 
 
Industrial consumers in particular will benefit from the improved 
quantity, quality and reliability of their power supply, since they 
account for the majority of consumption and bear the brunt of load 
shedding [planned power shutdowns] and other failures of supply.  
The Orissa government expects the state’s improved power supply 
outlook to attract additional industrial investment and encourage 
existing industries to expand their production facilities.  This 
expectation is fully in line with national surveys where 
industrialists consistently rate power supply as one of their most 
critical constraints.229  
 
In the lengthy, 222 page document, that includes details of the loan agreement, the reform 
program, and numerous appendices on various aspects of Orissa’s power sector, there is 
less attention to the low rates of electrification and development that characterize much 
of Orissa.  A later section states that the program is expected to only “indirectly help the 
poor by freeing up state funding…for higher priority use in the social sectors.”230  The 
privatization program was never expected to benefit either rural consumers or under-
served communities in the immediate term, or directly.  Rather the benefits would accrue 
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Conclusion 
 
This first case study of electricity privatization has pointed out the political 
economic features of Orissa that explain the government’s decision to privatize the 
electricity distribution sector.  The very factor that characterizes the state’s electricity 
grid as poorly developed—its low level of rural electrification—also made it the most 
politically viable as a candidate for privatization.  Absent a significant reliance on 
electricity for irrigation purposes, the rural interests that benefit from electricity subsidies 
in other parts of India were missing in Orissa, thereby removing the most significant 
political obstacle to privatization.  The explanation for why rural electrification as a 
critical element in a rural development program had never been carried out extensively in 
Orissa is located in the state’s historical political economy.  State-level politics in other 
parts of India had undergone significant political transformations in the decades leading 
up to and following independence, a process that transferred considerable power and 
subsequently resources to the countryside.  In Orissa, by contrast, the leading faction of 
the state’s political elite continued to be comprised of upper-caste, non-agrarian elites 
from the coastal districts of the state. 
While the role of the World Bank and the central government in supporting the 
privatization program are important, they cannot explain the whole story.  In this 
analysis, I lay emphasis on the local, state-level features of the political economy that 
explain why such external pressures were effective in Orissa and not in other parts of the 
country.  The next chapter, dealing with the privatization of electricity distribution in 
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Delhi, further elaborates the point that external pressures alone are an insufficient 
explanation for economic reforms in India.  In Delhi, the state undertook privatization for 
various internal reasons, without critical financial input from either bilateral or 
multilateral agencies.  
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Chapter 4:  Delhi:  A modernization story 
 
“I feel like a tailor who got a fabric in tatters and keeps stitching it.  Now they [the 
private companies] have to cope with it.”231 
Chief Minister of Delhi, Sheila Dixit, 




Throughout the 1990s, the Indian central government assembled the various 
states’ chief ministers in New Delhi to discuss power sector reforms on at least five 
different occasions.232  The goal of the early talks was to convince the states to invite 
private companies to build power plants, something of an easy sell as states were eager to 
augment electricity supplies in a way that required no other change or restructuring of 
existing public utilities.  By 1999, when Orissa was privatizing its electricity distribution 
infrastructure, there was a veritable explosion of agreements between states and private 
companies to build power plants, as I describe in Chapter 2.  Once the central 
government and various lending agencies realized that the fundamental problems of the 
electricity sector would not be solved by the entry of new private generating firms alone, 
but instead had to involve a more fundamental restructuring and change in ownership of 
existing infrastructure, the Indian government changed tack to press the idea of 
distribution privatization.   
                                                 
231 “Discoms rule out tariff hike,” July 22, 2002, Financial Express.  
232 Madhav Godbole, “Power sector reforms: If wishes were horses,” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 
37, No. 7 (Feb. 16, 2002). 
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Despite the center’s pressure and a system of incentives, three years after Orissa’s 
privatization, only one other state—Delhi—was ready to sell its distribution 
infrastructure.  The Delhi government took this decision despite the poor marks that the 
Orissa experiment was already garnering.  Why the Delhi government would take such a 
decision is the subject of this chapter.  I argue that in the first instance, what made the 
policy option viable in Delhi were factors similar to those that produced the Orissa 
outcome.  As in Orissa, in Delhi’s political economy, rural interests were negligible.  
Instead, a combination of pressure from industrialists, which was expressed most 
pointedly through their departure from the public grid and their return after privatization, 
and from middle class consumers whose ire was conveyed in noisy public 
demonstrations, was sufficient to convince the state government that privatization would 
yield both political and development benefits.   
Urban India is now the focus of marketing dreams.  The Indian middle classes 
who reside there have come to assume an almost mythic quality, especially so among 
producers and purveyors of consumer goods.  In a population of a billion, even a middle 
class that represented a mere ten percent of the total population would constitute a 
sizeable new consumer market, or so goes the perspective on the middle class that has 
been touted in the financial press since the time the government stepped up economic 
liberalization in 1991.233  India’s middle classes have happily acquiesced to playing their 
                                                 
233 As representative, consider the following, which dates to only the year after the major liberalization 
thrust: “But now that foreign investors are no longer treated as wicked exploiters, many of the world’s 
biggest companies are cautiously returning.  They are lured by the promise of further market-freeing 
reforms and the prospect of selling products to India’s large and growing middle class, which has long been 
deprived of the variety and quality of goods that affluent consumers elsewhere take for granted.” 
“Investment in India; reforms start to pay,” The Economist, July 18, 1992. 
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new role.  Shielded behind relatively high barriers to trade for decades after independence 
in the mid-twentieth century, the affluent urban Indian has proven a very enthusiastic 
acquirer of foreign and domestic cultural and consumer products.    
Just as the growth and increasing affluence of the middle class is influencing 
global patters of trade and capital investment, so too does it impact politics and the 
trajectory of economic policies.  The story of economic policy in Delhi, this thesis 
suggests, cannot be separated from the changing configuration of state-society 
interactions during the period of economic liberalization, in particular the growth of the 
middle class, and their effect on the state’s policy decisions.   
The anecdotal but widespread view of India’s public sector enterprises and in 
particular its electric utilities, is that they are critical sites of political corruption, evils 
necessary to finance growing election expenses.  From the perspective of the political 
leaders making decisions to privatize, the question then becomes one of explaining why, 
if these enterprises are so important for politicians, they would ever be privatized.  I 
suggest that as middle and upper class residential consumers and industrial consumers 
came to a consensus on the need to improve public services in Delhi, the political 
calculus facing the Delhi government shifted in favor of privatization.  From being a 
patronage boon and a resource for party funds, the publicly owned electricity sector 
became much more of a political liability. 
Urban India is equally significant as the host of its industrial sector.  Although 
one goal of India’s centrally planned investment regime from the 50s to the 80s was to 
correct regional imbalances in development and industrialization, industry continues to 
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be concentrated in and around urban clusters.  Delhi is no exception.  Industrial 
consumers, for whom electricity is a significant component of production, have indicated 
their dissatisfaction with high prices and poor quality since the 1980s by leaving the 
public grid in increasing numbers, opting to establish their own private supply units, 
called captive power stations.  Lobbying for privatization by industrial consumers 
consisted of this desertion from the grid; their exit was their vote.  Because industrial and 
commercial consumers are the only consumers who pay remunerative tariffs, the 
departure of the former further strained already stretched finances at the state-owned 
utility.  Like the middle classes, industrial consumers also expected to benefit from 
restructuring and privatization, especially as these were part of a larger package of 
proposals that included rationalizing and depoliticizing tariffs by handing the sector over 
to autonomous regulators.  
The story of Delhi’s privatization is also useful in assessing the thesis that an 
ideological commitment to market reforms is an essential ingredient to the 
implementation of economic liberalization.  Privatization in Delhi was driven more by 
pragmatism—on the part of industrial and residential consumers who believed that with a 
private utility they could avoid perennial black- and brown- outs; and by politicians who 
believed that holding on to a public utility, despite its patronage benefits, was potentially 
electorally damaging.  Had an ideological commitment to markets and competition 
played a greater role in the privatization process, the sequencing and details of the 
process would have looked much different.  In fact, some of the most trenchant criticism 
of the privatization in Delhi has come not from opponents of privatization, although they 
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too are critical, but from proponents of free markets and competition.  These critics argue 
that the government has essentially replaced a public monopoly with private ones.  
Ironically, critics of the privatization program from both the left (those who would prefer 
continued, albeit improved, public ownership of utilities) and the right (those who seek 
greater openness in the market), both accuse the state of essentially privatizing profits and 
socializing risks.  The two private firms that ultimately took over Delhi’s distribution 
segment are part of the largest and most politically potent business houses in India, 
Reliance Industries and the Tata industrial group.   
Delhi’s privatization is also an important challenge to the notion that market 
reforms are being undertaken at the behest of international donors through conditionality.  
Privatization was undertaken at an enormous cost to the government and without 
financial support from the World Bank or other international funding agencies.     
Delhi is unique among the cases investigated in this study, not merely because of 
its official status as a territory rather than a state, but also because of the composition of 
its society.  As a primarily urban space, Delhi is missing the caste / class structures that 
define the provincial elite in other parts of India.  For example, Delhi is lacking the 
numerically strong middle peasant castes, which have recently come to dominate politics 
in North India and have long done so in other parts of India, like Maharashtra and Andhra 
Pradesh.  The absence of strong rural consumers is the common thread linking Orissa and 
Delhi, the two states that privatized their distribution systems, although the historical 
processes that explain this are different in the two cases.   
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Delhi is suffused with a culture of bureaucracy and governance that dates to the 
Mughal period, when it was the seat of sultanate power, and the colonial period, after the 
British moved the capital of their prized colony from Calcutta to Delhi in the early 
twentieth century.  In a sense, there is less differentiation between state and society in 
Delhi than in other sub-national units of India.  The dominant societal elements—
composed of bureaucrats and others who work for government agencies and 
enterprises—are very similar, with shared socio-economic profiles and concerns, to the 
political elite of the Delhi state.  Education levels and per capita income attest that Delhi 
has the most educated and prosperous population among the states and territories of 
India.  A final characteristic that sets Delhi apart from other parts of India is a product of 
its status as the nation’s capital, which lends the city and its inhabitants a cosmopolitan 
profile.  More than Indians in other cities and certainly more than rural citizens, Delhi’s 
wealthy residents have come to expect a modern life, one that includes fast food, 
shopping malls, and central air, all of which require increasing amounts of reliable 
electricity supplies. 
Privatization of electricity distribution was perceived by Delhi’s consumers to be 
the solution to the capital’s chronic electricity shortages and erratic supply.  Scholars 
have suggested that electricity is one policy domain in which constituencies make fewer 
policy demands because “distributive consequences are opaque.”234  In this case, 
however, Delhi’s residential constituents could evaluate the future impact of privatization 
                                                 
234 Victoria Murillo, “Policy-making under globalization pressures:  reforming public utilities in Latin 
America,” Paper presented to the Comparative Politics Workshop, University of Pennsylvania, April 15, 
2003, p. 8.  
    145
by comparing Delhi’s electricity system with the privatized electricity system of Mumbai, 
which was perceived to be functioning much more efficiently although at slightly higher 
tariff levels.  This comparison was often made on the editorial pages of the English 
language press, which both represent and shape middle-class opinion in Delhi.  This 
perhaps distinguishes Delhi from Orissa, where it is less clear that middle class and poor 
constituencies had a strong prior expectation of what privatization would entail.  
Furthermore, opinion polls on the subject of governance in Delhi that asked explicit 
questions about electricity privatization reveal that among all consumers, middle and 
upper class residents favored privatization in greater numbers than low income residents.  
The latter continued to oppose privatization; for people with low incomes, the trade-off 
between higher prices and better supply would not necessarily be a favorable one.  For 
industrial consumers, the consequences of reform were even more obvious.  It was well-
known that industrial consumers of electricity in India paid much higher costs per unit of 
electricity than their counterparts in other countries, thanks largely to a system of cross-
subsidies and general operating inefficiencies.  Privatization was seen by manufacturers 
and commercial consumers alike as the best solution to these problems.  
Delhi’s privatization program further suggests that in this part of India, labor 
unions are not the effective oppositional force that they have been in other countries.  The 
political science literature on economic reform suggests that the pace of change has been 
slow because losers from the process know ex ante how they will be hurt, and organize to 
oppose change, whereas the potential beneficiaries of the process are an inchoate and 
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unorganized group.235  Among the former category, it is further assumed that labor 
unions in the public sector stand to lose the most.  In both Delhi and Orissa the state 
governments signed tripartite agreements with the apex labor unions and the new private 
utility owners that protected all existing jobs and benefits.  This went a long way toward 
dissipating union opposition.  In at least one case, a union leader who was a signatory to 
the tripartite agreement on behalf of the electricity engineers union, also went to occupy a 
senior-most management position in one of the new private utilities.  Informal 
conversations with union members revealed that at least some rank and file members of 
the union felt betrayed by the deal.236   
 
The state of Delhi’s infrastructure 
 
The Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB),237 Delhi’s equivalent of a state electricity board, 
was formed only in 1997.  Prior to that, the sector was managed by an administrative 
department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi called by the Delhi Electricity Supply 
Undertaking (DESU).  Delhi was not held to the mandatory creation of a state electricity 
board because of its status as a territory rather than a state.238  DESU’s performance as an 
integrated electric utility suffered from many of the same problems that plagued other 
                                                 
235 For an early instantiation of this argument that was followed in much of the subsequent literature on the 
politics of economic adjustment, see the essays in Joan Nelson, ed. Fragile Coalitions:  The Politics of 
Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989).  
236 While waiting in his office’s antechamber to speak to D. K. Puri, the Managing Director of the newly 
privatized BSES, I had separate conversations with two junior engineers who asked to remain anonymous.  
They both expressed the sentiment that the union leadership had personally benefited but had jeopardized 
broader union interests. 
237 Vidyut is the Hindi word for electricity. 
238 Various Delhi governments over the years have demanded full statehood from the central government. 
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electric utilities in the country.  These were perhaps exacerbated because of the 
institutional structure of Delhi politics, which has multiple tiers of government with 
overlapping jurisdictions.  The major institutions of governance include the Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi (MCD), the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (the 
equivalent of Delhi’s state government), and the central government.  Although the 
DESU, as a municipal department charged with generation, distribution, and transmission 
of electricity, was meant to be autonomous, this rarely obtained in practice.  For example, 
the ability of DESU to increase tariffs was constrained by the need to secure the approval 
of the central government.239    
Despite the continued importance of electricity in the state’s investment patters, 
reflected in the high though fluctuating share of energy investment as a percentage of the 
total Delhi investment plan, the electricity sector in Delhi deteriorated throughout the late 
1980s and 1990s.   
 
Table 15:  Plan spending on Energy 






expenditure as % 
of Total 
Sixth 1980-1985 1,042.07 169.80 16.29 
Seventh 1985-1990 2,631.47 838.86 31.88 
Eight 1992-1997 6,208.32 1,555.92 25.06 
Ninth 1997-2002 15,541.28 3,046.55 19.60 
Annual Plan 1997-1998 1,978.31 307.72 15.55 
Annual Plan 1998-1999 2,052.95 447.84 21.81 
Source: Economic Survey of Delhi, 1999-2000 (New Delhi: Government of Delhi, March 2000), Chapter 
11. 
 
                                                 
239 For example, after a tariff increase in 1985, tariffs were only revised again in 1991 although the costs of 
fuel and transportation increased throughout the period.  “DESU boosts tariffs despite Congress party 
opposition,” Power Asia, FT Energy Newsletters, February 11, 1991. 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, spending on energy made up between fifteen and 
thirty-two percent of Delhi’s total planned expenditure, which represents the largest share 
of spending in most plan periods.  
Agricultural subsidies, which advocates of privatization commonly blamed for the 
poor performance of electricity sectors in most other states, are not a significant issue in 
Delhi.  In the decades since Independence, the metropolis of Delhi has absorbed most of 
the rural hinterland that once ringed the city.  Agriculture currently represents a small 
portion of the total employment in the territory, and absorbs only a small fraction of 
productive inputs, including energy.  The Ministry of Agriculture reports that 1.33% of 
electricity consumed in Delhi was put to agricultural uses,240 while the Planning 
Department of the Delhi government leaves out agriculture entirely in their tabulation of 
electricity consumption, suggesting that the amount is insignificant from the planner’s 
perspective.   
Like those of most other state electricity boards, the numbers representing 
Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses, which have been rising steadily and now 
exceed the bounds of accepted technical losses, also hide theft of electricity. 
 
Table 16:  Transmission and Distribution Losses in Delhi Vidyut Board     
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1996-97 
22.56 22.46 30.32 32.18 42.55 42.11 42.72 
Source: Strategy Paper on Power Sector in Delhi, Government of Delhi, 1999. 
   
There are numerous points at which electricity is lost from the moment it is 
generated to the time it is used.  Higher voltage transmission lines are the most efficient 
                                                 
240 Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Agricultural Subsidies at a Glance 2003. (New Delhi: 
Government of India). Table 15.11 “State-wise Consumption of Electricity for Agricultural Purposes 
during 2000-2001.” 
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means of transporting electricity, and these are used to transfer electricity from 
generating plants to the perimeter of load centers, a term used to refer to a cluster of 
consumers.  From this perimeter, the voltage is stepped down via a transfer to a lower 
level (for example from 220 Kilovolt lines to 66 or 33 kilovolt lines).  As most load 
centers are cities or towns, transformers are generally located at the urban periphery.  At 
the lower voltage, electricity is then conducted to several more points within the city, 
where it is again stepped down via a transformer to levels suitable for consumption.  The 
cut-off between transmission and distribution segments is determined by the voltage of 
electricity; anything above 66 KV lines is considered the purview of wholesale 
transmission and anything below is part of the retail distribution business.   
Even in the most efficiently constructed and managed transmission and 
distribution system, some reduction to the original amount of electricity generated will 
take place as it makes its way to end users.  This is one of the particular characteristics of 
electricity as a commodity.  Another is that electricity must be consumed just as it is 
produced.  Reductions like these are considered part of technical losses and can be 
minimized, to a point, by making improvements to the quality of the design and the 
materials used in construction.  International norms of accepted technical losses have 
steadily lowered as generation and transmission technology has improved.   
In press coverage and everyday parlance in Delhi T&D losses are known as “theft 
and dacoity” losses, which has come to refer to all the other ways that electricity is lost 
along its transmission and distribution route.  There are several common ways that 
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electricity is stolen in India.241  The first involves adjusting or tampering with a meter so 
that it cannot record actual electricity consumption.  The second involves directly tapping 
into the current running along aerial distribution lines.  Theft like this is common and 
conspicuous.  A tangle of overhead electric wires is a common site along many streets in 
urban India.  A final method involves the complicity of the meter-readers and linemen of 
the utilities, who collude with consumers to profit privately at the expense of the utility.  
No systematic study has been undertaken to reveal the contributions of each of these 
methods to the total losses.  According to some estimates though, the theft of electricity 
in Delhi had exceeded fifty percent prior to the distribution privatization, meaning that 
only half of all the electricity that the DVB either purchased or generated was accounted 
for in revenues.   
The causes for the deterioration of Delhi’s electricity utility are numerous, and the 
data can provide very little guidance in assigning relative importance to the array of 
contributing variables.  Theft is one factor.  The neo-classical explanation for the failure 
of public sector firms, rooted in principle-agent problems, yields additional traction on 
the problem, particularly with reference to the poor management of the utility.  However, 
there are additional problems, one of which is a consequence of coordination problems 
with neighboring states whose electricity sectors are inter-connected through a regional 
transmission grid.   
                                                 
241 During an extensive conversation, D. B. Arora, Additional Superintending Engineer in the Punjab State 
Electricity Board, outlined the numerous crude and sophisticated methods of stealing electricity.  Author’s 
interview with D. B. Arora, April 3, 2003, Ludhiana, Punjab.  Stealing electricity is not unique to India.  An 
article in a trade journal of the electric power industry laments the rise of electricity theft, and the use of the 
internet as the newest medium through which information on stealing electricity is shared. Karl A. Seger 
“Energy theft – an international perspective,” Metering International, 2002, Issue 1. 
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Another significant problem in the territory of Delhi is caused by the 
mushrooming of new residential colonies and clusters in the city.  The use of land in the 
city is tightly regulated by a number of organizations with sometimes overlapping 
jurisdiction.  The Delhi Development Authority, the Delhi Municipal Council, and the 
New Delhi Municipal Council, also participate in land use issues.242  The legislation that 
governed the Delhi Vidyut Board prior to its unbundling was the Delhi Electricity 
Control Order, 1959, which prohibited an electricity connection being granted to any 
commercial, domestic, or industrial consumer until the proper certificates and clearances 
from the local municipal body were presented that either show ownership or a legal lease.  
These were notoriously difficult to obtain, partially because officials would use their 
offices for rent-seeking, which further increased the already high costs of legal 
construction.  Residents of unauthorized constructions, with no legal remedy, illegally tap 
the existing distribution wires for electricity.  Residents of illegal construction have the 
same difficulties getting water connections from the water utility as they do obtaining 
electricity connections.   
 
Consumption and production 
 The population of Delhi increased rapidly following independence, from 1.74 
million residents in 1951 to 13.78 million in 2001, according to the most recent census 
taken in 2001.  Initially this growth was disproportionately high compared to the rest of 
                                                 
242 There are even more agencies with jurisdiction over land use than these three.  “Delhi 2021” the report 
of the Delhi Urban Environment and Infrastructure Improvement Project, which was completed in February 
2001 and financed by the World Bank, lists at least eight separate agencies with such jurisdiction.    
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the country and even compared to comparably sized cities because of a large refugee 
influx following partition with Pakistan.  The pattern of electricity consumption reflects 
demographic trends in the city and also trends in income and spending patterns.  Table 17 
gives consumption figures for different categories of electricity users in the city. 
 











1976-77 441 247 444 111 363 1606 
1977-78 454 243 483 121 376 1677 
1978-79 530 243 567 131 424 1895 
1979-80 576 242 639 127 433 2017 
1980-81 701 453 590 175 453 2372 
1981-82 746 499 753 61 485 2544 
1982-83 850 598 821 42 530 2841 
1983-84 945 632 858 38 579 3052 
1984-85 1162 709 950 48 597 3466 
1985-86 1286 779 1095 193 598 3951 
1986-87 1385 827 1200 73 599 4084 
1987-88 1483 881 1085 280 639 4368 
1988-89 1687 918 1420 297 641 4963 
1989-90 2108 1046 1751 299 649 5853 
1990-91 2316 1093 1952 347 707 6415 
1991-92 3110 1002 1843 363 781 7099 
1992-93 3741 1024 2067 378 786 7996 
1993-94 3348 1172 1764 363 781 7493 
1994-95 2961 1278 1368 350 883 6840 
1995-96 2835 1501 1537 390 1037 7300 
1996-97 3038 1004 2047 528 931 7548 
Change over time 689% 406% 461% 476% 256% 470% 
Source:  Planning Department, Economic Survey of Delhi, 1999-2000 (New Delhi: Government of N.C.T. 
of Delhi, March 2000.) Table 11.3 
 
Domestic consumption increased almost seven-fold over the two-decade period, while 
the electricity for commercial, industrial, and municipal use increased by between four 
and five times their consumption levels of the late 1970s.  The lower growth rates for 
industrial and commercial categories also reflect the rise of back-up generator sets in 
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commercial and small industrial premises and captive power plants in large industrial 
units.  This will be discussed in further detail in a subsequent section. 
 Generation of electricity by Delhi’s municipal corporation (DESU) and later by 
the public utility (DVB) did not keep up with the growth in demand.  The utility made up 
the shortfall in its own generation capacity by purchasing supplies, primarily from 
centrally-owned generating stations (National Thermal Power Corporation mainly) but 
also from neighboring states.  
Table 18:  Available electricity in Delhi 
Year Generated by 
DESU / DVB (in 
million units) 
% of total  Purchased from 





1976-77 1569 77.9 446 2015 
1977-78 1593 74.4 548 2141 
1978-79 1413 59.3 971 2384 
1979-80 1467 56.7 1120 2587 
1980-81 1313 44.9 1613 2926 
1981-82 1113 34.1 2153 3266 
1982-83 1077 30.0 2520 3597 
1983-84 1037 25.7 2993 4030 
1984-85 1255 27.7 3283 4538 
1985-86 1158 23.6 3759 4917 
1986-87 1402 25.2 4157 5559 
1987-88 1359 22.0 4832 6191 
1988-89 1088 16.0 5732 6820 
1989-90 1662 21.8 5962 7624 
1990-91 2351 26.9 6378 8729 
1991-92 2415 26.0 6973 9288 
1992-93 2433 23.1 8115 10548 
1993-94 2281 20.9 8645 10926 
1994-95 2280 18.7 9905 12185 
1995-96 2212 17.0 10789 13007 
1996-97 2026 14.8 11656 13682 
     
Source:  Planning Department, Economic Survey of Delhi, 1999-2000 (New Delhi: Government of N.C.T. 
of Delhi, March 2000.) Table 11.1 
 
Delhi’s utility moved from being mostly self-sufficient with respect to generating 
resources to almost entirely reliant on purchases of electricity by centrally-owned stations 
and other states.  The trend toward increasing reliance on the central government is 
    154
present in the utility systems of most states, although not all became reliant to the same 
degree. The central government entered the generating business in the mid-1970s, when 
National Thermal Power Corporation and National Hydroelectric Power Corporation 
were formed with World Bank loans in 1975.  The Bank at that time shifted its funding 
pattern to favor the central government enterprises over SEBs.  Delhi is one of a handful 
of states that rely on external sources—both the central government and neighboring 
states—for over three-quarters of their supply needs.  This allows the central government 
greater control over Delhi’s electricity system and may have played a significant role in 
encouraging privatization.243 
From the perspective of advocates of power sector liberalization, if farmers are 
the primary obstacles to reform in other states, their counterparts in Delhi are residents of 
slums, or jhuggi-jhopri clusters as poorer unauthorized housing colonies are called.  The 
Slum and JJ Department, under the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, is charged with 
relocating dwellers of illegal housing clusters to legal residences.  In 1990 the 
government of Delhi adopted a new policy with the aim of curtailing the number of 
people forced to live in illegal jhuggi-jhopris.  The plan was to relocate residents of jj 
clusters when the land on which they are residing, which is mostly government owned, is 
to be used for some public development project.   
The number of Delhi’s citizens living in illegal clusters, like the population in 
general, has expanded rapidly despite the efforts of the Slum and JJ Department under the 
                                                 
243 I heard a great deal during interviews about pressure from the central government to repay outstanding 
dues owed to central government enterprises, although I could determine no systematic relationship 
between partisanship (of the state and central government) and the presence or absence of such pressure.   
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1990 program.  So long as people continued to live in illegal dwellings, they are not able 
to petition for a legal electricity connection from the utility, which forces them to steal 
electricity.  The demographic estimates of JJ cluster residents give a sense of the size of 
this problem.  The number of JJ clusters increased from 929 in 1990 to 1080 in 1994 
before climbing to 1100 in 2001, by which time the total population residing in these 
illegal communities had grown to 3,000,000.244    
Although the sum of electricity used in each individual shelter is small, the total 
quantity could become substantial.  Without legal connections and meters, the actual 
scale of electricity theft by different consumers remains the subject of endless debate.  
With relatively fewer poor residents of Delhi connected to the grid, their interest in 
whether the utility was privatized or not was also much lower than other residents.  
According to the 1991 Census, 80% of Delhi’s households had electricity connections; 
the remaining 20% were in JJ clusters, and unauthorized dwellings, and rural areas.245  
The 2001 Census records that a decade later, 93% of Delhi’s residents had legal 
connections, and only 7%, who were in JJ clusters, unauthorized dwellings, and rural 





                                                 
244 Taken from “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on accounts of Government of 
National Capital Territory of Delhi,” March 2002, Table 5.2.2 
245 Economic Survey of Delhi, 1999-2000, Government of Delhi, Chapter 11. 
246 Economic Survey of Delhi, 2003-2004, Government of Delhi, Chapter 11. 
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Power cuts and public protest: the middle class takes to the streets 
 
 Middle and upper class consumers of electricity came to see privatization of 
services as a solution to the chronic blackouts they faced, especially in the hottest months 
of the year.  Increasing anger over poor electricity service suggests that the electricity 
sector had become a political liability, forcing the state government to apologize 
repeatedly for poor performance in the months and years leading up to privatization.  
Conversely, as soon as privatization was complete and the new owners had assumed the 
reigns, the government was able to pin the blame for failures on the new private owners.  
As the quote that started the chapter suggests, Delhi’s chief executive looked forward to 
shifting the blame for poor electricity supply onto new owners.    
The role of the middle class in Indian political and economic life has been 
receiving increasing attention in recent years.  A book published in New Delhi in 1998 
titled The Great Indian Middle Class launched a popular stream of a discussion that had 
already been taking place among academics and policy-makers.  The author, Pavan 
Varma, a member of India’s foreign service cadre, argues that the ethos of Indian elites 
now is fundamentally changed from the early decades after Indian independence.  
Whereas in earlier decades India’s middle classes and elites had understood their 
economic and political destiny as inextricably bound with that of the much larger mass of 
poorer Indians, the situation in the late 1990s was one he characterized as a “secession of 
the successful.”247  Another portrayal of the middle class argues that they are 
                                                 
247 Pavan Varma, 1998, The Great Indian Middle Classes (New Delhi: Viking), p. xii.  
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“denationalized,” far more aligned with the ideologies and consumer preferences of the 
west than with those of their fellow Indians.248  A more recent book suggests that the new 
Indian middle class is marked both by changes in patters of consumption and lifestyle, 
but perhaps more importantly by certain representational practices that are impacting how 
the middle class defines itself.249  Among political science scholarship, there is some 
expectation that the middle classes will eventually take a leading role in facilitating 
economic liberalization in previously statist contexts.250 
 One method that citizens have to protest the inadequate provision of public 
services is to retreat from the public grid.  Those who can afford to exit public services 
often do so, in India and elsewhere.  Many Indians exercise this option in the sectors of 
health and education.  In higher education in engineering, for example, the share of the 
private sector has increased from 15% in 1960 to 86% in 2004.251  Similarly, in the power 
sector, consumers frequently turn to back-up power.  The steep economies of scale in the 
power sector, however, mean that such back-up power is more expensive than power 
from the grid.  This remains the case technological advances that have undoubtedly 
brought down the costs of such off-grid power.  The Delhi Vidyut Board was statutorily 
required to keep track of the number of diesel generator sets larger than 10KV in use in 
the capital territory.  However, as no figures were recorded for generator sets of any size, 
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249 Leela Fernandes, 2006, India’s new middle class: Democratic politics in an era of economic reform 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006).  
250 Haggard and Kaufman, Pathways from the Periphery FULL CITATION. 
251 Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Indian higher education reform: from half-baked socialism to 
half-baked capitalism,” paper presented at CASI conference on “Economic Reforms, Human Development 
and Governance in India: Changes in Institutional Structures and Incentives since 1991,” University of 
Pennsylvania   
    158
accounts of their use is largely anecdotal.  Despite the high cost, many consider that a 
majority of middle and upper income residents have either back-up generator sets or 
inverters, which act like massive batteries, charging while electricity supply is 
available.252  In assessing the main determinants of air pollution in Delhi, a serious 
problem in the capital in the early 1990s, one media account notes that “most middle-
class households now either have gensets or plan to get one.”253  This assessment of the 
prevalence of back-up energy sources was confirmed even by employees of the public 
utility, who one might assume have a stake in downplaying their use.254  
Electricity is a unique commodity in that it cannot be stored very efficiently, 
requiring it to be used when it is produced.  Maintaining an electrical system, therefore, 
requires careful management of production and consumption; an excess or a shortage of 
electrical current can damage equipment on both the utility and consumer ends.  The 
electrical load has to be managed to take into account fluctuations in consumption 
patterns.  In a typical system, the morning hours represent peak consumption, when 
residences, industries, and commercial establishments require energy.  The evening hours 
represent another peak in load, when people return home and lights and fans are turned 
on.  During the night, however, load decreases.  In addition to fluctuations in load during 
a single day, demand for electricity fluctuates throughout the year in response to changes 
in temperature.  Regions with the extreme seasonal variation are most affected by this.  
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Delhi is one such region.  In the summer months from May to July, average high 
temperatures exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit. 
In many states, utilities maximize efficiency by allocating electricity to farmers 
during the nighttime hours, who wake at odd hours to operate pumps that will bring 
groundwater to the surface.  Another method of managing peaks and troughs in 
consumption is to use hydroelectric power to satisfy peak demand.  Unlike thermal 
generating stations, hydroelectric stations can be turned on and off without a great loss of 
efficiency.  A relatively new form of load management, one that is only now being 
considered in India, is to price off-peak electricity at lower rates to encourage users to 
shift consumption from day-time and weekday usage to night-time and weekend usage. 
Delhi has fewer options than other states to manage load fluctuations.  The lack of 
agricultural load in Delhi is most often thought of as a boon for the state because it 
eliminates the expense of laying transmission lines in far-flung rural outposts and the 
difficulty of billing and metering sparsely situated consumers.  However, the lack of 
agricultural load has also meant that the utility could not rely on farm consumption as a 
way to even out its demand curve.  Delhi was also one of the few regions that had no 
hydroelectric stations contributing to its generating capacity.  All of the power that the 
utility generated came from costly thermal stations.   
 One way that the utility in Delhi responded to increases in peak load during the 
summer months is by scheduling planned cuts in power, which often became the focus of 
public protests that occasionally become violent.  Since electricity is used not only to 
power electrical motors and appliances, but also to pump water into homes, power cuts 
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have a far-reaching impact on daily life.  In June 1992, the Delhi Electricity Supply 
Undertaking, or DESU, unable to increase supplies to satisfy increased demand, restricted 
large air conditioners, factory production, neon signs, and electric decorations in 
commercial premises as a way to deal with a surge in demand for electricity in the 
summer heat.255  As the next section will discuss, industrial and manufacturing 
enterprises could exit the public grid and set up their own private supplies, which they did 
in increasing numbers throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  The economics of electricity, 
however, binds most residential consumers to the public grid because the costs of leaving 
the grid individually are prohibitively high.  In 1992, as in other years, residents protested 
the cuts in service by pelting stones at the utility’s offices and blocking traffic.  
 Public outrage over poor utility performance surfaced almost every year in Delhi 
during the hot months of summer.  For example, in 1994, residents were subject to cuts in 
supply, also called load-shedding, throughout the months of July and August.  In August 
of that year, 1,200 residents from the middle-class enclave of Kishan Ganj marched 
through the streets to the nearest utility office, screaming “we want electricity.”256  The 
Delhi headquarters of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which was then in power in Delhi, was 
flooded with complaints.  The government responded to public hostility, which again 
manifested itself with violence towards employees and offices of the utility, by firing the 
utility’s general manager.  The Chief Minister of Delhi at the time, Madan Lal Khurana, 
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stated at the time “I am against the privatisation move, but DESU has to buck up if this is 
not to happen,”257 rhetorically distancing his government from the government enterprise.   
Similar shortages of electricity prompted public protests in each of the years 
leading up to the privatization.  The protests communicated citizens’ views on the 
performance of the public utilities, forcing government officials in many instances to 
respond with public statements explaining the utility’s performance.  Almost immediately 
after privatization was complete, the government was able to shift the blame for the 
ongoing power crisis to the new private owners.  As the quote by Delhi’s Chief Minister, 
Sheila Dixit, that opened this chapter shows, the administration welcomed the transfer of 
authority and blame, to the new private owners. 
 Elections constitute less dramatic, more prosaic mechanisms for citizens to make 
their preferences known to elected leaders.  However, few scholars of India have 
considered elections in India to be public referenda on issues of governance or the quality 
and direction of public policy.  Far too often, the electorate’s attention is drawn to 
communal and caste conflicts.  Writing of the Indian polity in the late 1980s, for 
example, Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) argue that “other kinds of social formations rival 
or surpass class in the determination of collective action, historical change, and state 
orientation.”258  Caste identities have become even more of a political force after 1989, 
particularly in north India, when the government announced that affirmative action 
programs would be expanded according to the recommendations of the Mandal 
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Commission.  And the importance of religious identities as tools for political 
mobilization was underscored yet again after 1991, when a coalition of Hindu 
fundamentalist organizations destroyed a Muslim house of worship in order to re-build a 
Hindu temple.  This marked the beginning of period in which the Hindi nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party was the only party other than the Congress Party that could claim 
to have an all-Indian presence.   
In the case of Delhi’s elections in 1998, however, there is both theoretical and 
empirical support for the idea that social identities have less salience than in other parts 
of India, and that voters were concerned with issues of governance.  One reason that 
governance issues may be more prominent in Delhi than elsewhere is the nature of its 
citizenry.  As described at the start of this chapter, Delhi is without the vociferous and 
politically potent landed interests that continue to dominate politics in other provinces in 
India.  The percentage of Delhi’s population engaged in agricultural work has steadily 
declined, although ironically the proportion of residents who reside in areas zoned as 
rural has increased. This is due to the steady spread of urban Delhi into formerly 
agricultural lands in search of lower housing costs.   
Delhi’s population is largely a product of the successive waves of migration to the 
city starting after Partition.  Migrants from Punjabi Pakistan make up the first large group 
of migrants, but the promise of jobs and higher wages continued to draw migrants from 
neighboring states in the decades after Partition.  Data from the most recent census of 
India in 2001 show that migrants still compose close to 7% of Delhi’s population.  In 
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1961, over 56% of Delhi’s population recorded their birthplace outside of Delhi.259  
Migration disrupted networks of caste and clan to such an extent that, according to one 
scholar of Delhi’s politics, “it is no longer caste, but economic status that plays an 
important role in the voting decision of the people.”260   
Wealthier residents were more receptive to privatization than Delhi’s poorer 
residents, both before and after the change in ownership of electricity distribution took 
place.  A survey jointly conducted by the newspaper Hindustan Times and the Centre for 
the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in Delhi in 2003 asked respondents to 
comment on whether privatization had benefited the populace.  The results were 
disaggregated by socio-economic class.  Whereas 45% of rich respondents and 31% of 
middle class respondents answered in the affirmative, only 22% of poor respondents did 
so.261     
Unlike in other states in India, the electoral field in Delhi for several decades has 
been consistently dominated by India’s two national parties, the Indian National Congress 
and the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP.  The BJP had won state elections in 1993, 
capturing 43% of the total votes cast, as against the Congress vote share of 35%.  The 
assembly elections held in Delhi in 1998, in which the Congress Party captured 48% of 
the votes while the BJP received only 34% of the votes, brought the Congress back to 
power.  The CSDS conducted an opinion poll in 1998 to gauge the reasons for the state 
election outcomes in Delhi and three other states.  The results of the poll, given in Table 
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19, suggest that general dissatisfaction with governance was among the many reasons for 
the Congress victory in Delhi in 1998.   
 
Table 19:  Delhi citizens’ satisfaction with governance       
Level of satisfaction For State government For Central government 
Not at all satisfied 44.1 39.8 
Somewhat satisfied 31.3 32.4 
Very satisfied 21.3 23.3 
Source: Kumar (1999), who relies on data from the CSDS exit poll conducted in 1998 
 
Nearly half of all respondents (44%) reported that they were not satisfied with the quality 
of governance in the capital, and more leveled their dissatisfaction at the state than the 
central government.  Only 21% gave the response “very satisfied.”  Both the Congress 
Party, which was in opposition at the time, and the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party, 
built their election manifestos around issues of governance, suggesting their awareness of 
this discontent among the electorate.262   
The urban middle classes in India have been organizing to force the state to 
improve public spaces and civic life.  In Delhi, the most powerful middle class 
organizations are the Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs).  The Congress government 
led by Sheila Dixit introduced a program in 2003 that channeled the growing energy and 
organization of the RWAs into a collaborative relationship with the government.  Called 
Bhagidari, literally “collaborative partnership” the government launched the program in 
2000 to bring together RWAs and Merchants and Traders Associations to decentralize 
solutions to urban problems ranging from service delivery (water and electricity), safety, 
and public health to rainwater harvesting and the problem of illegal commercial and 
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residential premises.  Although the effectiveness of the Bhagidari scheme is debated, one 
of its impacts was the bring the Sheila Dixit-led Congress government a larger political 
base among Delhi’s middle classes.263   
 Newspaper editorials and letters to the editor in Delhi offer another way to gauge 
popular opinions about reform and privatization.  There are two surveys of media 
consumption in India, both undertaken by consortia of industries and businesses as a 
guide to rationally spending marketing and advertising money.  The older of the two, the 
National Readership Survey, was established in 1974 and carried out every five years, 
and the other, the Indian Readership Survey, was begun in 1994.  The sample size for 
each is approximately 200,000 households.264  Rural households are included but not in 
numbers proportionate to their share of the population.  One participant in the National 
Readership Survey consortium is the Indian branch of the Audit Bureau of Circulation, 
which has members in many other parts of the world.  The Audit Bureau of Circulation, 
which brings together publishers and advertisers to certify newspaper circulation figures, 
gave a press release prior to the publication of the most recently published National 
Readership Survey.  The survey substantiates the claim that English-language readership 
is attitudinally different from vernacular readers on a host of vectors.  For example, the 
results show that whereas 33% of non-English language press readers are “more likely to 
be willing to pay for quality” in spending decisions, whether for consumer durables or 
public services, 38% of English press readers can be characterized this way.265   
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The extent of newspaper penetration is highest in the Indian state of Kerala and is 
second highest in Delhi.266  In Delhi, the Hindi-language Navbharat Times has the 
highest readership followed by two English language dailies, the Hindustan Times and 
the Times of India.  If the city of Delhi is disaggregated into four areas, however, the 
Hindi paper has the highest readership in the north, west, and east zones but among 
readers in the southern zone, which is comprised of the most affluent areas in the city, the 
English papers are preferred.267  These factors suggest that the English-language press is 
more likely than the vernacular press to both inform and represent the views of Delhi’s 
wealthier citizens.  This press was a tireless critic of public utilities and advanced the idea 
that privatization of utilities was a worthy goal.  The following editorial, which was 
printed a year after privatization, is representative of this kind of thinking: 
As for urban centres, people now perceive lack of development in terms of 
opportunity costs. Take, for instance, the Delhi voter. Sheila Dikshit, the 
only Congress chief minister to buck the anti-incumbency wave this time, 
had the courage - albeit with prodding from the Supreme Court - to 
undertake measures that could be perceived in an earlier era as anti-
people. In fact, each one of them - whether it was the transfer of polluting 
units out of Delhi, the switch from diesel to compressed natural gas for 
public buses, the privatisation of electricity - was controversial and even 
created mass unrest on occasion. Yet, people began to perceive the 
benefits of such initiatives and, over time, even claimed ownership of 
them. This shift in popular perception is what Dikshit's opponent, Madan 
Lal Khurana, could not discern. He persisted with his old-style politics and 
paid the price for this. In fact, even the bait he offered of cheaper 
electricity did not work. An aware urban community like Delhi voters now 
knows that political sops of this kind are the surest route to deprivation in 
the long term. They would rather pay the cost of supporting a vital utility 
like power generation plants than be deprived of reliable electricity 
supply.268  
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Similar sentiments were expressed in the months leading up to the privatization.  The two 
most widely read English-language papers in Delhi, Hindustan Times and Times of India, 
published news stories as well as editorials with a bias in favor of privatization.  One 
story in the Times of India notes that “for the common Delhiite…the news of the 
privatisation of Delhi Vidyut Board's distribution sector comes as a relief.”269  The 
“common” citizens with which the article is concerned and whom the writer goes on to 
interview reside in neighborhoods like Chittaranjan Park, Vasant Kunj, and Model Town, 
all affluent areas of Delhi.  A common thread running through these published comments 
on Delhi’s public services is that they are incongruous with the profile of a national 
capital, and that the experience of private utility service in Mumbai suggests a better 
alternative.  
 Those close to the actual privatization process in Delhi also suggested that 
electoral pressure was a significant factor in explaining the outcome.  One bureaucrat 
called the “rapidly growing dissatisfaction with supply…the prime factor” explaining the 
Delhi’s government’s decision to privatize.270   The main architect of the privatization 
program from the bureaucratic side was the former chairman of the Delhi Vidyut Board, 
Jagdish Sagar.  According to Sagar, the fact that Delhi was the one urban place with 
serious infrastructure problems compelled the government to opt for privatization.  Just 
after coming to power in 1999, the Congress government led by Sheila Dixit published a 
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strategy paper on the power sector that eschewed the use of the politically-loaded term 
“privatization” and instead called for a vaguely worded “joint-sector” approach.  The 
paper was silent on the issue of whether the government or the new private owners would 
have controlling stake.  By the following year when the Delhi reform legislation was 
passed the government explicitly used the term “privatisation,” confident that the public 
would support the sale.271   
 Although under Sagar’s direction, the performance of DVB improved, Sagar 
himself insisted that there were limits to what he could do.  Politicians and bureaucrats 
also expressed the view that a state enterprise could not tackle theft of electricity as 
effectively as a private corporation, which provided another impetus for privatization.  
The minister for power and transport in the Delhi government, Ajay Maken, argued that 
“a democratic set-up has its own limitations.  We [the government] can’t go all out 
against power stealers, otherwise we will be inviting the wrath of the people in the 
elections.”272  
 
Industrial protest: exiting the grid 
 
Most industry relies on electricity as a critical component of production.  The high 
cost, dearth, or poor quality of electricity supplies can force firms to supplant or 
supplement utility supply with their own private generation, called captive power supply, 
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which is an option that Indian firms have pursued in most states.  The electricity sector is 
one characterized by steep economies of scale, which means that the decision to move 
away from public supply is not a lightly taken or easily afforded one.  According to one 
survey of industry in three Indian states, private power generators constitute 12 percent of 
fixed costs.273  Nevertheless, this is an option that many in industry pursued, preferring it 
to erratic supplies from the grid. 
 
Table 20:  Progress of Installed Electricity Generation Capacity of Captive Plants (1 MW & above) in 
Industries 
Year Total (MW) % increase from earlier period 
1950 587.85  
1955 723.51 23.1 
1960 935.37 29.3 
1965 1061.39 13.5 
1970 1417.43 33.5 
1975 2028.57 43.1 
1980 2859.51 41.0 
1985 5120.26 79.1 
1990 8115.73 58.5 
1995 11164.05 37.6 
2000 15336.20 37.3 
Source:  Figures taken from Central Electricity Authority, All India Electricity Statistics, General Review 
2005. New Delhi: Ministry of Power, Government of India, Table 4.10.  The last column was calculated. 
 
From 1950 to 2000, the installed capacity of captive power plants in India increased from 
587.85 MW to 15336.20 MW, and the rate at which industries pursued captive power 
supplies accelerated over the period.  This trend is first noticeable in the 1970s, which 
coincides with the first push towards mass electrification in the countryside and the rise 
of cross-subsidies.  As the demands on scarce electricity resources had to be shared with 
an ever-expanding number of consumers the quality and surety of power supply 
decreased.  Industrialists responded by turning to captive power generation.     
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Deserting the grid has been as common in Delhi as in other states.274  As one section in 
the introduction of this thesis mentions, the rates charged for industry in India are 
significantly higher than in other countries due largely to a system of cross-subsidies.  
While cross-subsidies exist in most Indian states, the cost of power supply for industry 
was even higher in Delhi than in other states.  Table 5 below lists comparative figures for 
electricity tariffs charged for industrial consumers in Delhi and India.  Although the 
tariffs for industrialists decreased significantly during the period leading up to 
privatization, they still remained above the all-India average, which continued to climb.    
 
Table 21:  Electricity Tariffs for Industry (paise per kWh) 
Year Delhi Average 
1997-1998 492.12 314.63 
1998-1999 384.56 324.33 
1999-2000 403.33 343.37 
2000-2001 424.80 368.37 
Source:  Planning Commission, Annual Report on the Working of the State Electricity Boards & Electricity 
Departments, Government of India, June 2001, Annexure 4.28. 
 
Along with cost, availability and reliability of power supply are important factors 
for industrial consumers.  The gap between supply and demand in Delhi was also wide, 
more so than in other states.  The balance of energy is affected by a number of factors, 
including the technical and managerial performance of the utility, the quantum of energy 
that the utility purchases from outside sources as opposed to generates internally, the mix 
of hydro and thermal power, and economic growth rates.  The following graph illustrates 
the energy shortage and the peak deficit in Delhi.   
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Source:  Ministry of Power, “Power Sector Profile: Northern Region.” 
 
The average peak deficit in Delhi for the six year period from 1997 to 2003 is 9.6, which 
is significantly higher than in many other states.  The average peak deficit for the same 
six year period in Delhi’s neighbor to the north, Haryana, is 2.9 percent.  The other states 
that had similarly high gaps between demand and supply were others with higher than 
average economic growth rates, like Gujarat and Maharashtra.  In Maharashtra, the 
average peak deficit for the same six-year period is 15.8 percent while the figure is 14.5 
percent in Gujarat.  In both of those states, however, many industrial consumers are 
located in and around the urban centers of Mumbai in Maharasthra, and Surat and 
Ahmedabad in Gujarat, all three of which have been served by private electric utilities 
even during the heyday of public ownership.  These electric utilities historically have 
delivered a more reliable electric supply, less subject to planned and accidental outages.   
 The World Bank and the Confederation of Indian Industry, one of India’s largest 
business associations, jointly carried out a survey of Indian industry in 2000 and 2003.275  
The Bank used the results of the survey, along with information from the Annual Survey 
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of Industries produced by the Indian government, to produce a report on the investment 
climate in the major urban centers of twelve states.  The study aims to investigate why 
some states have been much more successful than others in attracting private investment.  
The authors make an assumption that investment rates in India have not been as high as 
possible, based partly on a comparison of India with China and partly on a comparison of 
high-growth and low-growth regions within India.  Although path dependency or 
historical factors are considered to play a role in the successes of different regions in 
attracting investment, the study emphasizes that the investment climate, which is shaped 
by different governmental policies, matters a great deal.  For example, the firm-level data 
used for the study revealed that Indian firms report electricity price as the single most 
important variable in plant location decisions.276  The quality of power supply and 
telephony are other significant factors.  
 The survey uses two measures to gauge industrial satisfaction with power supply.  
The first is the percentage of firms in the sample that have their own generator sets on-
site as a back-up for disruptions in supply from the public grid.  The second is a measure 
of how many days it takes for a firm to obtain a connection to the public grid. The World 
Bank survey provides data for the first variable from surveys in 2000 and 2003, which 
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Source:  India: Investment Climate and Manufacturing Industry. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
November 2004, p. 55.  
 
Delhi is one of five states in which manufacturers reported a greater reliance on 
power from the grid in 2003 than they had three years earlier in 2000.  In 2000, Delhi was 
second only to Uttar Pradesh in the percentage of firms that had their own back-up 
supplies, signifying that public power was not considered a reliable power supplier by 
many industrial consumers in those states.  This figure declined significantly from 2000 
to 2003, falling from over 30 percent to fewer than 19 percent.  This represents the most 
significant decrease in captive power generation of the states included in the study, and 
the sharpest improvement of utility performance from the perspective of industry.  
Privatization encouraged industrial consumers of electricity to reverse their long exodus 
from the grid.   
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By 2003, manufacturers reported much greater satisfaction with power in Delhi 
than in other states, as evidenced by the data in the following two figures.    
 

















Source:  India: Investment Climate and Manufacturing Industry. Washington DC: World Bank. November 
2004, p. 54. 
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Source:  India: Investment Climate and Manufacturing Industry. Washington DC: World Bank. November 
2004, p. 56.  In the report, the title of the figure is given as “Number of Days to Get a New Power 
Generator—2003” but the text that accompanies the image states that the figure represents “the number of 
days needed to obtain a new connection to the public grid” (p. 51).   
 
Figure 3 represents the percentage of respondents who list power supply as a major 
bottleneck for future growth, while Figure 4 gives the average number of days that were 
needed to obtain an electricity connection.  No comparable figures for power as a 
bottleneck to growth and number of days required to obtain a new connection are 
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available from surveys taken in 2000.  One might infer, however, given the improvement 
in power supply in Delhi represented in Figure 2, that the numbers for Delhi given in 
Figures 3 and 4 also show improvement compared to what they would have been in 2000.  
Privatization in Delhi might have staunched the emigration of industry from the grid. 
 
The decision to privatize 
 
Delhi’s distribution companies were ultimately privatized in June 2002.  
However, this was not the first time that a privatization idea had been floated.  In 1992, a 
consortium composed of an Indian conglomerate, the Modi Group, and Electricite de 
France—France’s electric power behemoth—offered to purchase the transmission and 
distribution segments in the southern parts of Delhi.  The offer was not appealing to the 
Delhi electricity department because South Delhi, which contains the wealthiest suburbs 
of Delhi, housed the primary revenue-generating areas in the capital territory.  The 
Department requested that the private companies also take up service in East Delhi, 
where most of the losses were reported.  Though the four districts in South Delhi that 
were part of the offer have approximately the same number of consumers as the districts 
in East Delhi, the former yield nearly twice the amount of revenues as the latter.277  In 
response to this proposal by Modi and EdF, the unions of DESU went on strike on 
February 9, 1993.  The one day strike affected most Delhi neighborhoods, some of which 
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were without power for twelve hours.278  According to union leaders, the strike was a 
significant factor in derailing privatization.279  Unlike this earlier episode, the successful 
privatization in 2002 included as a part of the government’s plans an explicit negotiation 
with labor that offered labor unions significant concessions in exchange for their 
quiescence, which is discussed in greater detail below.  
 As a partial solution to the electricity problems in the capital territory, which were 
the result of many factors but also of poor investment in transmission and distribution—
there was a shortage of available transmission line for the current needed in the city—
DESU had planned to augment transmission supplies by constructing a ring of high 
voltage transmission wires along the periphery of the city.  Power from neighboring 
states, which was crucial to Delhi’s supply, could then be more easily transmitted.  The 
World Bank was financing the project with a 60 million dollar loan.   
Over the course of the 1980s, the World Bank, which had been a crucial supporter 
of the development of electric power systems in developing countries, shifted the terms 
of its financing.  Through a strategy paper published in 1983 and an Operations Directive 
from 1987, the World Bank outlined the new principles that would govern its lending to 
developing countries’ electric utilities.280  The new principles included promoting least-
cost planning, marginal cost-pricing as the method of tariff determination, and tariffs that 
would yield internal resources for new investments.  An earlier amendment to the ES48 
                                                 
278 “Workers Blame DESU,” Power Asia, Finantial Times Energy Newsletters, March 1, 1993. 
279 This was the view held by D. K. Puri, General Manager of one of the newly private distribution 
companies, BSES Yamuna.  He has held leadership positions in several unions, including the All India 
Power Engineers Federation, and the North Indian Power Engineers Federation, of which he was chairman 
at the time of the interview.  Author’s interview, September 25, 2003 in New Delhi.  
280 The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector:  Policies for Effective Institutional, Regulatory, 
and Financial Reform (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1993), p. 11. 
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passed by the Indian Parliament in 1983 required that the state electricity boards earn a 
minimum of 3% of fixed assets to be reinvested in the operations of the board.  This 
provision of the law had been almost universally ignored by the SEBs and state 
governments alike.  In putting the new principles governing electricity sector lending into 
practice in India, the World Bank required that DESU first earn its statutorily mandated 
3% rate of return on fixed assets.  For failing to comply, the Bank first delayed and 
ultimately cancelled its loan to DESU.  
By transforming DESU, a municipal department, into DVB, an autonomous 
public enterprise, some had hopes that the performance of the utility would improve 
through radical changes in its work culture and human resources management.281  Such 
changes did not materialize and the proposal to privatize resurfaced again in 1998 and 
1999.  The transformation of DESU into DVB was necessary as a first step toward 
privatization.  It was also part of larger transformations effected by legislation passed in 
1991 that provided for a legislative assembly and council of ministers for Delhi, which 
gave Delhi an administrative set-up that resembled more closely the one found in other 
states. 
 Elections in 1998 brought a new, Congress-led government to power in Delhi.  
The two years prior to the election had been among the worst in terms of power crises in 
the capital.  On New Year’s Day in 1997, Delhi faced its longest blackout to date, which 
lasted sixteen hours.282  A few weeks earlier, a twelve hour blackout had affected Delhi 
                                                 
281 Author’s interview with Jagdish Sagar, September 23, 2003, New Delhi  . 
282 “Indian capital faces further blackouts over 257m dollar unpaid bills” Agence France Presse February 3, 
1997.   
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along with seven other states in northern India.  Also, in 1997, the central government-
owned National Thermal Power Corporation threatened to curb off electricity supplies to 
Delhi unless its outstanding balance was settled.  This represented a new strategy by the 
central government to force reforms at the state-level.  The Delhi government was more 
sensitive to this coercion than other states because it possessed a relatively meager share 
of its own electricity generating resources.   
 The Delhi Electricity Reform Act was passed by the Delhi legislative assembly in 
2000.  Broadly, it called for “the restructuring of the electricity industry, rationalisation of 
generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity, increasing avenues for 
participation of private sector in the electricity industry and generally for taking measures 
conducive to the development and management of the electricity industry in an efficient, 
commercial, economic and competitive manner.”283  It also called for the unbundling of 
the vertically-integrated utility into separate transmission and generation companies that 
would continue to be in the public sector, and three distribution entities that carved up the 
Delhi territory into three distinct territories.  
 At the same time that the legislative assembly enacted reform legislation, the 
government removed a second hurdle to privatization by negotiating with labor 
representatives.  The government and the DVB managers signed two separate tripartite 
agreements with the representatives from one engineers association and an umbrella 
organization of disparate union groups in the utility.284  The main facets of the two 
                                                 
283 “Delhi Electricity Reform Act, 2000,” Government of Delhi. 
284 The two agreements were titled “Tripartite agreement between the government of NCT of Delhi, Delhi 
Vidyut Board and DVB Junior Engineers Association” and “Tripartite agreement between the government 
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agreements, the texts of which are identical, ensure that privatization will not be 
accompanied by employee retrenchment; the terms of employment (including salaries 
and benefits) will remain unchanged; the Delhi government will create a pension fund to 
cover the pension liabilities of the soon-to-be defunct DVB; and that pension obligations 
for former employees would continue to be met.   
Privatization in Delhi took a different route than in Orissa, the first state to 
privatize electricity distribution, partly as a result of perceived flaws with the Orissa 
model.  For this reason, the sequencing of privatization initiatives, that privatization in 
Orissa preceded Delhi’s privatization, is important to understand the contours of each 
plan.  Whereas Orissa had followed a model largely established by the World Bank and 
international consulting agencies, the Delhi arrangement was largely conceived by 
bureaucrats working in the sector.  The main conceptual difference between the 
privatization programs in Orissa and Delhi was that in the latter, local conditions were 
meant to more forcefully dictate the terms of the process.   
The main problem with the functioning of the sector in Delhi, and according to 
senior bureaucrats the main reason that privatization was the optimal solution, was the 
large percentage—almost half by some estimates—of electricity that was either lost or 
stolen during distribution.  According to the senior bureaucrat in the sector, although the 
performance of the utility had improved in the years preceding its privatization, there 
would be no way to continue the improvements if the upcoming state elections returned 
the opposition party to power.  The utility’s managers had the freedom to improve 
                                                                                                                                                 
of NCT of Delhi, Delhi Vidyut Board and Joint Action Committee of Workers, Supervisors, Engineers and 
Officers of DVB.” 
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performance only at the whim of the state’s political masters.  The best long-term 
solution, therefore, was the remove the potential for political intervention. 285  The reform 
legislation termed these losses AT&C (Aggregate Technical and Commercial losses).  
The goal of the legislation was the gradual reduction of these losses to a more 
manageable level.  To obtain this goal, the government asked companies to bid on the 
utilities according to how much they could reduce the losses in the system over time 
rather according to how much they would pay for the each 51% share of the utility.  The 
government specified minimum acceptable AT&C reduction targets for each distribution 
territory based on the types of consumers in each. 
The price of each distribution utility’s assets was determined by the government, 
but not on the basis of actual inventory of assets.  The accounts of the utility were neither 
rigorously maintained nor audited by independent agencies.  Therefore, the government 
made three assumptions in determining the values of the newly created distribution 
companies.  The first was that the distribution businesses would become profitable after a 
period of five years, the second that consumers would not be subject to enormous tariff 
increases, and the third, critically, was that the government would continue to support the 
private utilities up to 26 billion rupees over the subsequent five years.  The enormous 
debt of the erstwhile DVB, on the other hand, was transferred to a newly created 
government holding company. 
Out of six pre-qualified bidders, only two continued the process to submit formal 
offers.  These were BSES Ltd., the power subsidiary of Reliance Industries, and Tata 
                                                 
285 Author’s interview with Jagdish Sagar, September 23, 2003, New Delhi. 
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Power Company Ltd., owned by the Tata group of companies.  BSES bid for all three 
zones, while Tata Power Company made offers to purchase the North-Northwest and 
South-West distribution segments, the two relatively well-off zones.  Neither of the two 
companies, however, met the minimum reduction targets established by the government.  
The government had sought AT&C reductions of 20% over a five-year period and the 
bids submitted by Tata and BSES promised only 12 to 13% reductions.  The private 
companies also sought additional safeguards to ensure that their new businesses would be 
profitable.  Chief among these was the insistence that the government guarantee a 16% 
rate of return on their investment for a period of 30 years. 
After negotiating for two weeks, the government and the two private companies 
found an acceptable compromise.  At the behest of the private companies, the 
government agreed to pass legislation making theft of electricity a criminal offense, and 
increased its subsidy from 26 billion rupees to 34.5 billion rupees.  Tata and BSES agreed 
to increase their reduction targets to 17% in two zones and 17.25% in the remaining zone, 
and dropped their request for a guaranteed rate of return for 16 years.     
Critics of the privatization program from the left focused on several facets of the 
privatization program.  First, privatization was costly to the Delhi exchequer.  The large 
subsidy amount was far higher than the government had been paying when the utility was 
publicly-owned.  In addition, there were too many other concessions granted to the 
private players that transformed what was intended to be a competitive bid into a bilateral 
negotiation.  Finally, those opposed to neoliberal reform considered the privatization of a 
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public service like electricity to be a sign that the state was abandoning its traditional role 
of working towards equity in development.286 
Proponents of market reform, on the other hand, argued that by creating three 
non-contiguous distribution entities, the government was perpetuating the problems of 
monopoly service, which according to these critics, was the root cause of DVB’s 
inefficiencies.287  The privatization should have introduced competition, which according 
to these critics, is the only way to ensure progressive efficiency gains and lowered tariffs.   
 As an earlier section on electricity consumption by industry suggested, the price 
and quality of electricity provided to industry did improve sufficiently for many to return 
to the grid.  Most other consumers, who also expected the situation to improve, were 
disappointed.  The two private companies took over distribution functions on July 1, 




 As in the previous chapter on Orissa, this chapter on Delhi has focused on the set 
of internal political economy considerations that made privatization a favorable policy for 
the Delhi government to pursue.  The periodic protests by Delhi consumers—mostly 
middle class ones—over the dismal state of electricity supplies made public ownership 
more of a political liability than an asset.  Similarly, industrial consumers benefited from 
                                                 
286 Prabhir Purkaystha, Interview, October 23, 2002, New Delhi.  Activists and scholars from the Delhi 
Science Forum, including Prabir Purkayastha, exemplify this stance.   
287 Gajendra Haldea, “Blackouts Ahead, Private monopolies are a dim idea” Times of India December 31, 
2001; the Centre for Civil Society based in New Delhi made similar judgments.   
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an ownership change that promised to lower their electricity rates and improve the quality 
of supply.   
The common denominator linking Delhi and Orissa is the lack of a sizeable and 
politically influential agricultural consumer base that benefits from agricultural subsidies 
in other states.  The next chapter turns to examine Maharashtra, a state where agricultural 
production, especially of water-intensive crops like sugarcane, had become thoroughly 
reliant on the provision of subsidized electricity, which was used to draw groundwater to 
the surface.    
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In both Orissa and Delhi, privatization was carried out in the absence of the rural 
interests that had come to benefit from electricity subsidies in other states.  By contrast, 
in Maharashtra agricultural subsidies—for water, electricity, and price supports—are 
important as a means to bind the state government to the larger commercial farmers and 
agro-industrialists, particularly in the western districts of the state.  The existence of a 
politically influential rural class is significant in explaining why the government of 
Maharashtra never took up the privatization mantra being repeated elsewhere.   
One Indian political scientist has observed that politics in Maharashtra represents 
a tacit understanding between the economic power in the state, concentrated in Mumbai, 
and political power, held by a rural elite.288  The history and current politics of the 
electricity sector too supports this thesis, where the state was one of the few in India with 
a mixed public-private structure utility ownership.  Private utilities served the most 
lucrative market, in Mumbai, and a public utility that subsidized prices for farmers served 
the remainder of the state.  Another scholar has observed that while the “expansive elite” 
in the countryside are a powerful force in the state’s politics, their role is “more reactive 
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than initiatory.”289  What the rural elite exercise is a significant veto power over policies 
detrimental to their interests.   
The state of Maharashtra occupies a portion of the west coast of India, continuing 
far inland into what is known as the Deccan plateau.  It is made up of several regions, 
each with a distinct economic base, resource profile, and history.  These differences 
among the regions have affected the nature and distribution of political power and 
resource allocation in the state in important ways.  The state is one of the largest in terms 
of both territory and population, and by most measures, it is also among India’s most 
developed and wealthy states.  The capital city of Mumbai (formerly Bombay)290 and its 
environs host the country’s important financial, entertainment, real estate, and 
manufacturing sectors.   
For many reasons, the state was considered a ripe setting to experiment with the 
“World Bank model” of electricity reforms in the mid-1990s.  From its creation in 1960 
to the early 1990s, Maharashtra’s government and bureaucracy had a general reputation 
for effectiveness, and the state also enjoyed a good reputation with international donors.  
Maharashtra was the beneficiary of a large World Bank loan to its energy sector in the 
early 1990s, a time when the World Bank had already expressed its dissatisfaction with 
the performance of other SEBs by withholding financial aid.  That the state’s political 
elite from multiple parties were not averse to the entry of new private capital is amply 
demonstrated by the story of the state’s negotiations with the Enron Corporation to build 
                                                 
289 Donald B. Rosenthal, The Expansive Elite: District politics and state policy-making in India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), p. 13. 
290 The city’s name was changed from Bombay to Mumbai in 1995. 
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a gas-fired power plant in the coastal district just south of Mumbai.  Finally, one of the 
main justifications for continued state-ownership—making access to electricity more 
inclusive by taking up the expensive task of rural electrification—was at least notionally 
no longer valid since the state claimed to have achieved full electrification by the late 
1980s.   
Despite these seemingly ideal conditions for privatization, no such experiment 
was carried out, nor was the state’s SEB vertically unbundled until after passage of the 
Electricity Act 2003 by the central government, a piece of legislation that mandates the 
dismantling of SEBs.  In the case of Maharashtra, the challenge is one of explaining the 
lack of an expected policy change.  In this chapter I suggest that the same set of political 
imperatives that operate today in Punjab, which are briefly described at the very outset of 
the thesis—keeping production costs low for farmers even at the risk of stalling or 
eliminating industrial production—explain energy policy in the state of Maharashtra.   
Although the story is a complex one, involving multiple actors and influences, I 
suggest that one of the most significant reasons that the state resisted privatization lies in 
the political influence of rural Maharashtra, which effectively closed off the possibility of 
Maharashtra following or leading the path of liberalization taken by Orissa and Delhi.  
Specifically, my argument to explain the lack of distribution privatization in Maharashtra 
is two-pronged.   
The first reason for the lack of privatization lies in the strong links between urban 
and rural political and economic elites in Maharashtra, links forged in part because of the 
socio-political implications of caste institutions and identities in the state, and which 
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became stronger during the 1990s because of changes in Maharashtra’s electoral 
environment.  Many state governments, including Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, 
began the populist fashion of granting consumption subsidies for water, staple grains, and 
electricity beginning in the 1980s.  Often, these decisions were made in the context of 
increasingly competitive state electoral politics, as regional political parties emerged to 
displace the dominant Congress party.  Maharashtra remained one of the last bastions of 
unchallenged Congress hegemony until well into the 1990s, much later than most parts of 
India.  Perhaps for this reason, although goods like electricity were subsidized to some 
extent in Maharashtra, Maharashtrian farmers still paid more than their neighbors across 
state boundaries.  But although prices were not deflated to the extent that they were in 
other states, the volume of subsidized goods consumed by rural Maharashtra outweighed 
that in many other states.291   
Furthermore, selective distribution of electricity was still important as a means of 
favoring some regions and some interests in the state over others.  Specifically, electricity 
became important in the cultivation and processing of one of the state’s most important 
cash crops, sugarcane.  By extending electricity throughout Western Maharashtra, 
sugarcane cultivation and then processing of cane in cooperative factories became 
extremely profitable activities.       
                                                 
291 Ashok Gulati and Sudha Narayanan, The Subsidy Syndrome in Indian Agriculture (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 105-106.  The authors calculate the subsidies in fertilizer, irrigation, and power 
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Once the Congress’s domination of politics came to an end in the 1990s, parties 
began granting overt subsidies for favored constituencies, including electricity, as a way 
of extending and consolidating their “vote banks.”  In a climate of more competitive 
state-level politics, no political party wanted to embrace a policy—utility privatization—
that would be unpopular with the important, wealthy, and politically well-connected 
constituency of large, commercially-oriented farmers.   
By the late 1990s, the ties between the state and rural actors were such that the 
interests of Maharashtra’s large farmers, who are the primary beneficiaries of the 
electricity subsidies, in maintaining subsidized electricity were easily protected.  The 
particular history of caste and class formations in Maharashtra, distinct from other parts 
of India in their historical development and their current functioning, is one part of the 
story of why the rural lobby exercises greater strength in this state than in other Indian 
states.   
Secondly, unlike in Delhi, the bulk of Maharashtra’s middle-class urbanites, who 
reside in Mumbai and whose dissatisfaction with power scarcity and black-outs might 
have spurred politicians to consider privatization, were in a sense neutralized because the 
Bombay utilities were already privately owned.  The Tata Power Company (TPC) and the 
Bombay Suburban Electric Supply Company (BSES) were among the handful of private 
distribution and generation systems that were never nationalized in the decades after 
independence.  The TPC, a part of one of India’s oldest and largest industrial 
conglomerates, generates power and is a bulk supply company in Maharasthra.  BSES 
distributes electricity to residential consumers in metropolitan Mumbai.  Starting in the 
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late 1980s and continuing throughout the subsequent decade, Reliance Industries, another 
of India’s largest business houses, acquired majority stake in BSES.  The two together are 
considered the most politically influential business houses in India currently.   
 There are several additional reasons that are important to note in understanding 
why Maharashtra was able to hold out against the dominant model of reform advocated 
by the central government and the World Bank.  The first is the state’s substantial 
generating capacity.292  Unlike Delhi and Orissa, Maharashtra had built thermal and 
hydroelectric facilities that insulated the state from pressure from the central government.  
Additional factors that played into Maharashtra’s resistance to reform include the 
presence of concerted opposition from labor unions and vibrant civil society 
organizations that trained their attention on the energy sector.  Labor unions, which 
played a negligible role in Orissa and Delhi, were stronger in Maharashtra for a number 
of reasons.  Maharashtra’s unions—larger and more organized than elsewhere—learned 
and organized in response to the earlier privatization in Orissa.  Had the state government 
wanted to proceed with privatization, however, there is no prima facea reason to believe 
that a tripartite agreement like the ones employed in both Delhi and Orissa would not 




                                                 
292 The lack or presence of self-sufficiency in energy supplies, while important at the margins, can’t be 
considered the most significant reason that states privatized or did not, as I discuss in the introductory 
chapter.  Energy dependence can be considered a necessary but not sufficient explanation for reform, 
because although Orissa and Delhi as the only privatizing states, were both reliant on external sources, 
other dependent states, like Bihar, did not privatize. 
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Patchwork Maharashtra:  History and Geography 
 
Prior to 1960, present-day Maharashtra and Gujarat were governed together in a 
composite region called Bombay Province, the boundaries of which were largely 
inherited from the British administrative structure.  Following independence in 1947, 
social movements across India demanded that states be reorganized following linguistic 
borders.  In 1960, the efforts of one such movement in the Marathi-speaking territories, 
the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (Committee for a United Maharashtra), succeeded in 
splitting Bombay into Maharashtra to the south and and west, and Gujarat to the north, 
with the capital of the former located in metropolitan Bombay.   
Modern Maharashtra is a heterogeneous mix of regions with distinct natural and 
historical characteristics.  The three primary administrative regions of the state are 
denoted as Western Maharashtra, which includes the city of Mumbai (formerly Bombay), 
the Konkan littoral, and the Sahyadri mountain range and which was part of British 
Bombay; Marathwada, formerly part of the Nizam’s Hyderabad, an autonomous princely 
state that included much of present-day Andhra Pradesh; and Vidarbha, composed of 
former British Central Provinces and Berar, also once part of Hyderabad.  Scattered 
throughout these three primary regions are former autonomous princely states.   
    191
 
Map 3.  District map of Maharashtra, 2001 
Source: Office of the Registrar General, India 
Copyright: Public domain 
 
The topography and climate of Maharashtra’s regions vary as much as their 
historico-political antecedents.  The coastal strip that runs along the western length of 
Maharashtra from north to south feels the brunt of the annual southwest monsoon.  The 
quality of the land is inferior to other parts of western Maharashtra, although there is 
cultivation of cash crops like mangoes and coconuts.  Separating this strip from the 
remainder of the state are the Sahyadri mountains, whose uneven topography is balanced 
by heavy rainfall and rich soil.  The Deccan plateau comprises the remainder of the state; 
parts of this get less concentrated rainfall during the monsoon but get rain during other 
parts of the year as well.  Other parts are arid and easily susceptible to drought.  The 
Marathwada region is one of the poorest in the state.  Part of former princely Hyderabad, 
the region did not benefit from colonial-era development of irrigation structures like other 
princely states did, notably princely Mysore (in present day Karnataka) and Travancore 
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(in present day Kerala) to the South.  A large part of the land was under the zamindari 
system in which individuals were given the rights to collect taxes for large tracts of land, 
which enabled them to effect a great deal of control over villages in their territory.  Under 
this land tenure system, much of the agricultural surplus was extracted from cultivators 
and very little returned to the land in the way of agricultural investments.  Most of 
Western Maharashtra, in contrast, had a ryotwari system, in which state revenues were 
collected from individual cultivators.  The effects of the different kinds of land tenure 
arrangements in colonial and pre-colonial India continue to be seen in present-day 
landholding patterns and economic outcomes.293  
Several features of Maharashtra’s social composition and political history 
distinguish it from other parts of India, and are critical in the unfolding trajectory of 
political life in the state.  Foremost among this is the nature of the region’s dominant 
caste of Marathas.  Indian sociologist M. N. Srinivas, in an enormously influential work, 
wrote that  
a caste may be said to be ‘dominant’ when it preponderates 
numerically over other castes, and when it also wields 
preponderant economic and political power.  A large and powerful 
caste group can be more easily dominant if its position in the local 
caste hierarchy is not too low.294   
                                                 
293 Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: the Legacy of 
Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” American Economic Review Vol. 95, No. 4 (September 
2005):1190-1213. The research finds that the British territories ruled by zamindari or landlord, continue to 
have lower economic outcomes than districts that were characterized by ryotwari or individual cultivation.  
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Mughal revenue systems. 
294 M. N. Srinivas, “The social structure of a Mysore village” in Village India, ed. McKim Marriott 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 18.  
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This definition applies very neatly to the Marathas, who today represent the 
largest caste grouping in Maharashtra and from whose ranks emerge the majority of the 
region’s political and landowning elite.   
Political antagonism between Brahmins and the numerically preponderant 
Marathas, (or the Maratha-kunbi caste cluster as it is sometimes called), is an especially 
important feature of the state’s pre-Independence political history, and constructions of 
caste identity that grow out of the earlier period continue to shape Maharashtra’s post-
Independence politics and political economy in significant ways.  In western India in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unlike in other parts of India, Brahmins were not 
only ritually and socially superior but also commanded political and economic power, 
which they had gradually usurped from Maratha rulers over the course of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  Maratha-Brahmin rule, (in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
this was known as the Maratha Empire, while in the eighteenth it was known as the 
Peshwa confederacy, in reference to the Brahmin ministers who were the true wielders of 
power) was finally defeated by the British in 1818. 
During the colonial period Brahmins, who had a near monopoly on literacy, 
cornered the market of new bureaucratic opportunities in the expanding British 
government; during the late colonial period, the key nationalist thinkers, activists, and 
politicians came almost exclusively from among Brahmin communities.  During the late 
colonial period, Brahmin landlords and moneylenders were the target of many peasant 
agitations.  Although these peasant revolts could be read in purely class terms, non-
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Brahmin leaders, particularly well-to-do Marathas, saw the benefits of highlighting the 
role of caste and downplaying the economic bases of such struggles.295   
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and continuing well into the present, a 
series of lower-caste theorists and activists formulated new challenges to the traditional 
dominance of the region’s Brahmin elite.  The political ideas that emerged from this 
group of radicals were very distinct from larger currents of nationalist thought in India.  
For example, Joyotirao Phule, arguably the most influential lower caste thinker in the 
nineteenth century, proposed that a reformed colonial administration could actually be a 
boon to the lower castes because it provided new opportunities for employment that were 
outside the traditional division of labor based on caste.  Nationalist politics and the goal 
of independence, according to Phule, was not in the interests of the broader mass of low 
caste peoples.  Summing up this view, one scholar of the period states: “the [Indian 
Nationalist] Congress represented a spectre that had haunted non-Brahman thinkers since 
the early 1870s: a political body, dominated by Brahmans and the urban-educated, that 
was capable of winning for itself an institutionalized position as a mediator between the 
British government and the larger masses of Indian society.”296  Phule and others who 
followed in the non-Brahmin movement, particularly elite Marathas, remained outside of 
the anti-colonial struggle well into the 1930s, preferring to distance themselves from the 
Brahmin nationalists.   
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Another significant feature of rural caste society in western India is the more 
porous nature of Maratha caste boundaries relative to other strictly endogamous castes in 
India.  It was not always the case that Maratha as a caste name referred to the large 
community that it designates today; in the early nineteenth century, there is significant 
evidence that the term was used to designate a very small group of ninety-six elite 
families who could trace their lineage to sixteenth-century rulers.  Over the course of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, as a part of a conscious strategy 
by elite Marathas, the caste name came to refer to a much larger community of rural 
peoples that crossed class lines.297   
  At different points in history, elite Maratha families strategically affiliated 
themselves to lower castes, holding out the promise of upward social mobility to these 
groups in exchange for their loyalty to Maratha rule.  In the 1920s, the Maratha elite 
undertook the task of officially broadening the borders of the community to include the 
lower income and lower status kunbis.  The British census was one useful tool in this 
effort, as leaders exhorted Maratha and kunbi alike to mark their identity as “Maratha-
kunbi,” solidifying their merger as one large group.298  The size of this dominant caste is 
significant; according to some estimates nearing 40% of the total population of 
Maharashtra.  In many electoral systems, a community of this size would be considered 
large, particularly if its members voted with one voice.  But within India’s highly 
                                                 
297 O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, Chapter 2. 
298 Jayant Lele, Elite Pluralism and Class Rule: Political development in Maharashtra (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 55-56. 
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fragmented electorate, the number assumes even greater significance because it is easier 
for them to command a plurality.     
By the 1930s, as British departure seemed imminent, non-Brahmin leaders began 
to join the Congress.299  The expansion of Congress all over India was also due to 
Gandhi’s considerable efforts to broaden the base of Congress to include rural and lower 
caste elites.  After another brief departure of Maratha leaders to form the Peasants and 
Workers Party in the 1950s, the rural Maratha elite returned to the Congress Party in 
1960 and firmly held the reins of the party in Maharashtra from then until the mid-1990s.  
The means by which the Maratha elite retained control of the Congress, and the reasons 
that Congress was able to dominate Maharashtra’s politics even as the party declined in 
most other states, owes much to the way that state resources were expended to promote 
certain kinds of rural development, in particular water-intensive sugarcane crops and 
cooperative sugar factories, all of which required heavy use of irrigation and electricity 
inputs.   
By the 1990s, I suggest that rural interests, which in Maharashtra are highly 
organized through caste structures and cooperative institutions, therefore had an incentive 
in Maharashtra to stave off the kinds of economic liberalization policies that threatened to 
dismantle rural subsidies.  Privatization of electricity was one such policy.  In 
Maharashtra, the rural lobby also excercised considerable influence on state policy.  The 
mechanisms of this influence was both through a broad-based farmers’ movement that 
had emerged in the 1980s and continued to influence events in the 1990s, and because the 
                                                 
299 Lele, Elite Pluralism and Class Rule, p. 52. 
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majority of Maharashtra’s elected officials were either personally invested in agriculture 
and agro-industries, or were linked to those who did through networks of caste and 
kinship. 
The next section of the chapter narrates the history of electricity in Maharashta, 
which started in Bombay, to explain why the pro-reform lobbies that were so influential 
in Orissa and Delhi remained silent in Maharashtra.  While utilities around the country 
were being nationalized, Bombay remained in the hands of private companies.  
  
History of Electricity in Maharashtra: private ownership amid a nationalizing system 
 
The first use of electricity in Maharashtra was in the city of Bombay in 1882, to 
light Crawford Market, a major center of commerce that continues to thrive.  For the next 
several decades, there was irregular lighting in the Market, on a few major roads, and in 
municipal buildings, falling into sporadic disuse due to the financial and technical 
instability of early private generation and supply companies.  The Government of 
Bombay granted “The Bombay Electric License, 1905,” after which the use of electricity 
in the city, while still extremely expensive and therefore sparse, was more regular.  In the 
decades before independence, the majority of the state’s electricity was generated by Tata 
Electric Companies, which comprised Tata Hydro-Electric Power Supply, established in 
1910, Andhra Valley Power Supply Company, established in 1916, and Tata Power 
Company, established in 1919.  The electricity that these companies generated was used 
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primarily by industry and for public lighting in and around the city of Bombay.300  The 
Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company (BEST) had two small thermal 
generating units that were eventually closed down in 1926, but the main function of the 
company was to distribute electricity in the city.301  After the Tata Hydro-Electric Supply 
Company was established in 1910, BEST and the Tatas shared electricity functions, with 
occasional tension erupting between the two.  The agreement finally arrived at between 
the two allowed the Tatas to supply electricity from their generating units directly to 
factories requiring more than 500,000 units of electricity annually.  All other consumers, 
however, were to be supplied by BEST.  BEST was a British-owned operation but the 
Tatas, though indigenous, had much larger capital assets and more political favor.   
BEST, initially registered as both a British company in London and as an Indian 
company and later, for reasons of economy, as only an Indian company but with a largely 
British management operated from 1905 until one week before Independence, when it 
was taken over by the Bombay Municipal Corporation and run as a public sector 
undertaking.302  BEST continues to supply electricity to Bombay, now Mumbai, 
residents.  Consumers in suburban Mumbai were supplied electricity by Bombay 
Suburban Electric Supply (BSES) beginning in 1929.  From then until the mid-1990s, 
BSES purchased power from Tata Power Companies.  BSES began to generate its own 
electricity in 1995. 
                                                 
300 Tata Hydeo-Electric merged with two other Tata subsidiaries also in the power sector to become Tata 
Power Company in 2000. “Pioneers in Power,” Tata Power Company, company brochure.   
301 Much of the information about the early years of electricity in Bombay is taken from “History of 
BEST,” The Brihanmumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking, company history published by the 
BEST utility offices. 
302 According to “History of BEST,” Chapter 6 this was the first nationalization in independent India.  
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Aside from these private distribution and generation companies in and around 
Bombay, the region of present-day Maharashtra had several other small generation and 
distribution companies located in the state’s larger cities, like Thane and Pune.  The vast 
rural regions of the state were not electrified until well into the post-independence period.  
And even still, the residents of Mumbai and its environs use the bulk of all electricity 
consumed in the state.       
 The Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 mandated the created of state electricity 
boards in each state.  Fulfilling this mandate, the trilingual state of Bombay, which 
incorporated the northern part of current-day Karnataka, and parts of modern 
Maharashtra and Gujarat, established the Bombay Electricity Board in 1954.  The 
country’s federal structure was reorganized along linguistic lines, resulting in the creation 
of the primarily Marathi-speaking state of Maharashtra in 1960.  In the same year the 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board was created with the overall responsibility for 
electricity functions in the state.     
Electricity plays an obviously critical role in industrial mechanization.  In cities, 
its first customers were local governments, and its first uses were for street lighting and 
the lighting of municipal buildings.  As a network utility, one that relies on the 
establishment of a common grid, it is in the best interest of the suppliers and generators 
of electricity to invest resources to add as many consumers as possible up to the 
maximum electricity output of the generating station.  As in most places, potential 
consumers of electricity—residential and industrial alike—were reluctant to embrace the 
new technology.  To foster a larger residential consumer base, BEST sent canvassers 
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door-to-door explaining the benefits of the new technology and its applications in the 
home and factories.  In addition to canvassing consumers, BSES also established a show-
room in Bombay that displayed and demonstrated early kitchen appliances, an endeavor 
that was modeled after a similar display in London by the London-based branch of BSES.  
As with other network utilities, consumption is initially geographically concentrated.  
Even by the mid-1970s, more than fifty years after electricity became a mainstay in urban 
Bombay and two decades after the state electricity board was charged with spreading 
electricity, most of the state was still un-electrified.  Whereas Western Maharashtra, 
primarily Bombay, consumed 84.8% of all electricity in 1973-1974, Vidarbha consumed 
only 12.8% and Marathwada consumed a meager 2.4%.303  
 The Board’s task of rural electrification in Maharashtra was made more difficult 
by the fact that the largest revenue-generating region in the state was in the city of 
Bombay, which was in private hands.  From the first year of its creation, the Board 
started operating with a deficit.  While on the one hand the Board was pressured by 
politicians to electrify the state quickly, on the other hand, the most lucrative portions of 
the state were off-limits to the Board, so it was unable to generate internal resources fast 
enough to fuel expansion.  At the time of its creation, there were only a handful of places 
with a concentrated potential load that the Board could electrify.  These were Akola, 
Amravati, Ulhasnagar, Kolhapur, Khangaon, Talegaon, and Chand, which were dispersed 
across the breadth of Maharashtra.  Laying transmission lines to connect all of these far-
flung cities to the grid would be costly and time-consuming.  To counter these financial 
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difficulties, the Board determined to take over the private licensees that operated in the 
larger towns in the state.  This was part of the MSEB plan for the period of the 3rd Five-
Year Plan, from 1961-62 to 1965-66.304  There were three methods by which this 
occurred.  In some rare cases, the Government of Maharashtra revoked the private license 
for poor service.  More often, the Board purchased the assets of the licensee upon expiry 
of the license.   
In some instances, the licensees approached the MSEB to purchase their assets 
even before the license was due to expire because the undertaking was no longer 
profitable.  Once the MSEB finished laying transmission lines connecting an area in 
which a licensee was operating to the expanding public grid, the Board was authorized 
under Section 36 of the 1948 Act to require the private license holder to cease generating 
its own power and instead purchase power from the Board, which may have limited the 
profitability of the private firm. 
Despite the Board’s aggressive takeover program, Bombay—the most lucrative 
area in the state—was left in the hands of two private companies, BSES and the Tata 
Power Company, and one municipal company, BEST.  This ran counter to the aims that 
MSEB stated in its annual reports regarding the expansion of its electrification.  It was 
also perceived in outside reports on MSEB to be one of the main handicaps of MSEB 
relative to other public utilities in India.  As even a report prepared by an umbrella 
organization for private manufacturing and industrial associations states,  
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It is necessary to appreciate some important constraints within which 
[MSEB] has to function and over which it has no control.  Its cost 
structure is not fully comparable with other Boards and even private 
undertakings in view of the fat that highly concentrated industrial and 
other loads in the State yielding substantial revenue are not with it.  On the 
other hand, it is solely responsible for relatively less remunerative rural 
electrification programme. This affects its capacity to raise internal 
resources.305 
 
 Even as late as 1971-72, the private and municipal utilities that sold power 
to the concentrated industrial and residential consumers in and around Bombay 
accounted for the majority of all electricity sales in the state, equalling 58.8% of 
the total.306  Of the total sales, 12.8 percent went to Bombay Electric Supply and 
Transport (BEST), 8.7 percent to Bombay Suburban Electric Supply (BSES) 
accounted for 8.7, 36.1 percent to Tata Power, and 1.2 to a second small 
privately-owned municipal utility (Thane Electric Supply Company) located in 
Thane, an industrial center immediately to the north of Bombay.  The utility in 
Thane was nationalized and became part of the MSEB grid in 1973.  The largest 
of these private firms, Tata Power, both generated and distributed power in 
Maharashtra, but their distribution was limited to very large industrial consumers, 
again the most lucrative ones.  To get a sense of the relative size of TPC’s 
consumers, consider that in 1973, although Tata Power sold 36% of the electricity 
in all of Maharashtra, their total customers numbered only 216, or .01 percent of 
the total private, municipal, and utility consumers in Maharashtra.307  
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 Given how advantageous it would have been to MSEB to acquire the 
customer bases of Tata, BSES, and BEST in the concentrated region of Bombay, 
why were these companies not absorbed when the multitude of small private 
companies that dotted the country were nationalized in the 1950s and 1960s?   
During the debates in the Constituent Assembly, when the merits of 
nationalization in the electricity sector were being debated, one member remarked:   
“There are powerful vested interests in one or two places which it would 
be very unwise for us to displace now.  Take the Tata interests [in 
Bombay]; it would be very unwise straightaway to displace it.  It would be 
much better to get a corporation of that nature with its semi-impersonal 
character to help us in going ahead with our programme of developing 
electricity rather than tell them, “We are going to take you over”, and find 
ourselves faced with all the difficulty that would ensue in regard to 
managements and personnel.” 308 
 
The member of the Assembly who made these remarks, T. T. Krishnamachari, 
was also a member of the Select Committee who met with various stakeholders in the 
process of drafting the 1948 legislation that nationalized the sector.  And yet he suggests 
that although nationalization makes sense as a general policy, stripping assets from a 
corporation like the Tatas would be contrary to the country’s interests.  This decision to 
carve out exceptions to the policy of nationalization had long-term consequences in 
Maharashtra. 
The consequences of keeping Bombay private continued to be felt decades later, 
during the period of economic liberalization.  Because the area of Mumbai and its 
industrial hinterlands were served by private distribution and generation companies, 
neither the industrial consumers that had benefited the most from privatization in Orissa 
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and Delhi, nor the urban consumers that had agitated for better service in Delhi, were 
concerned about the fate of Maharashtra’s publicly-owned electric grid.  By the 1990s the 
rest of the country was just contemplating a return to the public-private mix that 
characterized ownership patters in the colonial period.  But Mumbai along with only 
three other cities in the country (Kolkata, Surat, and Amdhabad—all either prominent or 
rising industrial centers at independence), had never abandoned that model, despite the 
professed commitment to state ownership that characterized the period. 
To what extent indigenous capitalists—particularly large industrial capital—
supported or not India’s planned economy is a recurring debate in the literature on Indian 
political economy.  Some scholarship on this subject, and certainly nationalist histories, 
emphasize the socialist character of India’s political economy that was established by a 
developmental state with strong backing from Indian capital.  Most scholars point to the 
existence of the Bombay Plan, a document published in 1944 and 1945 by a group of 
India’s largest industrialists, including J. R. D. Tata, to suggest that Indian business 
favored planning.  More recent work suggests that India failed as a developmental state 
precisely because the Indian business class resisted the creation of a strong state with 
expanded regulatory functions.  Chibber, for example, argues that the industrialists who 
produced the Bombay Plan used the document as a way to 1) position themselves as good 
nationalists at a time when it seemed that the mass protest against colonialism could 
transform into an anti-private property agitation, and 2) to anticipate and shape the terms 
of the debate on planning that would follow independence.  Far from leading the agenda 
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of nationalization, planning, and state-led industrialization, he argues, Indian capitalists 
were crucial to the failure of these programs.309     
The pattern of nationalization in the electric sector, too, suggests that Indian 
industrialists had a significant input in directing how state-ownership would proceed.  
The outcome of nationalization, in which the most lucrative pockets of the electricity 
sector—the urban, industrialized zones—were preserved for private ownership is further 
suggestive of this thesis.  In addition to the Tata companies that were protected from 
nationalization, one other company, Killick Nixon and Company, owned the distribution 
zones in the other industrial centers of Surat, Ahmedabad, and the Bombay suburbs.310  
The company became a public limited company in 1948, floated in the nascent Indian 
financial markets.311  Just these four private companies (the three owned by Killick and 
the Tata Power) and the one private company that operated in Calcutta, Calcutta Electric 
Supply Corporation, India’s other major industrial center, still accounted for nearly one-
third of all generating capacity in India and most of the industrial consumption.312   
The story of Bombay and the power of certain private companies to shape the 
nature of India’s nationalized electricity sector is only one half of the narrative in 
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Maharashtra.  This is the part that explains the lack of advocacy for privatization.  But 
given the amount of pressure that the Maharashtra government was under from 
conditionalities imposed on its loans from the World Bank and the central government, 
we still have to ask why Maharashtra resisted following a policy that other states in India 
were already starting to formulate as early as 1993 in the case of Orissa.  If the political 
waters were flowing in the direction of privatization, why did Maharashtra resist?   
In the early 1990s, as mentioned earlier, there were signs that at least some among 
Maharashtra’s highest echelon of bureaucrats favored privatization.  Just a few years 
later, the tide had seemingly shifted, and there was no discussion of privatizing 
distribution, although by then the state had begun complex negotiations with the Enron 
Corporation to build a large and expensive power plant in coastal Maharashtra.  The mid-
1990s was also a period when the MSEB’s finance’s started to decline and came to 
resemble those of other bankrupt SEBs around India.   
The next section illustrates how electricity, in particular rural electrification, had 
come to play an important role in agricultural production.  This feature of Maharashtra’s 
electric industry distinguishes it from the patterns of consumption in Delhi (which had no 
rural sector) and Orissa (in which agriculture never became reliant on electricity).  
Understanding this difference is critical to understand the differing policy choices made 
by these state governments.  We begin by surveying the period just before independence 
through the 1980s, when electrification became increasingly important for irrigation 
facilities, particularly in some parts of the state and for certain crops.    
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Agriculture and Electricity 
 
Despite hosting India’s largest city, Mumbai, the state of Maharashtra, much like 
the rest of India, continues to have a larger rural than urban population.  According to the 
most recent Indian census in 2001, Maharashtra’s population is 57.6% rural.  Most of the 
state has sufficient rainfall to sustain one crop and some central portions of the state 
benefit from enough rain for multiple cropping.  Agricultural production in Maharashtra 
has gone through several transformations that have been the result of either technological 
or institutional changes.  In the twentieth century, the first technology to transform the 
countryside was canal irrigation.  Following this, electrification gave farmers access to a 
second new, cost-effective, and substantial source of irrigation: groundwater pumped via 
tubewells.  The following narrative about agriculture in Maharashtra will focus on two 
transformative periods, the advent of canal irrigation and later of tubewell irrigation.  The 
latter development was possible only after the state expanded its rural electrification 
program beginning in the late 1960s.  Electricity, therefore, is at the heart of 
Maharashtra’s second agricultural revolution, which had far-reaching implications for 
politics, agrarian political economy, and the policy choices about privatization of electric 
utilities in the current period.   
 
The Deccan Canals and the Growth of Maharashtra’s Sugar Industry 
 The development of irrigation can change the economic complexion of 
agriculture.  The change can be more radical in arid or semi-arid regions like the Deccan 
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plateau that covers most of Maharashtra because such landscapes are most susceptible to 
delays or absence in seasonal rain.  In addition, some of the Deccan areas of Maharashtra 
fall in the rain shadow and get much less rainfall than other parts of India.   
The growth of canal irrigation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
caused the first significant shift in agricultural production, particularly to cropping 
patterns.  Small-scale irrigation had long been practiced in India.  While tanks, wells, and 
small, private canals were, and are still, largely constructed by wealthier individuals with 
access to capital or credit, the construction of larger-irrigation structures like large canals 
in watersheds was largely an undertaking of the colonial state.   
The early large-scale canals in Maharashtra, known as the Deccan canals, were 
constructed by the British in the Bombay Presidency.313  Although the canals were 
originally intended to provide a measure of insurance against episodic drought and 
famine, the availability of assured water at the time of an expanding market structure led 
some entrepreneurial farmers to switch from subsistence to cash crops.314  Most popular 
among these was sugarcane, which was either made into gul by the farmers themselves, 
or processed into sugar by a cane factory.  The incentive for those farmers with the 
necessary resources to switch crops was enormous.  Studies of farming in the early 
twentieth century in Maharashtra have found that whereas an acre sown with millet or 
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sorghum (the subsistence crops that were the mainstay of this region) would yield Rs. 12 
to 13, an acre planted with sugarcane would yield Rs. 618, a fifty-fold increase.315  The 
first such entrepreneurial farmers were from the Mali community, a caste or jati of 
gardeners who migrated to the region from Saswad near Pune and had the necessary 
knowledge of cash cropping to take advantage of the opportunities posed by expanded 
irrigation facilities.   
From an individual farmer’s perspective, then, there were great financial 
incentives to switch to cash crops for those with the necessary resources.  The 
government, which had financed the expansion of canals, also had a great incentive to 
encourage cash crops.  These provided the only possibility for the colonial government to 
recoup its considerable investment.  The government therefore created considerable 
incentives for farmers to lease lands along the canals for sugarcane cultivation.316 
Although the Malis were inevitably the first to cultivate along the “irrigation 
frontier,” which refers to lands where irrigation is newly available, eventually wealthier 
members of the region’s dominant peasant caste, the Marathas, also took up sugarcane 
farming in the decades prior to independence.  After independence, Maharashtra 
embraced a model of cooperation in the agricultural sector.  The active involvement of 
the region’s numerically and socially dominant Maratha caste in sugarcane farming, and 
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the rise of the cooperative sector together constituted the twin engines driving the 
transformation of rich Maratha peasants into powerful political actors.   
At independence very little of the total cropped area of the Bombay presidency 
was irrigated.  The most common form of irrigation was by well, but government canals, 
private canals, and water tanks, or reservoirs, were also used.317  The second significant 
shift in irrigation patterns and therefore agricultural production came in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, when rural electrification enabled farmers to efficiently pump groundwater 
using irrigation pumpsets (IPS) and lift water from reservoirs using electrified pumps.  
This new access to irrigation coupled with hybrid seeds and intensive fertilizer use were 
the essential components of India’s state-directed Green Revolution.  
The history of cooperative farming in Maharasthra, and the growth of the sugar 
industry as a mainstay of agriculture and agro-industrialization in Maharashtra have been 
extensively researched by historians as well as political scientists.  What is largely 
overlooked in this research, however, is an appreciation for the ways in which 
development expenditure on electrification and irrigation constituted the mechanics by 
which these economic and political transformations occurred.  The next section will 
summarize the main conclusions from the scholarship on how cooperative sugar farming 
shaped politics in the state, before turning to analyze the patterns of rural electrification 
and irrigation that were a critical part of these processes.  
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Cooperative sugarcane farming and the rise of the “Sugar Barons” 
 The cooperative sector in Maharashtra has a long history that precedes 
independence.  The important facts of this history for our purposes are the role of 
cooperatives in the production of sugar.  During the colonial period, the dominant 
sugarcane-growing regions of India were located in north India, in present-day Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh.  These were the parts of the country most naturally suited to cane 
cultivation, and cane grew without the need for extensive irrigation.  The factories that 
crushed the cane into sugar were almost entirely owned by private companies.  There 
were some British-owned companies, but the bulk of them by the early twentieth century, 
were owned by Indian companies.  These included some of the most prominent Indian 
business families of the day, like Shriram, Birla, Walchand Hirachand, and Thapar.318  
These north Indian factories resolved the coordination problem that is at the heart of 
sugar production not through a plantation economy of the kind that emerged in many 
other colonies, but through a system of intermediaries.  “Landlords, money-lenders, and 
rich peasants…derived their strength not so much from their connection with the 
factories, or their entrepreneurial skills in exploiting new market opportunities as from 
their traditional position of political and economic domination in rural society.”319   
It was only as irrigation facilities spread throughout western India that sugarcane 
farming became viable and lucrative there.  In Maharashtra, the class of farmers who 
cultivated cane were themselves the entrepreneurial and capital-rich ones—first from the 
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Mali caste and later Maratha caste—who would take the risk of leasing land for a 
premium along the new canals.  In the 1930s, cane-growing Malis switched from 
producing gur, a sugar product that was produced locally, to processing their cane into 
refined sugar.320  Sugar had many advantages over gur, most importantly its longer shelf 
life and higher prices.  Whereas gur could be produced in a decentralized fashion, by 
individual families of farmers, the costs of refined sugar production required the 
establishment of larger factory enterprises.  Rather than selling their cane to the existing 
private crushing companies in the region, which had built a series of factory-run 
plantations, the Malis in one region solved the problem of coordinating cane production 
for factory processing by starting their own crushing cooperative in 1934.  The 
cooperative was extremely successful, expanding operations on several occasions and 
repaying loans ahead of schedule.321   
 Thanks to the success of the Mali factory, other farming communities also chose 
to bypass the private factories and establish their own factories along cooperative 
principles.  One of the earliest was set up in 1948 through the cooperation of cane-
growing Maratha peasants, and the organizational and conceptual help of D. R. Gadgil, 
who is sometimes called the father of the cooperative movement in Maharashtra.322  V. 
Vikhe, the main leader of the cooperative, organized his fellow farmers to contribute half 
of the share capital, convinced the Bombay State Cooperative Bank to raise the other half 
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of the share capital, and arranged a loan from the Industrial Finance Coporation to 
finance the costs of equipment and construction.323   
The cooperative sector received a major boost in 1954, when the provincial 
government of Bombay convinced the Indian government to reserve all future licenses 
for sugar factories for the cooperative sector.  In itself, this could be read as testament to 
the growing clout of the commercialized peasantry, most of whom came from the upper 
echelons of the Maratha community.  Cautioning against the danger of reading history 
backwards, however, one scholar of the sugar cooperatives suggests that the early 
cooperatives were the product of experimentation; it was only over time that they came to 
represent a “major power base” of the rural Maratha elite.324  The Bombay-based 
industrial houses were vocal but ultimately ineffectual opponents of the new policy.  For 
the landowning and commercial farming communities, cooperative factories allowed 
them to develop an alternative to the strength of urban based industrial capital.  Thanks to 
the resources of the state banking and credit societies, these landowners were also able to 
overcome the constraints of capital scarcity.  As one scholar notes, the “sugar 
cooperative, therefore, became an important vehicle for this transformation of the 
Maratha cane-growing community from that of a subordinate peasant community to 
becoming the dominant agrarian class.”325 
The emerging structure of cooperative institutions, in which cooperative factories 
got financial support from cooperative credit and banking institutions, was not spread 
                                                 
323 Attwood, Raising Cane, p. 194. 
324 Attwood, Raising Cane, p. 190. 
325 Baru, The Political Economy of Indian Sugar, p. 86. 
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evenly among all castes.  For the most part, it was landowning Marathas who emerged as 
the main organizers and beneficiaries of these evolving institutions.  Likewise, these 
institutions were regionally concentrated in the districts of Western Maharashtra.   
The existence and pattern of cooperatives in Maharashtra are one important 
reason for the Congress Party’s continued dominance in the state even as provincial 
politics in other parts of they country were becoming more and more competitive, with 
effective national and local opposition parties emerging to challenge the hegemony of the 
Congress.  The first state to elect a non-Congress government was Kerala in 1957, which 
elected a Communist government; in subsequent decades, elections all over the country 
became multiparty contests in which the Congress frequently lost.  Maharashtra, 
however, remained a Congress stronghold.  The brief period of non-Congress rule in 
Maharashtra in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency in the late 1970s seems only 
to confirm the strength and influence of Congress politicians in the state’s politics.  When 
the Janata Party won the national elections in 1977, Maharashtra was one of five states in 
which the Congress retained a large measure of its former power.326  The Congress also 
was ruled out of power in most of the state elections that coincided with or followed the 
national elections.  In Maharashtra, however, the only way that a non-Congress 
government could come to power was after a local Congress politician, Sharad Pawar, 
defected from the party along with a large number of other ex-Congressmen.  Sharad 
Pawar was the chief minister from this period before again re-joining Congress in the 
mid-1980s.  The Congress itself has split several times into factions organized around 
                                                 
326 James Manor, “Where Congress Survived: Five states in the Indian general election of 1977,” Asian 
Survey Vol. 18, No. 8 (August 1978): pp. 785-803.  
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powerful leaders, but barring the brief period in the late 1970s, these splits did not allow 
opposition parties to come to power in the state until the 1990s, a period to which we will 
return in a later section.   
Cooperative institutions were critical to Congress success because they provided 
avenues for the party to build durable alliances at the local level.  According to some 
analyses, cooperative institutions were also the means by which the state government 
could garner support from influential segments of the countryside for agro-industrial 
development.327  As many scholars have noted, there were multiple channels linking the 
Congress party to the cooperative institutions.  In the first instance, Congress politicians 
were among the first to establish new agricultural cooperatives, relying on state credit to 
do so.  Furthermore, the Congress party drew new political elites into the party from 
among the cooperatives.  Rural political aspirants who first rose to local prominence as 
directors, managers, and board members of cooperative institutions were then drawn into 
politics, bringing to the Congress party political experience and the ready-made 
constituencies that they had built while running the cooperatives.328  An analysis of the 
Maharashtra legislative assembly in office from 1967 to 1972 determined that out of the 
263 legislators who responded to the questionnaire, 159 or 60.7% percent of them were 
                                                 
327 Ashok S. Chousalkar, “Co-operatives: How has their leadership affected Maharashtra politics?” in 
Politics in Maharashtra, eds. Usha Thakkar and Mangesh Kulkarni (Bombay: Himalaya Publishing House, 
1995) p. 34-35. 
328 Narayan R. Khekale, The Pressure Politics in Maharashtra (Mumbai: Himalaya Publishing House, 
1999), p. 93-95.  During interviews conducted by Khekale, two presidents of the Maharashtra Pradesh 
Congress Committee, the regional party office, confirmed that when deciding which candidates will be 
given tickets to contest elections, they explicitly looked for experience in running cooperatives as evidence 
of political aptitude and chances of success.   
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chairmen, directors, or secretaries of credit, sugar, or other state cooperative 
institutions.329  
This could be compared to the way that diverse Indian political parties have relied 
on India’s vibrant, and occasionally violent, student politics in colleges and universities 
to yield new political stars.  Of the current crop of influential politicians in India, Lalu 
Prasad Yadav of Bihar, Mulayam Singh Yadav of Uttar Pradesh, and Buddhadeb 
Bhattacharya from the CPI(M) in West Bengal all got their start in student politics.  In 
Maharashtra, many of the most influential politicians of the last three decades got their 
start in cooperative politics, including Sharad Pawar, Vasantdada Patil, Ajit Pawar.  The 
one Maratha who is remembered as having attempted to weaken the dominance of the 
“sugar barons” in Maharashtra’s politics was Shankarrao Chavan.  He was a Maratha but 
from Marathwada rather than Maharashtra, who studied in Hyderabad and practiced law 
before running for elected office.  
Several ethnographies of rural Western Maharashtra provide details of the ties 
that bind cooperative institutions and the Congress party, on the one hand, and the 
dominance of cooperative institutions by Marathas on the other.  Both of these tendencies 
serve to entrench the interests of rural elites in state and local politics.  One of 
Maharashtra earliest post-Independence factories was the Kopergaon sugar factory, 
founded in 1953 and located in the Ahmednagar district of Western Maharashtra.  For 
most of the 1950s, there was relatively little direct political involvement in the running of 
the factory.  But by the 1960s, the links between the Congress party and the board 
                                                 
329 Khekale, Pressure Politics in Maharashtra, p. 92. 
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management were clear.  For example, for much of the 1960s, the chairman of the factory 
was a man named S. D. Kale, a Maratha leader who was also president of the District 
Congress Committee, and a member of the state legislative assembly who later held 
cabinet portfolios.330  Also during the height of cooperative-party affiliation, the factory’s 
jeeps and physical plant were used for Congress campaigning.  Perhaps most significant 
given the costs of Indian elections and the scarcity of funds, the sugar factory made 
substantial financial contributions to the Congress party.  This the factory did by 
imposing a nominally optional levy on each ton of sugarcane that it collected from its 
member-growers.  In reality, the cooperative’s leaders exerted considerable pressure 
particularly over smaller farmers to contribute to the fund.331 
Marathas dominate not just the sugar cooperatives, but also cooperative credit and 
irrigation societies.  Another ethnography, of Girvi town in Western Maharashtra, 
provides convincing evidence of this in an isolated region.  The town is in the district of 
Satara, the heart of sugarcane production.  In the late 1960s, although elite Marathas332 
constituted only one-quarter of the population of the town and its outlying areas, they 
held close to three-quarters of the shares in the Shriram Sugar Factory in the region, close 
to forty percent of the shares in the Girvi Credit Society, and just over 50% of the shares 
in the areas lift irrigation society.333 
                                                 
330 B. S. Baviskar, The Politics of Development: Sugar Cooperatives in Rural Maharashtra (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), p179 
331 Baviskar, Politics of Development, pp. 74-75. 
332 This ethnographer distinguishes between elite Maratha, those who held hereditary estates in land and 
office in colonial and pre-colonial times, and other Marathas, those who in the nineteenth century would 
have been referred to as kunbis.  
333 Anthony Carter, Elite Politics in Rural India: Political stratification and political alliances in Western 
Maharashtra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 75-76. 
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The rapid spread of cooperatives went hand in hand with the continued spread of 
irrigation technologies.  Once the “irrigation frontier” resulting from new canals was 
fully saturated, it was the turn of rural electrification to provide new irrigation 
possibilities, which again were concentrated in only some parts of the state.  Given the 
uneven supply of canal waters, even before widespread electrification brought down the 
cost of well irrigation, farmers who grew sugarcane on canal tracts relied heavily on 
wells to ensure adequate irrigation.334  Electrification was doubly important for sugar 
production.  Sugarcane farming requires large amounts of water, and in the semi-arid 
Deccan, groundwater pumped via an electrified pumpset provided a fillip to cane 
production.  Electricity was also used in the factories that processed cane into sugar.  In 
Maharashtra, these factories were established along cooperative lines, again dominated 
by geographically linked caste clusters, like the Malis and later the Marathas.  
Cooperative farming institutions are the crucial link connecting sugarcane production and 





                                                 
334 G. S. Kamat, Management of Co-operative Sugar Factories in Maharashtra (Bombay: Maharashtra 
Rajya Sahakari Sangh, 1976), p. 38.  This study of thirteen cooperative factories in 1961 found that while 
farmer members of some of the cooperatives relied almost wholly on canal waters, members of other 
cooperatives that had farmed in canal tracts nevertheless used a mix of well and canal waters, and in still 
others, wells were used almost exclusively.  For example, sugarcane-farming members of the Pravara Sugar 
Factory, the first cooperative factory to be set up in Maharashtra following independence, cultivated a total 
of 4,634 acres of sugarcane.  Out of this, despite between located in the area of the Pravara Right and Left 
Bank Canals, farmers irrigated 85% of the land with well water and only 15% with canal waters.   
    219
Uneven rural electrification and its impact on agriculture 
 
Rural electrification was not uniform across Maharashtra.  Rather, the pattern 
followed, and later reinscribed, deeper political and economic inequalities in the state.  
The farmlands of Western Maharashtra benefited the most from the irrigation potential 
provided by rural electrification.  In the first years after the formation of MSEB in 1960, 
the utility expended resources laying transmission lines in the districts of Vidarbha, 
which followed a certain economic logic because a bulk of the generation stations were in 
the Vidarbha region, and electrifying villages closest to the power plant is most cost 
effective.  The region of Marathwada has consistently received the fewest resources, 
thereby reproducing the regional inequalities in the state that lead to the present, in which 
the districts of Marathwada are among the poorest regions in India, despite their inclusion 
in Maharashtra, India’s wealthiest state.  As politics started to impact the utility’s 
decision-making in the late 1960s and 1970s, more of the electrification resources went to 
the districts of Western Maharashtra, where they were vital for sugarcane farming and 
cane crushing operations.   
The inequality in allocation of electrification resources is manifest in both the rate 
of village electrification in each region as well as the number and size of irrigation 
pumpsets electrified in each region.  The following tables depict the imbalances in rural 
electrification across the three primary regions of Western Maharashtra, Vidarbha, and 
Marathwada during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Table 22:  Electrification of Irrigation Pump Sets in Western Maharashtra  









1960 242 2,844 .02 
1965 9,216 45,843 .57 
1970 91,269 459,300 5.66 
1975 209,056 1,044,555 12.97 
 
 
Table 23:  Electrification of Irrigation Pump Sets in Vidarbha 









1960 5,168 15,821 .41 
1965 14,587 44,715 1.16 
1970 39,659 121,950 3.17 
1975 92,789 304,815 7.41 
 
 
Table 24:  Electrification of Irrigation Pump Sets in Marathwada 









1960 8 43 .00 
1965 1,208 3,846 .18 
1970 28,785 121,100 4.3 
1975 68,193 299,560 10.2 
Source Tables 22-24:  Maharashtra State Electricity Board Annual Report, various years. 
 
The sizes of each of Maharashtra’s three territories are different, with a different 
number of villages in each region.  For the purposes of comparison, the fourth column 
gives a ratio of the number of electrified pumpsets from column 2 to the number of 
villages in each region.  The results of India’s decadal census from 1951 indicate that 
there were then 16,113 villages in Western Maharashtra, 12,523 in Vidarbha, and 6,677 
villages in Marathwada.  The data for 1960 represent a base of sorts, because the work of 
electrification in each of the three regions before that point had been carried out by an 
assortment of different government and administrative authorities:  Bombay state in the 
case of Western Maharashtra; Madhya Pradesh until 1956, when Vidarbha was ceded to 
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Bombay state; and Hyderabad state until 1956, when Marathwada too became part of 
Bombay state.   
It is only after 1960, when Maharashtra took its present form, that we can begin to 
judge how the state chose to allocate scarce resources among different regions and 
classes of consumers in the process of electrifying the state.  As Chapter 2 suggested 
through an analysis of amendments over time to the national Electricity Act of 1948, the 
ability of politicians to affect the functioning of the state utilities to satisfy political 
agendas increased gradually over time, from the 1950s through the 1970s, as successive 
amendments to the national legislation weakened the autonomy of the Boards and made 
their functioning more subject to government approval.  One area of interference was in 
the pattern of rural electrification, which became a huge boon that a politician could 
confer on grateful constituencies. The incentives for politicians to become involved in 
influencing what in earlier decades had been technocratic decisions were therefore very 
high.  
By 1965, the proportions of resources going to each region start to become more 
skewed, with the bulk of resources going to Western Maharashtra.  The figures showing 
actual consumption of electricity by agriculturalists in each region are also revealing of 
this trend.  By 1973, of all electricity consumed by the farm sector, 74.8% went to 
Western Maharashtra, 14.2% to Vidarbha, and only 11.0% to Marathwada, which was 
then and remains the poorest of the three regions, where purchasing power and income 
levels also prevented the emergence of more input-intensive agricultural production.  So 
while the number of pumpsets per village in Marathwada is much higher than in 
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Vidarbha, and close to the level in Western Maharashtra, the consumption of power in 
Marathwada is the lowest of the three regions by far.  
In the late 1970s, one particular decision made by the MSEB had the 
unintentional consequence of further skewing the distribution of resources in the state 
among various regions and crops.  This was the decision to switch from a tariff based on 
actual consumption of electricity as recorded by a meter, to a flat-rate tariff that was 
based on the size (in horse power) of the pump.  This decision was made in 1977, when 
Madhav Godbole was chairman of the MSEB, a post he held from 1976 through the end 
of 1978.  The government of Maharashtra introduced flat-rate tariffs following strong 
recommendations made by the World Bank.  Reading the meters of far-flung rural 
consumers was a time and labor intensive activity and there were frequent complaints of 
malfeasance lodged at both customers and meter-readers.  In some cases, meter-readers 
accused rural customers of deliberately tampering with meters.  In other instances, utility 
staff colluded with customers to show a much lower reading of consumption in exchange 
for payment.  So the World Bank’s proposed flat rate system was meant to obviate these 
myriad problems.335   
Decades after his retirement as chairman, Godbole realized that the World Bank’s 
recommendation, which according to his recollection were inspired by the electricity 
policies of much smaller northern European nations like Sweden, were completely 
inappropriate for India, where distances and populations are much more vast.336   
                                                 
335 Madhav Godbole, Unfinished Innings (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1996), p128. 
336 Interview with Madhav Godbole, Pune, India DATE??? 
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While the decision may have been taken for what were considered at the time to 
be sound technocratic reasons, the consequences were far-reaching in further 
transforming both Maharashtra’s pattern of agriculture and also the political power of 
certain classes of farmers and rural elites.  A flat-rate tariff grossly benefited those crops 
that need intensive irrigation, like sugarcane, by dramatically lowering the cost of 
electricity per unit.  MSEB records show that it was precisely farmers in western 
Maharashtra that first took advantage of this new facility in pricing, as the following 
tables demonstrate.  
Table 25:  High and low tension, metered and unmetered consumers in Western Maharashtra  








1981 505 35 257,419 109,741 
1986 657 92 383,635 137,499 
1990 820 115 590,807 203,142 
 
Table 26:  High and low tension, metered and unmetered consumers in Vidarbha   








1981 23 35 75,873 102,592 
1986 23 n.a. 718,534 157,299 
1990 19 57 137,480 172,874 
 
Table 27:  High and low tension, metered and unmetered consumers in Marathwada 








1981 6 59 103,277 48,542 
1986 9 77 169,231 65,105 
1990 43 14 313,616 n.a. 
Source for all Tables 25-27:  Maharashtra State Electricity Board Annual Report, various years. 
 
 
The largest of agricultural consumers of electricity, the lift irrigation schemes (LIS), 
required a high tension connection with a higher voltage connection.  While a regular 
electric pump supplied by a low voltage connection is between one and five horsepowers, 
lift irrigation schemes have much larger pumps.  These pumps are more efficient, run for 
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longer hours, and are much more expensive.  The expense was great enough that only a 
community of farmers together can afford the expense of a lift irrigation scheme, many of 
which came to be organized with the explicit help of the management of cooperative 
sugar factories.    
By 1994, almost three-quarters of farmers in Maharashtra paid a flat-rate as 
opposed to a metered tariff for their electricity consumption.  In addition to the regional 
imbalances in electrification, the benefits of the agricultural subsidy are also imbalanced, 
this time in favor of larger farmers. A careful study of who benefits from the subsidy 
deduced that a very small percentage of the total farming community captures a large 
measure of the benefit. 337  While the government of Maharashtra claims that subsidies 
for rural electricity have to continue in order to benefit marginal and poor farmers, Sant 
and Dixit find that it is primarily large farmers who profit from subsidies.  Only one-fifth 
of all farmers in Maharashtra either own their own pumpsets on private wells or are 
members of a cooperative lift-irrigation society that requires electricity to life water from 
rivers or streams.  Of this one-fifth of subsidy beneficiaries, three-quarters get only a 
negligible amount.   
These two trends together—the spatial bias in rural electrification and the 
implementation of flat-rate tariffs—help us to understand why sugarcane cultivation 
commands a considerable share of the state’s groundwater resources.  From 1960-61 to 
1997-98, the area under sugarcane cultivation increased from 0.83 percent of the total 
                                                 
337 Girish Sant and Shantanu Dixit, “Beneficiaries of the IPS subsidy and the impact of tariff-hike” 
Economic and Political Weekly, December 21, 1996.  The study is necessarily deductive since the MSEB’s 
data about agricultural consumption are not reliable, a quality not unique to MSEB.   
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cropped area in the state, to 2.33% of the total cropped area.338  However, the crop 
commands considerably more of the total irrigated area in the state.  In 1960-61, 
sugarcane accounted for 12.33% of the state’s irrigated land.  This figure increased to a 
high of 18.85% in 1994-95 before declining to 13.48% in 1997-98.339   
 
Agro- politics in the 1990s  
During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, Maharashtra devoted far more 
resources to rural development, particularly in the western cane-country, than other state 
governments.  This resulted in a very different pattern of rural electrification and more 
importantly, the electrification or “energization” of pumpsets, than that of other states.  
The following table gives information about the rural electrification program in India’s 




















                                                 
338 EPW Research Foundation, District-wise Agricultural Database for Maharashtra: 1960-61 to 1997-98 
(Mumbai: EPW, 2004), Annexure II: Area Under Different Crops: Maharashtra. 
339 EPW Research Foundation, District-wise Agricultural Database, Annexure IV: Area Irrigated Under 
Different Crops: Maharashtra.  
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Table 28:  Village and irrigation pumpset electrification 
State Total # of 
villages (1991 
census) 
# electrified as of 
March 1993 (%) 
Estimate of potential 
# of electrified 
pumpsets 
# electrified as of 
March 1993 (%) 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
27,379 27,358 (99.9) 1,600,000 1,398,049 (87.4) 
Assam 21,995 21,481 (97.7) 200,000 3,675 (1.8) 
Bihar 67,546 47,498 (70.3) 1,000,000 261,100 (26.1) 
Gujarat 18,114 17,892 (98.8) 700,000 512,780 (73.3) 
Haryana 6,745 6,745 (100) 430,000 396,639 (92.2) 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
16,807 16,761 (99.7) 10,000 3,755 (37.6) 
Karnataka 27,028 26,483 (98.0) 850,000 869,461 (102.3) 
Kerala 1,219 1,219 (100) 300,000 265,224 (88.4) 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
71,352 65,468 (91.8) 1,300,000 1,003,900 (77.2) 
Maharashtra 39,354 39,106 (99.4) 1,800,000 1,760,976 (97.8) 
Orissa 46,553 32,682 (70.2) 500,000 61,428 (12.3) 
Punjab 12,342 12,342 (100) 700,000 639,343 (91.3) 
Rajasthan 34,968 28,460 (81.4) 600,000 439,120 (73.2) 
Tamil Nadu 15,831 15,822 (99.9) 1,500,000 1,402,858 (93.5) 
Uttar Pradesh 112,566 84,256 (74.9) 2,400,000 694,902 (29.0) 
West Bengal 38,024 28,455 (74.8) 500,000 94,710 (18.9) 
Source:  Ministry of Power Annual Report 1994/95 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1995), pp. 24-25.   
 
 The data for rural electrification reveals stark differences across the states.  To 
judge how important electricity had become to agricultural production, the data on 
electrified pumpsets are more significant than the information about electrified villages.  
The Ministry of Power had a low threshold for calculating village electrification, and 
judged a village to be electrified so long as a single electricity connection existed there.  
This explains why so many states had achieved relatively high levels of rural 
electrification.  The lowest rates of electrification are in Orissa and Bihar, in both of 
which roughly 70% of the villages had at least one electricity connection.   
The data for pumpset electrification reveals even greater disparity across states 
than the figures for village electrification.  The figures given in the table for potential 
electrified pumpsets were calculated by the Ministry of Power on the basis of 
groundwater stores, area under cultivation, and the extent of alternative irrigation 
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supplies, such as from canals.  In some states (among them Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh), 
less than a third of the potential was met.  Maharashtra is one of two states (the other is 
Karnataka to the south) where nearly all of the potential for pumpset irrigation was 
achieved by 1993, less than twenty-five years after the national Rural Electrification 
Corporation was formed in 1969 to fund such projects.   
The other means by which farmers’ interests were represented in state politics—in 
addition to the overlapping leadership of cooperative institutions, particularly sugar 
cooperatives, and state government institutions—was through a significant social 
movement of farmers that emerged in the 1970s, and whose heyday was in the 1980s.340  
Throughout that decade, farmers organized to demand improved terms of trade that 
included subsidies for inputs like fertilizers, electricity, and seeds, and higher prices for 
farm output.  There were several epicenters of the movement, including in Punjab and 
Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra.  Over time, the various regional incarnations 
of farmers lobbies were united under a single umbrella organization to better influence 
central government policy.   
In Maharashtra, the most influential farmers’ organization was the Shetkari 
Sanghatana, led by the charismatic Sharad Joshi, who came to farming relatively late in 
life after a diplomatic career than included stints at the United Nations in Europe.  The 
farmers’ most effective means of protest included demonstrations that involved hundreds 
of thousands of peasants, blockades of railroads and entire villages to government 
officials and politicians, and in Maharashtra, farmers also withheld crops like onion, 
                                                 
340 Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-rural struggles in India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Chapter 5. 
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cotton, and tobacco from the markets, causing a spike in prices.  Movement leaders also 
urged farmers to stop paying taxes, electricity bills, or bank loans.341   
 During the 1990s, the most influential politician in Maharasthra was a man named 
Sharad Pawar, who continues to serve as the Minster of Agriculture in the current Indian 
central government.  Pawar exemplifies many of the trends outlined in the preceding 
sections about the links between rural cooperatives and state institutions, and the 
importance of rural elites in Maharashtra’s politics.   
 
Maharashtra:  the reformist state that did not reform 
 
Already by the mid- 1990s, the discussion surrounding reform in India had turned 
away from the entry of independent power producers (IPPs) to distribution privatization, 
and the state singled out as the most likely candidate was Maharashtra.342  The rationale 
among energy experts in naming Maharashtra as an ideal site for privatization included 
the following:  the utility was among the most profitable of all electricity boards in India; 
its losses owing to transmission and distribution were among the lowest; and the state of 
Maharashtra, according to predictions by energy experts within and outside of India and 
also according to Indian politicians and policy-makers, was to face an imminent crisis of 
supply and did not possess adequate capital resources to finance new capacity.  All of 
these facts coincided with a growing reluctance on the part of international financial 
                                                 
341 Staffan Lindberg, “New Farmers’ Movements in India as Structural Response and Collective Identity 
Formation: The cases of the Shetkari Sanghatana and the BKU,” The Journal of Peasant Studies Vol. 21, 
No. 3/4 (April/July 1994): 95-125. 
342 “Why Maharashtra SEB might be worth privatizing” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, March 25, 
1991. 
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institutions, which had backed most of India’s earlier generation expansion, to continue 
to fund state-owned companies that often operated with deficits and growing debt.  In 
addition, Maharashtra was hailed as a “reformist” state because of the way the state had 
embraced other elements of the new economic program.  Also, Maharashtra had emerged 
from the previous four decades of centralized planning as one of the wealthiest states in 
India, and was considered well positioned to take the lead in the new climate of private-
sector led development.   
 As early as the 1980s, the Maharashtra government had indicated a willingness to 
embrace new models of encouraging private capital to the state.  This was evident even in 
the state’s appointment of P. Abraham as chairman of the MSEB.  Like Jagdish Sagar, 
the chairman of Delhi’s utility a decade later, P. Abraham was an adroit career bureaucrat 
who embraced the new climate of liberalizing India and in particular in the energy 
sector.343  He served in various capacities in the sector, as energy secretary to the 
Maharashtra government from 1986 to 1989, as Chairman of MSEB from 1989 to 1991, 
and as power secretary to the government of India from 1994 to 1997.  One of Abraham’s 
strength as a board chairman was the close ties he enjoyed with the government from 
previously having served as energy secretary.   
 Several actions taken by the state government and the MSEB suggest that the 
state was willing to embrace new policy models in its energy sector.  In 1989, the 
government of Maharashtra started lobbying the central government to approve new gas-
based power projects.  These would have required supplies from the centrally-run gas and 
                                                 
343 Author’s interview with P. Abraham, April 2, 2003, New Delhi.  Much of the following information is 
drawn from this meeting.  
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oil terminals at a time when the demand for natural gas and oil was already exceeding its 
current supply in India.  Although the central government had not yet amended the 
electricity act to permit private investments in the sector, which would not happen for 
another two years, Abraham told the press that the state was “nonetheless preparing 
grounds for such eventuality.”344  Given Maharashtra’s large supplies of coal and the 
existing dominance of coal in thermal generation, the emphasis on gas-fired plants was 
evidence of the state government’s willingness to adapt new technologies to enhance 
energy efficiency.  As gas-based projects also have shorter gestations and lower capital 
costs, the state government was also considering the most expeditious means of resolving 
what was at the time expected to be an imminent energy shortage. 
 A second policy that underscores the state’s reformism was the decision to allow 
the private company, BSES, up to this point purely a distribution company, to begin 
generation functions.  By the end of 1990, the state and central governments had granted 
permission to BSES to build its first power plant in coastal Maharashtra.  In early 1991, 
the last remaining obstacle had been removed when the Bombay High Court dismissed 
two petitions filed on the grounds that the power plant would disrupt the delicate marine 
ecology.  The policy that most sharply illustrates the state’s reformism was its decision to 
raise electricity tariffs.  Just as other states were selectively lowering electricity tariffs, 
MSEB raised its tariffs across the board by eighteen percent.345   
                                                 
344 “Maharashtra pushes for gas-fired plants despite opposition” Power Asia – FT Energy Newsletter, 
September 25, 1989. 
345 “MSEB goes for big tariff hike” Power Asia – FT Energy Newsletter, June 15, 1992. 
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  For all of these reasons—the government’s and the SEB bureaucracy’s apparent 
willingness to adopt new models and embrace private capital; and the solid financial base 
of the SEB, especially compared to other SEBs—MSEB was considered to be the best 
candidate for privatization.  One proposal that emerged in the ongoing discussions 
between the SEB and the government, was to restructure the utility to allow private 
equity participation, to float the SEB via the Bombay stock exchange.  Whether through 
this method or direct sale of assets to a single investor, the energy policy community 
determined that “it may be that a real stab at privatisation is an idea whose time has 
come.  If so…then the MSEB is as good a place as any to start.”346   
Despite these predictions, Maharashtra chose to retain MSEB as a public 
company.  The reasons have much to do with how significant agricultural consumption 
was by the mid-1990s in Maharashtra, particularly compared to other states.  Subsidized 
power (along with subsidies for water and fertilizer), were important links between the 
governing coalition and certain rural sectors, particularly the water-intensive sugarcane 




As in the two cases examined thus far—Orissa and Delhi—understanding state 
governments’ policy choices regarding utility privatization involves understanding the 
                                                 
346 “Why Maharashtra SEB might be worth privatizing” Power Asia - FT Energy Newsletters, March 25, 
1991.  This is a speculation that I heard from others in the energy bureaucracy in the state, including P. 
Abraham and Jayant Totade, Joint Secretary of MSEB at the time I was conducting fieldwork in 2002-
2003. Author’s interview with Jayant Totade, October 13, 2003, Mumbai; Authors’s interview with P. 
Abraham, April 2, 2003, New Delhi. 
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incentives and political strength of both the proponents of privatization as well as its 
detractors.  Industrialists and urban residents—the advocates of privatization elsewhere—
were silent from the debate in Maharashtra since they were already served by private 
companies.  Rural interests that benefited from state subsidies through public sector 
ownership were free to command policy in their favor.  State and local politics in 
Maharashtra continued to be dominated by rural Maratha elites.  It was often the case that 
the important development portfolios in the state government—irrigation, energy, and 
rural cooperatives among the key posts—were held by Maratha leaders with strong ties to 
the land and cooperative institutions.347   
Another axis by which rural interests came to be represented in government 
policies was through the considerable influence of the new farmers’ movements of the 
1980s.  In western Maharashtra, the farmer’s movement had proven itself able to 
mobilize significant portions of the peasantry to rally for higher price supports and 
greater subsidies through public marches and rallies throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s.   
 
                                                 
347 This was pointed out to me by several keen observers of politics, but it awaits further confirmation by a 
systematic analysis of cooperative leadership and the major development portfolios in the state government 
– irrigation, power—during the 1980s and 1990s.  Prashant Khotadiya, former youth member and political 
worker of the Peasants and Workers Party, Interview with author, July 12, 2003, Pune.   
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Chapter 6:  Andhra Pradesh:  One step forward, two steps back 
 
As economic reforms accelerate there will be a period when the divide between those who benefit directly 
from them and those who will only see the benefits at a later stage, will widen.  The role of government will 
be to insulate the poor from the harsh effects of the reforms and hold the prices of their basic necessities.  
There is no contradiction in pushing both for reforms and subsidies. 




As the last chapter argued, Maharashtra was expected to take the lead in 
implementing electricity distribution privatization because the state had already achieved 
rural electrificaton, had already enacted other kinds of liberalizing policies, and could 
have easily attracted private investors.  The nature of Maharashtra state’s ties to rural 
constituencies, however, meant that the government shied away from privatization 
because it would have threatened to dismantle a long-standing system of state subsidies 
to politically influential large farmers and agro-industrialists.   
Perhaps even more than Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh was expected to be a leader 
in economic liberalization, including in the electricity sector.  The reason for this belief 
was bound up in the figure of Chandrababu Naidu, who was the state’s chief minister 
from 1995-2004, the entire period when distribution privatization was being both 
advocated (by the central government and the World Bank), and enacted (by Orissa and 
Delhi).  Hailed a “CEO” chief minister by the Indian and global business press as well as 
international financial institutions, Naidu professed a strong ideological commitment to 
                                                 
348 N. Chandrababu Naidu with Sevanti Ninan, Plain Speaking (New Delhi: Viking, 2000), p. 249.  
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economic liberalization.  He seemed to evince a strong “political will” to liberalize, 
considered the necessary factor in many accounts of economic reform.   
Unlike Maharashtra, Naidu’s Andhra Pradesh was one of the three states (along 
with Orissa and Haryana) to embark on the electricity sector restructuring process being 
advocated by the World Bank starting in the mid-1990s.  The process, as we have seen in 
earlier chapters, had two primary steps.  The first involved restructuring the existing 
vertically-integrated public utility into separate transmission, distribution, and generation 
companies.  The distribution business was then further subdivided by geographic zone.  
According to restructuring plan followed by Orissa, transmission was intended to remain 
under state-ownership; generation would come under mixed ownership as private 
companies invested to build newer generating stations that would operate alongside the 
older state-owned plants; distribution would be privatized, with the ultimate goal of 
creating a competitive distribution environment.  Naidu’s government was able to initiate 
the process of restructuring much more quickly than most state governments by passing 
the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act in 1998.  However, efforts to prepare the 
ground for privatization were resisted by the state’s population, constantly fell short of 
what was required.  Rural voters for whom electricity subsidies were gradually being 
decreased were spared the full brunt of the tariff increases that affected other categories 
of consumers, even though rural electricity consumption was viewed by both Naidu and 
the World Bank funders as the primary cause for the utility’s operational and fiscal 
difficulties.  In response to the very minimal tariff increases that affected the farm sector, 
Naidu’s political opponents depicted his government as anti-poor and anti-farmer.   
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After serving two terms and being hailed as the CEO chief minister, Naidu lost in 
2004.  A major platform of the Congress party was a pledge to restore free power for 
farmers, and implementing this promise was the first act of Andhra Pradesh’s new chief 
minister, YSR Reddy.  This together with the termination of World Bank funding that it 
prompted, signaled an end to Andhra Pradesh’s flirtation with electricity liberalization.   
Naidu’s attempts to restructure and privatize APSEB speak on the one hand of his 
ideological commitment to reform (necessary to stimulate industrialization and 
“development” as the chief minister himself often put it).  On the other hand, these 
commitments ram up against the political pressures to maintain populist subsidies that 
benefited the state’s rural communities.  Just as in Maharashtra, electricity had become an 
important input in agricultural production, particularly in the rich agricultural districts of 
coastal Andhra Pradesh.  Again, as in Western Maharashtra, agricultural production in 
these districts had been stimulated in an earlier period by British colonial spending on 
canal irrigation; in the postcolonial era these districts were also the prime beneficiaries of 
Green Revolution growth, particularly through water intensive rice cropping.  The result 
of increased spending on rural electrification in the late 1960s was that a steadily 
increasing percentage of the state’s electricity supplies were allotted to agricultural 
consumption.  And agriculture in Andhra Pradesh relative to other states is particularly 
reliant on tubewell irrigation via electrified pumpsets.  The large consumption of 
electricity by the farm sector was the critical factor affecting the state’s energy policy; it 
was both blamed for the fiscal crisis of the public utility and was thus the most urgent 
reason for change.  And it was also the biggest obstacle to the implementation of the 
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restructuring and privatization programs followed by other states and financially 
supported by the World Bank’s lending program.  
Naidu’s power sector reforms also become the most visible symbol of his 
government’s neoliberal agenda and served as a lightening rod for political opposition, 
bringing parties of all persuasions together to launch massive protests and rallies.  
According to media sources, Naidu’s unpopular power reform policies stimulated the 
longest agitation in the state centered on a purely economic issue. 
 
Electricity and Agriculture 
 
Like most other states in India, Andhra Pradesh is an amalgam of regions, each 
with distinct ecology, social structure, and political history, but united by a common 
linguistic identity, in this case the language Telegu.  The three different regions of the 
state—Rayalaseema, Telengana, and Coastal Andhra—were part of different political 
formations during the colonial period.  The region called Telengana was the seat of the 
Nizam’s Hyderabad, and contains the state’s capital city, Hyderabad.  The Rayalseema 
region, which includes the southwestern districts of the state, was ceded by the Nizam to 
the British and was administered as part of Madras Presidency.  Like Rayalaseema, 
Coastal Andhra Pradesh (in the eastern part of the state) also became part of the colonial 
Madras Province.  As in Western Maharashtra, the districts of Coastal Andhra during the 
colonial period benefited from extensive irrigation investments in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  As a consequence, these districts were well poised to take 
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advantage of the Green Revolution policies of the 1960s, which further exacerbated the 
inequalities between this region and the other two.  Rayalaseema, which is distinct 
agroclimatically from the coastal districts, neither benefited from irrigation development 




Map 4:  District map of Andhra Pradesh, 2001 
Source: Office of the Registrar General, India 
Copyright: Public domain 
 
If the largest consumer of water in Maharashtra was the water-hungry sugar cane 
crop, the culprit in Andhra Pradesh is rice, or paddy.  Rice cropping increased in Andhra 
Pradesh tremendously during the Green Revolution.  While farmers in Punjab came to 
dominate wheat cultivation, and reaped the benefit of the central government’s public 
wheat procurement program, the same was true of Andhra Pradesh’s rice farmers, 
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particularly in the coastal districts.  From the mid-1950s to a high-point in 1998-99, the 
area of cropped area in the state under rice cultivation increased by close to 50%.349  In 
roughly the same period, the share of coarse cereals, many of which are drought 
resistance and more suitable to Andhra Pradesh’s ecology, decreased from 40% in the 
1960s to 11% in the late 1990s, a more rapid decline than in India as a whole.350  The 
politics that led to these cropping outcomes in Andhra Pradesh are part of a general 
pattern that mirrors some of the trends seen in Maharashtra, where politically influential 
agricultural communities were able to channel subsidized resources to input-intensive 
cash crops.   
 The shifts in agricultural production to water-intensive crops led to an increased 
reliance on tubewell irrigation throughout the decades.  This went hand-in-hand with the 
state’s focus on rural electrification and pumpset irrigation.  The number of electrified 
pumpsets increased steadily from the 1960s to the 1990s.  During the 1960s, the average 
growth over a three-year period in number of electrified pumpsets was over 100%; during 
the 1970s and 1980s, the average increase over a three-year period was close to 35%.351  
By the end of the 1990s, however, the government stopped providing new electricity 
connections for irrigation pumpsets, in an attempt to stem the revenue losses from 
                                                 
349 Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Five Decades of Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad: Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 2006), Table 7: Area under principal crops in Andhra Pradesh from 1956-57 to 2005-06. 
350 Kensuke Kobo, “Cropping Pattern Changes in Andhra Pradesh during the 1990s: Implications for 
Micro-level Studies,” in Agricultural Production, Household Behavior, and Child Labor in Andhra 
Pradesh, ed., Seiro Ito (Wakaba, Japan: Institute for Developing Economies, 2005), p. 209-10. 
351 Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited, Power Development in Andhra Pradesh 
(Statistics) 1999-2000, (Hyderabad: AP Transco, 2000). 
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agricultural consumption, each unit of which represents a significant financial loss to the 
utility.352   
Coterminous with the increase in number of pumpsets in operation, the tariffs for 
agricultural consumers began to steadily decline from the mid-1970s onwards.   
Table 29:  Electricity Tariffs for Low Tension Agricultural Consumption, 1977-1999  
 Metered Tariff Flat rate tariff 





(up to 5 HP) (above 5 HP) 
1975-1977 16 paise/unit 3 Rs./HP   
1977-1982 16 paise/unit 2 Rs./HP   
1982-1989 16 paise/unit 2 Rs./HP Rs. 50/HP Rs. 50/HP 
1989 41 paise/unit 6 Rs./HP Rs. 50/HP Rs. 50/HP 
1990-1992   Up to 5 HP – no charge;  
 
5 HP-10 HP Rs. 
100/HP/annum; 
1992   Up to 5 HP -100/HP/annum; 5-10 HP Rs. 250/HP/annum; 




  Rs. 50/HP/annum Rs. 50/HP/annum 
1996-1998   Upto 3 HP Rs. 
150/HP/annum; 3-5HP Rs. 
250/HP/annum; Rs. 
400/HP/annum 
5-10 HP Rs. 350/HP/annum; 
Above 10 HP Rs. 
400/HP/annum 
As of Jan 
1999 
  Up to 3 HP Rs. 
150/HP/annum; 3-5 HP Rs. 
250/HP/annum 
5-10 HP Rs. 350/HP/annum; 
Above 10 HP Rs. 
400/HP/annum 
Source:  Annual Report of APSEB, various years. 
 
The combination of larger numbers of pumpsets and lower tariffs for agricultural 
consumers led to a greater proportion of all electricity consumption in the state going 
towards agriculture.  Agricultural consumption made up a modest 18.4% of total 
electricity consumption in 1970, increasing to 40.8% in 1999.  The share of industry in 
                                                 
352 Balarama Reddy, Administrative Staff College of India (Hyderabad), Interview with author, March 4, 
2003, Hyderabad.  Trained as an engineer, Reddy began working in APSEB in 1953.  He retired in the 
position of Chairmen of APSEB, which he held from 1992-1995. 
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total energy consumption declined by more than two-thirds over the same three decades, 
from 65.4% in 1970 to 23.5% in 1999.353 
 From the farmer’s perspective, electrified pumpsets were clearly advantageous 
over pumps operated by diesel engines, which is often the alternative means of irrigation. 
A cost-benefit analysis of diesel versus electrified pumpset use found that while initial 
capital costs (price of diesel engine versus cost of pumpset) were higher for the latter, the 
costs for using the two alternatives were much higher for diesel engines due to electricity 
subsidies.354   
 One reason that the pace of granting subsidies increased even further during the 
1980s is that elections in Andhra Pradesh evolved from single-party contests dominated 
by the Congress to bipolar contests in which the Congress was pitched against the Telegu 
Desam Party, founded in the early 1980s by a charismatic star of Telegu cinema, NT 
Rama Rao.  Rao brought an explicitly populist agenda to state politics, instituting the 
wildly popular 2 Rs/kilo rice scheme, and further subsidizing inputs like electricity.355   
 By 1991, less than 20% of the net cropped area of the state was irrigated by either 
canals or electric-powered tubewells.356  Of this, only 15% was accounted for by tubewell 
for the state as a whole.  However, in some districts there was far greater reliance on 
electric pumps.  In one of the richest agricultural districts in the state, West Godavari, 
                                                 
353 Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited, Power Development in Andhra Pradesh 
(Statistics) 1999-2000, (Hyderabad: AP Transco, 2000), Table 9.11. 
354 Meera Rajagopalan and Harvey Demaine, “Issues in energy subsidies for irrigation pumping,” Energy 
Policy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan. 1994): 89-95. 
355 Atul Kohli, “The NTR Phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh: Political Change in a South Indian State,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 28, NO. 10 (Oct. 1988): 991-1017. 
356 Kensuke Kobo, “Cropping Pattern Changes in Andhra Pradesh during the 1990s,” p. 216.  Kobo relies 
on statistics published in the Indian Ministry of Agriculture’s Indian Agricultural Statistics volumes. 
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16.5% of the net cropped area in the district was irrigated by tubewell.  From 1991 to 
1998, there was a 5% increase in tubewell-irrigated lands in the state, but again there was 
wide variation among the districts.  The fastest increase was in Nizamabad.  In 1991, 
13.7% of the districts net cropped area was irrigated by tubewell; from then until 1998, 
this area increased by 22.5%.  
Subsidizing electricity use by the farm sector had an effect on the state’s overall 
economic development, particularly in the balance of support for agriculture versus 
industry.  Increasingly throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the supplies of electricity to 
industrial consumers were curtailed to allow greater allocation to farmers.  Unlike in 
Maharashtra, where industrial consumers were shielded by the barriers that surrounded 
the privatized Mumbai zones, industrial consumers in Andhra Pradesh relied on the same 
scarce resources as farmers.  In the near term, the effect was a zero-sum game between 
competing classes of consumers.   
The cuts for industrial consumers began in the 1970s, as the rural electrification 
program of the 1960s and 1970s was resulting in a greater demand for electricity that was 
not being met by greater supplies.  In April, 1975, the government increased a power cut 
that was already in place on industrial consumers by an additional 10-20%, depending on 
the quantum of their needs.  The APSEB also introduced a restrictive weekly quota 
system.  Industrial consumers who exceeded their weekly ration would lose their power 
connection.357  According to the state utility’s annual reports, for the twenty-three years 
from 1977 to 2000, there were only nine years in which electricity consumers were not 
                                                 
357 “Bigger power cut,” Indian Economic Diary April 2-8, VI.14, p. 3121. 
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faced with power restrictions.358  During the 1970s and until the mid-1980s, all 
consumers shared equally in the cuts, which were fixed at anywhere from twenty to thirty 
percent.  From the mid-1980s through the rest of that decade, there was a noticeable skew 
in the way that power cuts were distributed among consumers.  Those consumers who 
required the greatest amounts of energy (generally industry and manufacturing) faced 
restrictions of anywhere from thirty to sixty percent.  For consumers who required 
smaller amounts of power, which would include farmers as well as domestic users, the 
APSEB imposed a much more modest restriction of anywhere from fifteen to thirty 
percent.  During the 1990s, farmers and domestic consumers were entirely protected from 
the load restrictions that continued to affect large industrial consumers.   
This continued to be the scenario as the reform decade of the 1990s unfolded.  In 
what was an annual ritual, in January 1991, the APSEB cut electricity supplies to high 
tension consumers (the largest consumers of electricity) by 30%.359  January is the height 
of the sowing season and farmers are therefore urgently in need of irrigation.  In addition 
to the increased needs of farmers, shortages in coal supplies exacerbated the state utility’s 
problems.360  The power cuts were even higher in 1996, when power to some industries 
was restricted by between forty and sixty percent.   
                                                 
358 Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited, Power Development in Andhra Pradesh 
(Statistics) 1999-2000, (Hyderabad: AP Transco, 2000), Table 7.14 Power Restrictions (1977-2000). 
359 “Supply cuts again for Andhra Pradesh industry,” FT Energy Newsletters – Power Asia, January 28, 
1991. 
360 This points to a larger structural problem in the electricity sector that affects all utilities in the country.  
There are multiple actors at both the state and federal levels that must coordinate their activities along the 
electron production chain.  From the dominant fuel source, coal, to transportation by the railways, and 
finally to the mostly state-owned generating facilities, there are endemic problems of coordination, and 
electric utilities are the final repositories for inefficiencies that stream throughout the chain of production.  
The two most obvious examines of these inefficiencies are from the coal and railways sectors, both of 
which are owned and operated by the Indian central government.  Coal mines were nationalized and put 
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The reliability of power supply to industry changed only from 1998 onwards, 
when the power cuts on industrial consumers were lifted as the reform program began.  
For a state trying to improve the financial health of the utility in preparation for 
privatization, it made the most sense to supply as much power as possible to the utility’s 
most lucrative consumers, those who paid the highest tariffs and consumed the greatest 
quantities. 
Agricultural subsidies also had a negative impact on the functionality of the whole 
system.  The flat rate system based on the size of the irrigation pumpset was introduced 
in November 1982, a few years after it was instituted in Maharashtra.361  For the utility’s 
bookkeeping, this meant that a huge quantum of electricity use was estimated rather than 
accurately measured.  Over time, the utility used this category of agricultural 
consumption to hide electricity losses that were the result of aging and inadequate 
distribution and transmission equipment, and theft and corruption on the part of utility 
staff.         
 As the following narrative of Naidu’s attempts to restructure and ultimately 
privatize suggest, his government was ultimately unable to make the necessary changes 
                                                                                                                                                 
under the authority of Coal India Limited, a centrally-owned public sector company, in 1973.  Since that 
time, and especially in some parts of the country like Bihar, which is rich in both coal supplies and state-
sanctioned criminality, theft and corruption has come to pervade coal mining operations.  To offset the 
losses from these inefficiencies, the prices for coal are increased, in turn affecting state utilities’ finances.  
Railways have always been owned by the central government.  High freight charges are used to cross-
subsidize the rates for civilian rail traffic.  This point was made to me during several interviews, 
particularly by critics of privatization as the solution to the sector’s problems.  Prabhir Purkayastha of the 
Delhi Science Forum made the point most succinctly.  Interview with author, October 23, 2002, New Delhi.    
361 The shift to a flat rate system was initially resisted by the utility chairman, who correctly foresaw the 
longer term implications for the utility’s finances.  E. A. S. Sarma, Principal, Administrative Staff College 
of India (Hyderabad), Interview with author, March 5, 2003, Hyderabad.  Sarma worked in APSEB from 
1976-1978, when the government was first contemplating switching the billing systems.  Thanks to 
resistance from him as well as the then chairman of the utility, Tata Rao, the utility delayed the shift until 
the early 1980s.  
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that would have led to greater quantities and better quality of power to attract new 
investments in the state.  To get around this, his government embraced the option of 
creating special economic zones that allowed firms to bypass the restrictions that applied 
to the state at large.  In his bid to turn Hyderabad into “Cyberabad,” Naidu gave 
significant concession on land and infrastructure, including power, to information 
technology firms.362  In addition, the government adopted a lenient approach to allowing 
industrial units to establish captive power plants and sell excess power back to the state 
grid.363  These measures went some way toward attracting the kinds of private capital 
flows that Naidu’s government believed were critical for the state’s future development.  
The problem of changing policies for the entire state, however, was a much more 
entrenched one, as the next section suggests. 
 
Power sector reforms in the 1990s 
 
Andhra Pradesh was at the leading edge of the World Bank’s new focus on state-
level lending program that began in the mid-1990s.  It is a poor, populous state, but it also 
had at its helm a politician in Naidu who set out to re-orient the state’s policy agenda 
towards development.  By “development,” Naidu envisioned engaging the latest 
                                                 
362 For example, the “Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy of the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh 2005-2010” (Hyderabad: Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2005) allowed small and 
medium sized firms a 25% rebate on the power bills for three years.  The “Andhra Pradesh Policy on 
Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) 2002” (Hyderabad: Government of Andhra Pradesh, 
2002) exempts ITES firms from the statutory cuts that had crippled industry in the state for the preceding 
three decades.  
363 The Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission announced in October 2003 that no consumer 
would require consent or permission to install a captive power plant or generator of any size or capacity.  
APERC, Press Release dated December 2003. 
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technologies in both governance and economic activity, gradually easing the government 
out of productive spheres and into a more regulatory capacity, and allowing private 
capital to finance future growth.   
Andhra Pradesh’s power sector reforms, assisted by the World Bank’s loan for a 
power restructuring program, were just the largest part of a broad array of reforms 
programs fueled by Bank lending.  From mid-1998, when the Andhra Pradesh Economic 
Restructuring Project was initiated, through 2004, when Naidu lost the chief ministership, 
the total volume of Bank lending to Andhra Pradesh totaled nearly US$1.6 billion from 
mid-1998.  According to both Naidu as well as the World Bank, though, among all of the 
various reforms programs, the power sector reforms were the most critical.364   
A World Bank document from 1997 first defined the parameters for the myriad 
reforms programs that would follow.  After a long section in the report dealing with the 
state’s finances, the bulk of the substantive part of the document deals with six critical 
sectors that require restructuring, including power, irrigation, roads, ports, education, and 
health.  In the section on the power sector, the report’s authors identify a critical power 
shortage as the main challenge for the sector, and further argue that the power crisis can 
only be averted by private investment flows.  These, however, are unlikely to materialize 
in the current scenario of massively subsidized tariffs and inefficient financial and 
                                                 
364 The Bank’s project appraisal document states that “the Government of Andhra Pradesh has launched an 
ambitious program for restructuring and reforming its power sector, complex and challenging by itself but 
made even more ambitious by the inter-linked objective to use power sector reform as a critical most 
important element of structural and fiscal reform in Andhra Pradesh.”  Energy Sector Unit, South Asia 
Region, “Andhra Pradesh Power Sector Restructuring Program, Report No. 18849IN (New Delhi: World 
Bank, January 1999), p. 8.  Naidu, in a public forum in 2002, stated “I spend maximum time on the power 
sector. These reforms are important to my political career.” “Power reforms crucial for my future, says 
Naidu” Times of India, April 21, 2002.  
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physical operations.  In order to attract private capital, the state must carry out five main 
procedures.  These are “a) adjust agricultural tariffs to reflect costs; b) privatize 
distribution progressively; c) create an independent and transparent regulatory system; d) 
corporatize power utilities and manage them as commercial entities; and e) enact reform 
legislation to enable implementation of the above reforms.”365  With respect to tariffs, the 
document further states that in order to improve the financial position of the distribution 
companies prior to privatization, tariffs for agricultural consumption must be increased to 
at least 50 paise/kWh in the short term and progressively increased so that the tariffs 
reflect cost of supply and reduce cross-subsidies; and electricity supply should be 
metered for farmers rather than charged on a per horse power basis.366  As in 
Maharashtra, most farmers in Andhra Pradesh have opted to pay a per horse power 
supply rate rather than for a specific quantum of metered electricity.  Agricultural tariffs 
were thus a central axis of the reform program, particularly critical if the state was to 
successfully attract private investment to the sector.   
Just a few years later, when the reform program began in earnest, however, the 
Bank’s emphasis on the importance of raising agricultural tariffs to the all-around success 
of the restructuring and privatization program was revised considerably.  Similarly, the 
Andhra Pradesh government under Naidu, who in several public statements had made 
clear that agricultural subsidies were unsustainable, shielded farmers from any tariff 
increases in the early years of the program.  In a press interview in 1997, for example, 
                                                 
365 Country Operations, Industry and Finance Division, South Asia Region, “Andhra Pradesh: Agenda for 
Economic Reforms” (New Delhi: World Bank, January 1997), p. 31. 
366 Ibid., p. 36. 
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Naidu stated that “reforms in the power sector were inevitable.  The subsidy on 
agriculture at the cost of power to industries would one day badly hit the farm sector 
because there would be little revenue from industries to subsidise farmers…[Tariffs] will 
go up any way, reforms or no reforms.  Prices of coal and other inputs have already gone 
up.”367  Despite these statements at the start of Naidu’s reformist agenda, electricity rates 
for farmers, as the following narrative will make clear, were not increased until after the 
state assembly election in 1999, and even then were increased under the auspices of the 
statutorily independent electricity regulatory commission in the hopes that the political 
class would be shielded from the inevitable popular fallout.   
The Bank’s lending program for the Andhra Pradesh power sector began with a 
loan for US$ 210 million in January 1999.  As an Adaptable Loan program, this first sum 
was intended to be the first in a series of five loans that would total US$ 750 million to 
fund the much larger reforms program; subsequent funds were to be released contingent 
on the state’s performance during the first period.  During the first loan period, the state 
government was expected to legislative electricity reform; constitute a regulatory 
commission; split up the existing utility into separate transmission, generation, and 
distribution companies that would function as independent corporate entities.  The new 
distribution companies were expected to have gone through at least one round of tariff 
revisions with the new regulatory body.  The 1999 Bank document states that while the 
agricultural tariff is well below a minimum acceptable threshold (below even the Rs. 
.50/kWh minimum that the central government had arrived at in consultation with states’ 
                                                 
367 Deva Kesava Rao, “India CM completes 2 years in office; sets ‘dream’ agenda,” The Hindu, September 
1, 1997. 
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chief ministers), “it is unlikely that in the short-term, under the current political situation 
the agricultural tariffs can be increased significantly…Once the Regulatory Commission 
comes into existence, the tariff setting would be depoliticized.”  The Bank and Naidu 
were thus explicitly willing to delay raising agricultural tariffs.   
There were two main reasons that the Bank and Naidu were willing to relax the 
requirements for tariff increases for agricultural consumers.  Unlike in Orissa, where 
farmers very quickly faced steep tariff increases, in Andhra the farmers are a powerful, 
numerous, and organized political force.  Both to prevent electoral losses in the next 
assembly elections as well as to deflect popular protest, Naidu understood that delaying 
tariff increases for farmers would be critical to his longer-term electoral prospects.  Both 
the Bank and the central government were willing to make concessions to Naidu’s 
government because of the critical role he played in the precariously balanced coalition 
government at the center, where he leveraged his strength not by directly entering the 
coalition but by providing outside support that he could strategically threaten to 
withdraw.  Other analysts of India’s coalition governments as well as the World Bank’s 
state-level lending programs emphasize that Andhra Pradesh received special treatment 
from both the central government and the World Bank because of the important role that 
Naidu’s Telegu Desam Party played in central coalition politics.368  
                                                 
368 Jason Kirk, “The World Bank and the Federal Politics of Economic Reform in India: Structural 
adjustment lending goes subnational” Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2005.  In a 
chapter explaining how Andhra Pradesh came to be chosen along with Uttar Pradesh and Karnatak for the 
Bank’s subnational lending program, Kirk suggests that both the central government and the World Bank 
were keenly aware of Naidu’s political power vis-à-vis the fragile United Front coalition government that 
ruled the center from 1995-1997, and in which he was a constituent, as well as the Bharatiya Janata Party-
led National Democratic Alliance that ruled from 1998 to 2004, in which Naidu’s TDP supported from the 
outside. See in particular Chapter Four.  
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To lay the groundwork for the subsequent restructuring and privatization 
program, Naidu’s electricity sector reforms preceded the World Bank loan by several 
years.  Naidu introduced a bill in the state assembly restructure the Andhra Pradesh State 
Electricity Board (APSEB) in early 2007.  Immediately the unions responded by 
declaring an indefinite strike that had no negative impact on power supply in the state.  
Also immediately, the main opposition parties in the state, including the Congress, 
Communist Party of India, and Communist Party of India (Marxist) but excluding the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, staged a sit-in in the assembly to protest the reform program.  
Naidu’s response in the state assembly was to read from the national Congress party’s 
election manifesto from the most recent parliamentary elections, in which the party 
pledged to reform the power sector through the same program of restructuring and 
privatization that the state unit of the political party was now opposing in Andhra 
Pradesh.369  The federal politics of economic reform have meant that many political 
parties implement economic liberalization in states in which they form the government, 
yet oppose vehemently the same reforms in states in which they are the opposition.  Just 
to the north of Andhra Pradesh, the Congress-ruled Orissa was carrying forward the 
utility privatization that the previous Janata Dal government under Biju Patnaik had 
initiated.  The same phenomenon characterizes diverging policy stances between the 
national and provincial units of political parties.  The reason that the BJP did not 
participate in the opposition protest was that by this time, the TDP had already emerged 
as an important constituent of the federation of parties brought together by the BJP in the 
                                                 
369 “India Bill introduced as power staff go on strike,” The Hindu, April 28, 1998. 
    250
national coalition government.  In a press conference that followed the political and union 
opposition Naidu pledged that notwithstanding the World Bank’s lending agreements, the 
electricity rates for farmers would not be increased.370  
The vocal opposition to the reform legislation continued into the next day’s 
assembly meetings, and the members of the Congress, CPI, CPI(M) and several smaller 
parties were suspended for stalling the assembly’s proceedings.371  In the absence of the 
opposition, the remaining legislators, mostly Naidu’s party-men in the Telegu Desam 
Party, passed the reform legislation without disturbance.  The TDP’s nearly two-thirds 
majority in the assembly would have ensured the legislation’s passage even had the 
opposition been present.  The legislation accomplishes a number of restructuring tasks 
and paves the way for broad private sector participation in what in Andhra Pradesh 
previously had been an entirely government-owned sector.  In addition to establishing a 
regulatory commission, splits up the vertically integrated utility into separate 
transmission, distribution, and generation companies.  The most contentious part of the 
legislation, and the one that garnered much of the opposition prior to its passage, is the 
room it leaves for private companies to enter into all three facets of the electricity 
business.372  Even more than the sale of state assets to private companies, however, the 
opposition focused their attention on the World Bank’s role in the program arguing that 
Naidu had allowed the state’s policy to be directed by the Bank’s global headquarters.373  
Given the World Bank’s involvement with many areas of the state’s policy agenda, this 
                                                 
370 Ibid. 
371 “India Power Bill passed; Opposition suspended,” The Hindu, April 29, 1998. 
372 Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998, Hyderabad, Anhdra Pradesh.  Part VI of the Act deals 
with granting licenses to non-State actors for transmission and supply (or distribution). 
373 Amarnath K. Menon, “Andhra Pradesh: Ramming home reforms,” India Today, May 11, 1998, p. 30. 
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anti-globalization, anti-World Bank position became the central thrust of the opposition’s 
political strategy from 1998 to 2004, when the Telegu Desam Party’s ten-year reign came 
to an end.   
By the end of 1998, after the government disaggregated the public utility into 
separate generation, distribution, and transmission companies, and in preparation for 
distribution privatization, the state government began the necessary tariff increases.  
Despite Naidu’s earlier pledges that farm tariffs were unsustainable and must be 
increased, the government’s tariff increases completely bypassed agricultural consumers.  
Instead, the rates increases affected approximately 400,000 domestic consumers who 
used more than a certain quantum of power (protecting the poorest consumers from the 
upward revision), 300,000 commercial consumers, and high tension industrial 
consumers.374  Both of the latter two categories already paid higher tariffs relative to 
other states in India, and much higher tariffs than non-Indian commercial and industrial 
consumers.  And yet, despite Naidu’s earlier position that agricultural subsidies were 
unsustainable, the bulk of the state’s electricity customers, which includes 1.8 million 
farmers, and 6.9 million residences, were completely protected from the changes.   
Instead of increasing the utility’s revenues from farmers by raising their tariffs, 
the government in 1998 launched a campaign to depress agricultural consumption of 
electricity. During the sowing season that came just two months before the tariff revision, 
                                                 
374 “Power tariff hiked for HT, bulk consumers,” The Hindu, December 29, 1998 
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the government started an agricultural extension program to teach farmers about the 
benefits of planting less water-intensive crops than rice.375   
 In response to the tariff increase, the opposition political parties claimed that the 
electricity reforms were already proving to be “anti-people.”376  In fact, Naidu and the 
World Bank had clearly allowed political pragmatism to govern the reforms so far.  The 
tariff increases affected only middle class consumers, industrialists, and small business 
people, who protested the apparent reversal in Naidu’s stance from an earlier 
unwillingness to increase the burden on industry.377 
 Two things inform the government’s allocation of tariff increases: the imminent 
state assembly elections, and the rural protests that had accompanied the last attempt at 
raising farmers’ electricity tariffs.  In 1995, shortly after seizing the chief ministership 
from his father-in-law and founder of the TDP, Naidu raised electricity rates for farmers.  
In response to large-scale protests and opposition from farmers’ groups, the government 
granted a subsidy to the utility so that it could maintain the lower electricity tariffs for 
farmers.  Farmers’ groups had already expressed their opposition to the utility 
restructuring, rightly fearing that the road from restructuring to privatization would 
require that their subsidized access to electricity be severely curtailed if not eliminated.378  
                                                 
375 “Andhra Pradesh move to cut rabi paddy area,” Business Line, October 12, 1998. 
376 “Congress dharna against power rate hike,” The Hindu, January 6, 1999. 
377 The Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chamber of Industries met in February 1999 to publicly urge Naidu 
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378 Meetings of the leaders of several farm organizations, such as the Peddireddy Thimmareddy Farm 
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Rythanga Samakya, were held in October 1997.  The leaders voiced their opposition to privatization, 
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No private company would be willing to purchase a distribution system in which the 
majority of the consumers paid a tariff that was a fraction of production costs.  
The other variable impacting Naidu’s decision was the imminent state assembly 
elections.  For Naidu’s part, his desire to appear “reformist” to international donors and 
sell himself within his state as development-minded required that the government impose 
some tariff increases.379  However, his need to maintain the populist agenda that the TDP 
had become almost synonymous with, required that the tariff increases spare the largest 
part of the population, and most importantly, the rural vote banks.  This was possible 
since the allocation of the tariff increases was subject to the government’s discretion, as 
even the World Bank had agreed that it was not politically feasible to raise rates for 
farmers. 
Electricity politics were likewise a central concern of the main opposition party in 
the state, the Congress.  In the run-up to the assembly elections, the main emphasis of the 
Congress party’s agenda was a promise to reinstate free power for farmers.  However, 
because the rate that farmers were paying was already so low, the promise did not have 
the intended effect.  James Manor has pointed out that another aspect of the 
regionalization of Indian politics—that is a shift in the locus of power and importance to 
the provincial levels—is also reflected in the rhetoric and policies of the two national 
parties, the Congress and the BJP.380  He points out that the state units of the Congress in 
                                                 
379 An India media report on the reasons for the tariff increases reported that a 10% increase in tariffs was 
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particular, come to take on the same political identity as their main regional opponents.  
In the case of Andhra Pradesh, this has meant that the Congress has counterposed the 
populism of the TDP with its own variant of profligate consumption subsidies, as their 
1999 election agenda demonstrates.    
Although there were many other parties in the fray, including the BJP and the 
various communist parties, the 1999 election became a two-way contest between Naidu, 
who projected himself as “development-oriented” and YSR Reddy, the Congress 
politician, whom Naidu protrayed as regressive.  As with the electricity reforms, 
however, Naidu changed policies just enough to comfortably fit the label of a 
“development-minded politician,” but not enough to actually disrupt the system of 
consumption and production subsidies that benefited the majority of the state’s citizenry.  
Naidu’s Telegu Desam Party captured 180 (out of 294 seats) and 43.9% of the vote, as 
again the Congress’s 91 seats and 40.6% votes.  Some would go further in pointing out 
the split between Naidu’s rhetoric of liberalization and practice of continuing a style of 
populist business as usual.381  The international business press proclaimed that Naidu’s 
victory signaled that a new style of business-oriented politics was on the ascendant, a 
statement that belies both an exaggeration of the TDP’s victory (which was only slight), 
and ignorance of the actual state of economic policies under Naidu.382  Many Indian 
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analysts of the elections attribute the TDP’s victory to a combination of Naidu’s populist 
development policies as well as his party’s last minute decision to ally with the BJP.383 
Just months after the election’s end, Naidu held a meeting with his fellow TDP 
legislators about the power sector.  During the meeting, he suggested that tariffs would 
increase, that as politicians it would be their duty to explain the reason for the increases 
to their constituents, and that there would be 15% tariff increases for each of the next 
three years.384  The increase, when it finally came six months later, was much larger than 
any in the political class was prepared for.  By this time, a critical new actor had 
emerged, the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission.  The Commission, 
which came into being in early 1999, took over the tariff-setting responsibilities from the 
utility and the government in late 1999, although the tariff revision of 2000 was the first 
under its sole direction.  APERC raised tariffs fro all classes of consumers, but the rates 
for domestic consumers increased by the largest amount.  Second only to farmers, 
domestic consumers are the most heavily subsidized class of electricity consumers in 
most Indian states, including Andhra Pradesh.  Unlike the tariff increase imposed last 
year, which targeted middle class consumers, this increase affected even the poorest 
consumers.  The average increase was 50%, but this climbed to 81% for those with the 
lowest monthly consumption.  For farmers, the tariff increased to 25 paise per unit (still a 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Something amazing happened in Indian politics….In the large southern state of Andhra Pradesh, the party 
that promised the biggest freebies lost.  And the politician who warned that there’s no free lunch won.” 
Celia W. Dugger, “Surprise in Indian State: politics of promising fails,” New York Times, October 9, 1999. 
383 Rajen Harshe and C. Srinivas, “Vote for Development: How sustainable?” Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 44 (October 30, 1999): 3103-05. 
384 “Power tariff hike on the cards,” The Hindu, November 19, 1999. 
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massive subsidy).385  In giving its rationale for the decision, the APERC explicitly 
claimed that with this new set of increases, the cross-subsidy burden (on account of farm 
subsidies) that had been borne exclusively by industrial and commercial consumers, 
would now be shared by domestic consumers as well.  In public, Naidu claimed to be as 
surprised by the tariff increase as everyone else, but asserted that the government was 
statutorily prevented from interfering in the decision-making of the independent 
regulator.386  The only way the government could mitigate some of the effects of the 
increase was to provide a subsidy to the utility, and thereby shield domestic consumers 
from approximately 50% of the tariff increase.387  
The APERC’s tariff decision, which was implemented by the utility only two 
weeks after it was announced, fomented a long-standing protest led by opposition 
political parties.  The protest was joined by farmers’ organizations as well as civil society 
groups opposed to the World Bank’s involvement in the state, but the primary organizers 
were political actors.388  The agitation against the tariff increases turned into the longest-
standing public protest that was based on an economic issue.389  Among the tactics 
employed by the protestors were staging day-long fasts, surrounding and locking up 
utility staff in regional headquarters and offices, holding rallies and marches, and 
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destroying local utility offices.  The political opposition from the Congress and CPI (M) 
that spearheaded the protests also urged customers to stop paying their bills.  Eventually, 
the sweeping political opposition influenced even Naidu’s fellow legislators and party 
workers in the TDP to oppose the tariff increases.  In several general body meetings of 
the TDP in different districts of the state, power politics dominated the discussion, and 
the Deputy Speaker of the assembly, a TDP legislator named A. Chandrasekhara Rao, 
wrote a public letter urging the chief minister to intervene.  In what became an 
embarrassment to the chief minister, the language of the letter exhorted Naidu to allow 
the common man to at least hold onto his “langot” (underwear).390   
The opposition protests continued for ten weeks, until the assembly re-convened 
in August and the debate was once again focused on the electricity sector.  In the 
assembly, Naidu argued that the government was unable to force the APERC to revise its 
decision, and that the only thing the government could directly do was provide a subsidy 
to offset the costs to consumers.  This the government was already doing for agricultural 
consumers.  In total in 2000-2001, the state government was estimated to pay a subsidy 
of Rs. 1,626 crores (roughly US$ 300 million) to the utility so that it could continue the 
subsides for farmers.  To fully offset the tariff increases for middle class consumers, the 
state government would have to provide an additional subsidy of nearly Rs. 800 crores 
(another US$ 150 million).391  The debate in the assembly lasted for almost a week, led to 
the suspensions of many opposition legislators, displaced assembly debate on other 
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subjects like the state budget, and even led to deaths as police responded with force to a 
demonstration outside of the assembly building.392   
The protest was finally quelled when the chief minister increased the 
government’s subsidy to the utility, which in turn brought down the tariff hike from 20% 
to 14.5%, and presented the agreements that the government had signed with the World 
Bank for the restructuring program to the assembly.393 
In the run-up to the next assembly elections, however, even the modest tariff 
increases for agriculture that Naidu’s government had managed to implement were 
rolled-back in an attempt to appease the numerous farm sector.  Naidu promised to 
deliver nine hours of uninterrupted power supply to all rural areas; the Congress, led 
again by YSR Reddy, trumped this by again promising free power for farmers.394  The 
politics of power played some part in the elections, although many other factors also led 
to Naidu’s defeat.  In a sign of how the Congress party interpreted its electoral victory, 
immediately after the election results were declared, Reddy and his new government 
implemented farmer-friendly policies, including free power and a waiver for unpaid bills.  
As one media outlet reported on it,  
“Minutes after being sworn in Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Dr. Y. S. Rajasekhara 
Reddy signed a file in full public glare to give effect to the Congress-I’s pre-poll promise 
of free power to farmers.  A little over 23 lakh [2,300,000] farm connections will benefit.  
This means an annual outgo of Rs. 436 crore [US$ 86 million] and the one-time waiver 
will leave the exechequer poorer by Rs. 1,192 crore [US$ 238 million].” 
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With this, Andhra Pradesh’s experiment with electricity privatization ended.  The 
World Bank, in its completion report for what had initially been planned as just the first 
tranche of a much larger lending project, noted that “subsidized power supply to 
agriculture is a deeper public policy issue and not a mere sectoral issue” and later, that 
“unless the distribution business becomes viable and commercial risk of power supply to 
agriculture is minimized the successful privatization of the Discoms in the present 
structure would be difficult.”395   
In the end, the Indian politician who was the most vocal advocate of economic 
liberalization was unable to privatize the electricity distribution business, thanks largely 
to a state political economy in which significant developmental resources had been 
extended in earlier periods to provide electricity-based irrigation, and farmers relied on 
expansive input subsidies to generate profits.  More than other cases, Andhra Pradesh 
under Naidu reveals the extent to which a political will to change is insufficient in the 




This case study of Andhra Pradesh rounds out the selection of cases examined in 
the thesis.  In Andhra Pradesh, Chief Minister Naidu, the most ardent advocate of 
economic liberalization, was unable to counter the built-in resistance to privatization 
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posed by extensive rural subsidies.  In the first two cases of the thesis, Orissa and Delhi, 
privatization was achieved with none of the political posturing and maneuverings evident 
in Andhra Pradesh during Naidu’s attempts to privatize his state’s distribution 
infrastructure.  The importance difference is the lack of subsidies for farmers in the cases 
of successful privatization and their robust presence in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra.  
The cases of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra—in which rural subsidies are an important 
part of state-level political economies—are more characteristic of the other large states in 
India, especially those that during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s devoted resources 
to rural development.  The more successful rural developmental states, those that 
implemented Green Revolution technologies to increase agricultural productivity, were 
paradoxically locked into this equation of providing subsidies even when they were 
potentially no longer needed by rural beneficiaries.  A state like Orissa, by contrast, 
skipped over that phase of political economic development that characterized the rest of 
the country during the 1970s and 1980s.  In the absence of the interests that benefited 
from such subsidy policies, Orissa was therefore able to proceed more easily with the 
new agenda of economic liberalization and privatization during the 1990s. 




The larger aim of the World Bank is to implement neoliberal reforms in the agricultural 
sector; it is just using reforms of the electricity sector as a means to achieve this. 
Prabhir Purkayastha396 
 
No reforms that aim to take away from rural India what little it has achieved in terms of 
state benefits – like subsidized power – and transfer these to other sectors or classes like 
industry will be sustainable because they are not politically sustainable. 
Ashok Rao397  
  
 
The previous four chapters discuss the electricity sector policies in four states in 
India, and suggest that differing configurations of what Bardhan calls the “dominant 
proprietary classes”398 in India’s political economy led to differing policy outcomes in the 
four cases during the period from 1991 to 2003.  Orissa and Delhi pursued privatization 
in the absence of the rural beneficiaries of electricity who are locked into India’s 
agriculture’s “subsidy syndrome.”399  Although Maharashtra was considered an ideal 
candidate for the restructuring and privatization that swept across much of the developing 
world (particularly Latin America) throughout the 1990s, the government never seriously 
entertained such policies.  The opponents of privatization were not only politically potent 
but also held the reins of state power in the government and cooperative institutions.  The 
advocates of reform, the industrialists and middle-class consumers, were in a sense 
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neutralized in this debate about utility ownership because the city of Mumbai was already 
served by private companies. In Andhra Pradesh, the state government’s desire to 
stimulate economic development by encouraging investments in industry, manufacturing, 
and services put the state on the reform path from which it was quickly derailed by 
electoral compulsions.  The reformist chief minister, Chandrababu Naidu, was defeated in 
an election that is consistently interpreted to mean that ending populist subsidies is 
political suicide in Andhra Pradesh politics.  The new chief minister’s restoration of free 
power for farmers seems only to underscore such an interpretation.   
The findings of those chapters set up an expectation that privatization or any kind 
of policy that threatens the extensive system of agricultural subsidies benefiting medium 
to large farmers in most states (the exceptions being parts of India like Orissa and Delhi) 
is difficult if not impossible.  It is particularly so in those parts of India where peasant 
movements built on solidarities of caste and community asserted a stake in local power 
structures in earlier decades.  The argument sketches a process of path-dependence: 
thanks to successful developmental policies of extending electricity-based irrigation 
(Green Revolution), coupled with lower caste political mobilization during the 1960s and 
1970s, certain parts of India have become locked into patterns of state ownership even 
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The prospect of electricity policy in India: Punjab as a portent of the future 
 
Political economies are not static.  Just as India’s Green Revolution created a new 
set of agrarian actors with a stake in commanding how state governments allocated scarce 
development resources, the current period of broader economic liberalization is creating 
new actors that may begin to lobby for changing agricultural policies.  As their numbers 
and political influence increase, they may become the critical new actors in pro-reform 
coalitions.  This was brought home to me most sharply during a brief fieldwork foray into 
the north Indian state of Punjab.   
Punjab is the wealthiest state in India by many metrics, including per capita 
income.  More than any state it reaped the advantage of central government allocations to 
implement Green Revolution policies during the 1960s and 1970s.  And more than any 
other group, Punjab’s wheat farmers have disproportionately benefited from India’s 
massive grain procurement program that guarantees minimum prices for grain that is 
meant to be distributed to the poor, but more commonly is fated to rot in government 
warehouses.  Landholdings in Punjab tend to be much larger than in other parts of India, 
and land fragmentation is also much less than anywhere else.  By the 1980s farming was 
profitable enough that a new trend emerged of larger farmers renting land, or “leasing-in” 
plots, from small-farmers.  
 On April 5, 2003, in response to indications that the Punjab government was 
entertaining Orissa-style restructuring and privatization (which ultimately foundered), the 
electricity engineers associations of the Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB) organized 
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a one-day conference in the Punjabi city of Ludhiana on the “Challenges before power 
sector in Punjab.”  The panel was presided over Padamjit Singh, the chief engineer of the 
PSEB.  Among the other panelists were M. S. Bajwa, whose promotion to Superintending 
Engineer of PSEB had been celebrated the evening before; Suresh Gupta, who worked in 
PSEB as an engineer since the 70s and retired in 2003 as the technical member of the 
PSEB; Ajmer Singh Lakhowale, president of the Punjab Bharatiya Kisan Union 
(BKU);400 Manjit Singh, general secretary of the BKU; and J. S. Hara, a man who was 
introduced as a “progressive farmer” and the recipient of several awards for farming.   
 The two leaders of the Punjab BKU, Lakhowale and Singh, stated that the 
proposed electricity sector restructuring and privatization were not acceptable.  Singh 
further complained that the committee that put together the restructuring proposal had not 
consulted a single farmers’ association and yet claimed to have held meetings with 
important stakeholders in the state.  Six months earlier, in October 2002, the Congress 
party’s newly elected state government announced that the free power policy of its 
predecessor government would be terminated.  The response from farmers’ groups was 
immediate.  Within two weeks, several farmers’ associations came together to blockade 
roads and railroads across the state on October 29.  During that agitation, the same 
Lackowale who spoke at the Power Engineer’s conference announced that farmers would 
continue with such grass-roots protest activities, but also that the BKU would protest the 
state government’s decision through litigation.401 
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 In his opening remarks, J. S. Hara, the “progressive farmer” which in the Punjab 
context generally means a larger-landowner who has sufficient capital and the outlook to 
embrace new technologies in farming and new outlets for products, said that he had come 
to the conference prepared to denounce the government’s restructuring proposals, but that 
what he had heard from other panelists had now convinced him to rethink his position.  
He argued that the initial resistance to the entry of private actors in the electricity 
distribution business sounded much to him like the initial outcry against private banks in 
the early 1990s.  The claim then, he said, was that private banks would refuse credit to 
agriculturalists and monopolize state resources.  He argued that this did not happen.  For 
many farmers, especially those like him with good credit and sufficient collateral, the 
entry of private banks had meant greater credit options.  The other panelists’ remarks 
about the electricity sector now sounded to him very similar.  He went on to add that 
India’s accession to the World Trade Organization meant that Indian farmers would have 
access to new markets.  So long as private distribution companies supplied farmers with 
high quality electricity, there should be no opposition among farmers to paying market 
rates.402  
 Later research revealed that Hara was a newsworthy farmer in Punjab.  Two 
decades earlier, a British paper had featured Hara in a news report on the two faces of 
Indian farming:  the small minority of thriving, larger farmers typified by Hara; and the 
vast majority of India’s 500,000 million small landowners who barely reap a subsistence 
from their small plots of land, exemplified by a farmer named Shankar Solaba in northern 
                                                 
402 J. S. Hara spoke in Punjabi, and his remarks were translated for me immediately afterward by Ashok 
Rao and Padamjit Singh, two of the organizers of the conference.  
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Maharashtra.403  Singh’s newspaper profile told of his “swimming pool, large bank 
account” and “ultramodern bungalow” in a village just outside of Ludhiana where with 
the help of mechanization, input intensification, and twenty-five laborers he has been able 
to switch from single-cropping to growing three and in some cases four crops annually on 
his ninety acres.  Decades later, Hara had transformed his 90 acre operation into the Hara 
Seed Farm, and shown himself to be keenly responsive to market signals.  As the profit 
margins of the Basmati variety of rice increased due to the growth of export markets and 
in urban India, Hara shifted from other rice varieties to Basmati cultivation.  During a 
meeting organized by the Punjab government, urged his fellow farmers to do the same.404   
 There are signs that Hara is not alone in Punjab and that the ranks of “progressive 
farmers” may be increasing.  The government meeting at which Hara urged other farmers 
to plant Basmati was meant to showcase the launch of an aggressive contract farming 
scheme that would bring Indian corporate houses into agriculture after decades of being 
excluded.  Various government measures like the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets 
Act, 1961 (which had corollaries in most other states) curtailed who could buy and trade 
agricultural products, limiting the actors to farmers themselves and government 
procurement centers.  In Punjab, this act was amended in 2005 to allow private 
companies to own and operate produce markets, paving the way for corporate forays into 
agriculture either through direct leasing-in of land, or more commonly through contracts 
with individual farmers.  Hara was one such farmer who supplied Basmati rice on a 
                                                 
403 Richard Cowper, “500m Indians work on the land,” The Financial Times (London), May 24, 1982. 
404 “Basmati the best bet for diversification,” The Economic Times, April 28, 2003. 
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contract-basis to the Indian corporate firm Escorts Ltd., who in turn had allied with three 
rice exporters to send the grain abroad.405 
 By 2006, thirteen other states had amended their agricultural produce market acts 
to allow private actors in agriculture, spurring a rash of new corporate initiatives that 
included some of India’s largest corporate houses like Tata and Sons, Reliance Industries, 
and Bharti Enterprises.406  It is still far too early to evaluate the extent or the likely 
outcome of these initiatives, but larger farmers like Hara are the most likely to participate 
as contract farmers.  As these farmers find new markets for their goods that are not 
dependent on government procurement, they may also be among the new voices 
supporting other kinds of economic liberalization, including changes in how inputs like 
electricity are priced and distributed.  Their support for liberalization will be strengthened 
if the new private electricity distributors deliver better quality and more assured supplies 
of electricity. 
When I first heard the two quotes that opened this chapter during interviews, I 
thought they sounded far-fetched as explanations for either the causes of or the resistance 
to electricity sector liberalization, perhaps bordering on the genre of “conspiracy theory.”  
As I later came to understand the central role that the agricultural sector plays in 
electricity sector policies the statements seemed less fanciful, although attributing all of 
the causal weight to the World Bank is still problematic.  As the four case studies 
                                                 
405 “Escorts arm in tie-up for basmati exports – Contract farming initiative takes off with three firms 
signing deal,” Business Line, May 7, 2003. 
406 Irshad Daftari, “Contract farming lures India Inc biggies,” The Economic Times, May 8, 2006. 
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demonstrate, not all privatizing states were World Bank loan recipients (Delhi), and not 
all World Bank recipients were able to restructure and privatize (Andhra Pradesh).   
The critical role of agriculture in the electricity sector, however, does seem to be 
substantiated.  Subsidies to the agricultural sector have been steadily consuming a larger 
share of government spending, particularly of state government expenditure, and are 
routinely cited as the main cause of the states’ deteriorating fiscal positions.  And a wide-
spread ecological crisis is developing as more and more groundwater from subterranean 
pools is exploited by subsidized irrigation pumpsets without adequate time or means 
being given for the reservoirs to recharge.  Finally there is a continuing inequity in who 
benefits from rural electrification; on one side are the medium and large farmers who 
corner the lion’s share of state subsidies, and on the other are the far greater number of 
landless laborers or small farmers who cannot afford the costs of acquiring and 
maintaining electricity connections and pumpsets.  Even if state governments can ally 
with new actors in the farm sector to enact liberalization, privatization of public utilities 
and a shift in the tariff structure alone will not solve the problem of the 400,000 million 
Indians who are still off-grid in India.      
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